Narrative:

We landed at dfw airport with the wrong frequency selected on the radio. I was the first officer and the PF, the captain was the PNF. The oversight occurred on final approach as we configured the aircraft. The approach controller cleared us for the visual approach to runway 36L and instructed us to maintain 170 KTS to the OM. The frequency was very congested, as it virtually always is when you fly into dfw and the approach controller seemed very busy. At the OM, with the aircraft already configured with 15 degrees of flaps, I called for the gear down, 20 degrees of flaps and the landing checklist. As the flaps extended to 20 degrees, the autoplt (I was flying a coupled approach) disengaged itself. I immediately took control of the aircraft and continued the approach. The disengagement of the autoplt and the close proximity of the aircraft to the ground focused my attention completely to the task at hand -- to land the aircraft safely. After landing the aircraft safely, and clearing the runway, the captain called for the after landing checklist, which I performed. After the checklist was completed I noticed that the radio seemed very quiet so I looked and found that the approach frequency was selected on the radio. This, of course, meant that the tower frequency was never selected after the disengagement of the autoplt. As I looked up to inform the captain, he had also realized the oversight. I immediately selected the appropriate frequency and checked in with the tower. The controller issued the taxi clearance and we taxied to the ramp. Looking back on the incident, and after discussing it with the captain, it is clear that neither myself nor the captain heard the approach controller's handoff. It was our responsibility to question the controller and to ensure that the correct frequency was selected. In this instance, the fact that we as a crew were concentrating on the problem at hand resulted in narrowing our attention to landing the aircraft safely and contributed to the oversight.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: UNAUTH LNDG. THE FLC WERE DISTR BY THE AUTOPLT DISENGAGING AND FORGOT TO SWITCH TO TWR FREQ FOR LNDG.

Narrative: WE LANDED AT DFW ARPT WITH THE WRONG FREQ SELECTED ON THE RADIO. I WAS THE FO AND THE PF, THE CAPT WAS THE PNF. THE OVERSIGHT OCCURRED ON FINAL APCH AS WE CONFIGURED THE ACFT. THE APCH CTLR CLRED US FOR THE VISUAL APCH TO RWY 36L AND INSTRUCTED US TO MAINTAIN 170 KTS TO THE OM. THE FREQ WAS VERY CONGESTED, AS IT VIRTUALLY ALWAYS IS WHEN YOU FLY INTO DFW AND THE APCH CTLR SEEMED VERY BUSY. AT THE OM, WITH THE ACFT ALREADY CONFIGURED WITH 15 DEGS OF FLAPS, I CALLED FOR THE GEAR DOWN, 20 DEGS OF FLAPS AND THE LNDG CHKLIST. AS THE FLAPS EXTENDED TO 20 DEGS, THE AUTOPLT (I WAS FLYING A COUPLED APCH) DISENGAGED ITSELF. I IMMEDIATELY TOOK CTL OF THE ACFT AND CONTINUED THE APCH. THE DISENGAGEMENT OF THE AUTOPLT AND THE CLOSE PROX OF THE ACFT TO THE GND FOCUSED MY ATTN COMPLETELY TO THE TASK AT HAND -- TO LAND THE ACFT SAFELY. AFTER LNDG THE ACFT SAFELY, AND CLRING THE RWY, THE CAPT CALLED FOR THE AFTER LNDG CHKLIST, WHICH I PERFORMED. AFTER THE CHKLIST WAS COMPLETED I NOTICED THAT THE RADIO SEEMED VERY QUIET SO I LOOKED AND FOUND THAT THE APCH FREQ WAS SELECTED ON THE RADIO. THIS, OF COURSE, MEANT THAT THE TWR FREQ WAS NEVER SELECTED AFTER THE DISENGAGEMENT OF THE AUTOPLT. AS I LOOKED UP TO INFORM THE CAPT, HE HAD ALSO REALIZED THE OVERSIGHT. I IMMEDIATELY SELECTED THE APPROPRIATE FREQ AND CHKED IN WITH THE TWR. THE CTLR ISSUED THE TAXI CLRNC AND WE TAXIED TO THE RAMP. LOOKING BACK ON THE INCIDENT, AND AFTER DISCUSSING IT WITH THE CAPT, IT IS CLR THAT NEITHER MYSELF NOR THE CAPT HEARD THE APCH CTLR'S HDOF. IT WAS OUR RESPONSIBILITY TO QUESTION THE CTLR AND TO ENSURE THAT THE CORRECT FREQ WAS SELECTED. IN THIS INSTANCE, THE FACT THAT WE AS A CREW WERE CONCENTRATING ON THE PROB AT HAND RESULTED IN NARROWING OUR ATTN TO LNDG THE ACFT SAFELY AND CONTRIBUTED TO THE OVERSIGHT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.