Narrative:

Aircraft was assigned climb to FL310. Autoplt was in use with flight director set for heading and altitude select with vertical speed selected. At FL300 PF was given call out of 1000 ft to level and responded with the same. At approximately 300 ft to level altitude capture engaged. PNF looked away for other cockpit duties when altitude reminder went off again indicating 300 ft high. PF disengaged autoplt and leveled off 500 ft high and was returning to altitude when reassigned FL320. If autoplt trim wheel (that will select vertical speed rate or IAS change) is moved after altitude capture is engaged it will remove altitude capture. PF was not sure if he moved the trim wheel after altitude capture was engaged. PNF had seen this selected at 300 ft approximately before level off, however, it was not selected when 300 ft high. PF thought autoplt failed to capture because of failure to trim properly. This is common on the CE560 for the autoplt not to trim properly because of the backlash in the trim PNF has noted this in 3 different CE560's that the trim has a spongy feel, this has been reported and confirmed it is normal. PNF should have monitored PF and autoplt until altitude hold was captured. PF should have monitored more closely. I know why the last 1000 ft of altitude in climb or descent at maximum of 500 FPM was removed from aim, but an amendment to this would have been better to help assure altitude captures. I don't think the feature of the autoplt flight director where the autoplt trim wheel removes the altitude capture or hold is conductive to flight safety. The CE560 would benefit from a trim improvement. How long will it take for cockpit resource management for required crew's in high performance aircraft to become mandatory, just like the 12 month check. Ultimate safety will result with crewmembers trained to standardize monitoring and control of aircraft.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CPR LTT JET OVERSHOOTS ASSIGNED ALT ON CLB.

Narrative: ACFT WAS ASSIGNED CLB TO FL310. AUTOPLT WAS IN USE WITH FLT DIRECTOR SET FOR HDG AND ALT SELECT WITH VERT SPD SELECTED. AT FL300 PF WAS GIVEN CALL OUT OF 1000 FT TO LEVEL AND RESPONDED WITH THE SAME. AT APPROX 300 FT TO LEVEL ALT CAPTURE ENGAGED. PNF LOOKED AWAY FOR OTHER COCKPIT DUTIES WHEN ALT REMINDER WENT OFF AGAIN INDICATING 300 FT HIGH. PF DISENGAGED AUTOPLT AND LEVELED OFF 500 FT HIGH AND WAS RETURNING TO ALT WHEN REASSIGNED FL320. IF AUTOPLT TRIM WHEEL (THAT WILL SELECT VERT SPD RATE OR IAS CHANGE) IS MOVED AFTER ALT CAPTURE IS ENGAGED IT WILL REMOVE ALT CAPTURE. PF WAS NOT SURE IF HE MOVED THE TRIM WHEEL AFTER ALT CAPTURE WAS ENGAGED. PNF HAD SEEN THIS SELECTED AT 300 FT APPROX BEFORE LEVEL OFF, HOWEVER, IT WAS NOT SELECTED WHEN 300 FT HIGH. PF THOUGHT AUTOPLT FAILED TO CAPTURE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO TRIM PROPERLY. THIS IS COMMON ON THE CE560 FOR THE AUTOPLT NOT TO TRIM PROPERLY BECAUSE OF THE BACKLASH IN THE TRIM PNF HAS NOTED THIS IN 3 DIFFERENT CE560'S THAT THE TRIM HAS A SPONGY FEEL, THIS HAS BEEN RPTED AND CONFIRMED IT IS NORMAL. PNF SHOULD HAVE MONITORED PF AND AUTOPLT UNTIL ALT HOLD WAS CAPTURED. PF SHOULD HAVE MONITORED MORE CLOSELY. I KNOW WHY THE LAST 1000 FT OF ALT IN CLB OR DSCNT AT MAX OF 500 FPM WAS REMOVED FROM AIM, BUT AN AMENDMENT TO THIS WOULD HAVE BEEN BETTER TO HELP ASSURE ALT CAPTURES. I DON'T THINK THE FEATURE OF THE AUTOPLT FLT DIRECTOR WHERE THE AUTOPLT TRIM WHEEL REMOVES THE ALT CAPTURE OR HOLD IS CONDUCTIVE TO FLT SAFETY. THE CE560 WOULD BENEFIT FROM A TRIM IMPROVEMENT. HOW LONG WILL IT TAKE FOR COCKPIT RESOURCE MGMNT FOR REQUIRED CREW'S IN HIGH PERFORMANCE ACFT TO BECOME MANDATORY, JUST LIKE THE 12 MONTH CHK. ULTIMATE SAFETY WILL RESULT WITH CREWMEMBERS TRAINED TO STANDARDIZE MONITORING AND CTL OF ACFT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.