Narrative:

Landing clearance was not received prior to landing on runway 35R at den. We had been told to expect runway 35L ILS. That was changed to runway 35R after we had briefed the approach. We were also behind schedule and the flight duration was short (30 mins). It was also the second to last leg of our 14.5 hour 8 leg day. WX was bad all over. I had just been the PF on an approach to minimums in cys and we had to deice and help with baggage. Also, on takeoff out of cys, with the first officer flying, I had to take the controls because he was going to bust an altitude. For some reason he was having trouble with pitch control. I gave him back the controls and then noticed he had set the wrong VOR frequency in the active navigation radio. After channelizing the correct frequency and giving back the controls and ensuring everything was under control and we were established on course I resumed my duties as the PNF. At this point I had lost all confidence in the abilities of my co-pilot. ATC was vectoring us on right downwind with an expect visual to runway 35R. I had the co-pilot guard communication #1 while I called company on #2. When I came back we were on right base and had just broken out of the clouds with runway 35R in sight. The altitude alert was going off and co-pilot was descending through the assigned altitude and saying something I didn't catch to ATC. I said, 'did you call a visual?' he said, 'no.' I said, 'what is your altitude.' he started to pull up and I called the visual. ATC cleared us for the visual and told us to contact tower. The co-pilot said, 'he asked me to report the altitude when we broke out.' an explanation of what was going on when I got back on #1 communication. I was considering this and monitoring the co-pilot's approach. I didn't contact tower. There was a crosswind from the right and as the co-pilot lined up on centerline I noticed that the inclinometer was showing one full ball to the right, and we still had about 500 ft to go. I was considering bringing up the inclinometer, but started thinking about the relationship between the crosswind and rudder control in a slip. It wasn't a big problem so I just monitored the landing with a little anxiety. It was an uneventful landing and as we exited the runway I reached to communication #1 to transfer the ground frequency (I normally put the ground frequency in the standby window after receiving landing clearance) and noted that the approach frequency was still in the communication #1 active, indicating that we had never received landing clearance. I then contacted tower and told them we were clear of the runway. Tower handed us off to ground and nothing more was said. I would say that fatigue had dulled my senses at bit, also, I was certainly focused on the co-pilot's performance which caused me to ignore my own duties as the PNF. As a corrective action, situational awareness could be practiced or thought of like an instrument scan. Anytime you become focused on one aspect of the flight, it is time for a xchk.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A COMMUTER FLC LANDED WITHOUT A LNDG CLRNC. THE PNF DISCOVERED THE ERROR WHILE SELECTING THE GND CTL FREQ, AFTER LNDG. THE RPTR CITES FATIGUE FROM WX RELATED WORKLOAD, FO'S POOR FLYING TECHNIQUE AND DISTR WITH XWIND APCH. UNAUTH LNDG.

Narrative: LNDG CLRNC WAS NOT RECEIVED PRIOR TO LNDG ON RWY 35R AT DEN. WE HAD BEEN TOLD TO EXPECT RWY 35L ILS. THAT WAS CHANGED TO RWY 35R AFTER WE HAD BRIEFED THE APCH. WE WERE ALSO BEHIND SCHEDULE AND THE FLT DURATION WAS SHORT (30 MINS). IT WAS ALSO THE SECOND TO LAST LEG OF OUR 14.5 HR 8 LEG DAY. WX WAS BAD ALL OVER. I HAD JUST BEEN THE PF ON AN APCH TO MINIMUMS IN CYS AND WE HAD TO DEICE AND HELP WITH BAGGAGE. ALSO, ON TKOF OUT OF CYS, WITH THE FO FLYING, I HAD TO TAKE THE CTLS BECAUSE HE WAS GOING TO BUST AN ALT. FOR SOME REASON HE WAS HAVING TROUBLE WITH PITCH CTL. I GAVE HIM BACK THE CTLS AND THEN NOTICED HE HAD SET THE WRONG VOR FREQ IN THE ACTIVE NAV RADIO. AFTER CHANNELIZING THE CORRECT FREQ AND GIVING BACK THE CTLS AND ENSURING EVERYTHING WAS UNDER CTL AND WE WERE ESTABLISHED ON COURSE I RESUMED MY DUTIES AS THE PNF. AT THIS POINT I HAD LOST ALL CONFIDENCE IN THE ABILITIES OF MY CO-PLT. ATC WAS VECTORING US ON R DOWNWIND WITH AN EXPECT VISUAL TO RWY 35R. I HAD THE CO-PLT GUARD COM #1 WHILE I CALLED COMPANY ON #2. WHEN I CAME BACK WE WERE ON R BASE AND HAD JUST BROKEN OUT OF THE CLOUDS WITH RWY 35R IN SIGHT. THE ALT ALERT WAS GOING OFF AND CO-PLT WAS DSNDING THROUGH THE ASSIGNED ALT AND SAYING SOMETHING I DIDN'T CATCH TO ATC. I SAID, 'DID YOU CALL A VISUAL?' HE SAID, 'NO.' I SAID, 'WHAT IS YOUR ALT.' HE STARTED TO PULL UP AND I CALLED THE VISUAL. ATC CLRED US FOR THE VISUAL AND TOLD US TO CONTACT TWR. THE CO-PLT SAID, 'HE ASKED ME TO RPT THE ALT WHEN WE BROKE OUT.' AN EXPLANATION OF WHAT WAS GOING ON WHEN I GOT BACK ON #1 COM. I WAS CONSIDERING THIS AND MONITORING THE CO-PLT'S APCH. I DIDN'T CONTACT TWR. THERE WAS A XWIND FROM THE R AND AS THE CO-PLT LINED UP ON CTRLINE I NOTICED THAT THE INCLINOMETER WAS SHOWING ONE FULL BALL TO THE R, AND WE STILL HAD ABOUT 500 FT TO GO. I WAS CONSIDERING BRINGING UP THE INCLINOMETER, BUT STARTED THINKING ABOUT THE RELATIONSHIP BTWN THE XWIND AND RUDDER CTL IN A SLIP. IT WASN'T A BIG PROB SO I JUST MONITORED THE LNDG WITH A LITTLE ANXIETY. IT WAS AN UNEVENTFUL LNDG AND AS WE EXITED THE RWY I REACHED TO COM #1 TO TRANSFER THE GND FREQ (I NORMALLY PUT THE GND FREQ IN THE STANDBY WINDOW AFTER RECEIVING LNDG CLRNC) AND NOTED THAT THE APCH FREQ WAS STILL IN THE COM #1 ACTIVE, INDICATING THAT WE HAD NEVER RECEIVED LNDG CLRNC. I THEN CONTACTED TWR AND TOLD THEM WE WERE CLR OF THE RWY. TWR HANDED US OFF TO GND AND NOTHING MORE WAS SAID. I WOULD SAY THAT FATIGUE HAD DULLED MY SENSES AT BIT, ALSO, I WAS CERTAINLY FOCUSED ON THE CO-PLT'S PERFORMANCE WHICH CAUSED ME TO IGNORE MY OWN DUTIES AS THE PNF. AS A CORRECTIVE ACTION, SITUATIONAL AWARENESS COULD BE PRACTICED OR THOUGHT OF LIKE AN INST SCAN. ANYTIME YOU BECOME FOCUSED ON ONE ASPECT OF THE FLT, IT IS TIME FOR A XCHK.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.