Narrative:

On taxiout for takeoff (lax-nrt-mar/xx/95), ground control told us to contact our company. We were informed the aircraft was overweight and we needed to return to the gate to off-load cargo. We checked our awabs (weight and balance) form, it showed we were below our maximum weights. At the gate, ground crews off loaded 6000 pounds of cargo, our new awabs for departure showed 6000 pounds less cargo, but 30 additional passenger in coach (from 120 to 150). Obviously someone had left off 30 passenger on our original awabs for dispatch. This could have been serious in an abort situation or engine failure on takeoff. We were at our maximum takeoff weight. Our crew procedures do not address anyway of verifying our passenger count with gate personnel. The awabs is brought on board just before push back, and everyone is rushed to get the aircraft out on time. We, (as pilots) assume the data on the awabs is correct. Possible correction of problem: anytime the aircraft is in a critical takeoff situation, the pilot crew should take the time to verify passenger count with the flight attendants, and verify the cargo load with ramp tower. This should be a checklist item. No procedure exists at this time to avoid a reoccurrence of this problem. Also on this flight, a false fuel slip was generated after the flight was topped off at the gate. The captain requested a fuel slip, but the ground personnel generated a hand written copy of the first one. No data as to how much fuel was added was ever documented. This is wrong.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR TAXIS OUT FOR TKOF WITH 30 MORE PAX THAN SHOWN ON WT AND BAL AND IS AT MAX GROSS WT.

Narrative: ON TAXIOUT FOR TKOF (LAX-NRT-MAR/XX/95), GND CTL TOLD US TO CONTACT OUR COMPANY. WE WERE INFORMED THE ACFT WAS OVERWT AND WE NEEDED TO RETURN TO THE GATE TO OFF-LOAD CARGO. WE CHKED OUR AWABS (WT AND BAL) FORM, IT SHOWED WE WERE BELOW OUR MAX WTS. AT THE GATE, GND CREWS OFF LOADED 6000 LBS OF CARGO, OUR NEW AWABS FOR DEP SHOWED 6000 LBS LESS CARGO, BUT 30 ADDITIONAL PAX IN COACH (FROM 120 TO 150). OBVIOUSLY SOMEONE HAD LEFT OFF 30 PAX ON OUR ORIGINAL AWABS FOR DISPATCH. THIS COULD HAVE BEEN SERIOUS IN AN ABORT SIT OR ENG FAILURE ON TKOF. WE WERE AT OUR MAX TKOF WT. OUR CREW PROCS DO NOT ADDRESS ANYWAY OF VERIFYING OUR PAX COUNT WITH GATE PERSONNEL. THE AWABS IS BROUGHT ON BOARD JUST BEFORE PUSH BACK, AND EVERYONE IS RUSHED TO GET THE ACFT OUT ON TIME. WE, (AS PLTS) ASSUME THE DATA ON THE AWABS IS CORRECT. POSSIBLE CORRECTION OF PROB: ANYTIME THE ACFT IS IN A CRITICAL TKOF SIT, THE PLT CREW SHOULD TAKE THE TIME TO VERIFY PAX COUNT WITH THE FLT ATTENDANTS, AND VERIFY THE CARGO LOAD WITH RAMP TWR. THIS SHOULD BE A CHKLIST ITEM. NO PROC EXISTS AT THIS TIME TO AVOID A REOCCURRENCE OF THIS PROB. ALSO ON THIS FLT, A FALSE FUEL SLIP WAS GENERATED AFTER THE FLT WAS TOPPED OFF AT THE GATE. THE CAPT REQUESTED A FUEL SLIP, BUT THE GND PERSONNEL GENERATED A HAND WRITTEN COPY OF THE FIRST ONE. NO DATA AS TO HOW MUCH FUEL WAS ADDED WAS EVER DOCUMENTED. THIS IS WRONG.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.