Narrative:

On the inbound flight the #2 engine electronic control fault light came on and would not reset. We then informed maintenance of the problem. On arrival in dfw maintenance deferred the #2 engine electronic control. Our review of the MEL 73-6 was not as thorough as it should have been. We did note and complied with the 17000 ft altitude restr, but failed to note a reference to airport facility manual 7.02.07 which limits the takeoff weight. Close inspection of airport facility manual 7.02.07 reveals the automatic takeoff power control system must be switched off for takeoff resulting in a weight penalty. This restr is not readily apparent from reading the MEL. Also, our dispatch release did not contain this weight restr as is required. This incident could have been prevented by a statement in the MEL warning of restrs with a deferred engine electronic control. Also, a more concertive effort on the part of dispatch to include the required information on the dispatch release would have certainly prevented this incident.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MEL REQUIREMENT. THE CREW KNEW THAT THE ENG ELECTRONIC CTL WAS OUT. WHAT THEY DID NOT KNOW IS THAT THIS CONDITION LIMITS THEIR GROSS WT FOR TKOF.

Narrative: ON THE INBOUND FLT THE #2 ENG ELECTRONIC CTL FAULT LIGHT CAME ON AND WOULD NOT RESET. WE THEN INFORMED MAINT OF THE PROB. ON ARR IN DFW MAINT DEFERRED THE #2 ENG ELECTRONIC CTL. OUR REVIEW OF THE MEL 73-6 WAS NOT AS THOROUGH AS IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN. WE DID NOTE AND COMPLIED WITH THE 17000 FT ALT RESTR, BUT FAILED TO NOTE A REF TO ARPT FACILITY MANUAL 7.02.07 WHICH LIMITS THE TKOF WT. CLOSE INSPECTION OF ARPT FACILITY MANUAL 7.02.07 REVEALS THE AUTOMATIC TKOF PWR CTL SYS MUST BE SWITCHED OFF FOR TKOF RESULTING IN A WT PENALTY. THIS RESTR IS NOT READILY APPARENT FROM READING THE MEL. ALSO, OUR DISPATCH RELEASE DID NOT CONTAIN THIS WT RESTR AS IS REQUIRED. THIS INCIDENT COULD HAVE BEEN PREVENTED BY A STATEMENT IN THE MEL WARNING OF RESTRS WITH A DEFERRED ENG ELECTRONIC CTL. ALSO, A MORE CONCERTIVE EFFORT ON THE PART OF DISPATCH TO INCLUDE THE REQUIRED INFO ON THE DISPATCH RELEASE WOULD HAVE CERTAINLY PREVENTED THIS INCIDENT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.