Narrative:

We were relocating the aircraft from fll to fxe, a 5 mins flight in VFR conditions. The copilot was flying the airplane, as we approached fxe, the tower asked us if we would like runway 13 which is a shorter runway than runway 8, which we were setting up for. I turned that down and we continued in for runway 8. The tower asked us to keep it in close due to a plane on long final. Then on base tower asked if we could make a short landing, preferable hold short of the crossing runway 13. At this point I took over control of the aircraft and continued on approach. The copilot was reading out reference speeds on final. On the callout 'reference minus 10' the airplane touched down hard on the right side, followed by a normal touchdown on the left side. After touchdown the plane yawed to the right and I realized we had blown the main tires on the right side. I counteracted with left reverse and nosegear-steering to keep the plane on the runway. After clearing the runway, I shut down the engines, and the mechanics came out to change the tires. That was when we realized there had also been some damage to the right landing gear support. A right crosswind at the time of landing is the reason the right gear took the full impact of the hard landing. Contributing factors are that the decision of taking over the control was done at a late stage in the approach, so there was not a lot of time to set myself up for the landing. The incident occurred after a 12 hour duty day, so fatigue was very likely a factor. The situation could probably have been avoided by refusing the short landing and instead make a go around and reenter the traffic pattern again to give myself better time. Supplemental information from acn 302462: I am a new first officer on a metropolitan III. Although I feel fully capable of flying the aircraft in the environment of a 135 operation, I am still learning the different capabilities of this new aircraft. For this reason I find myself having to be reliant on the decision of the captain in many instances as I learn what to do in sits not presented to me in training. For instance on all of the 5 flts I have had so far the capts have been able to accept clrncs which required flying skills not presented or required by normal approachs. In each case this expedited traffic flow and eased the many times heavy burden placed on the controllers. Unfortunately it was this desire to accommodate a controller's needs that played a large factor in the following event. Just as we turned base for runway 8 the controller advised us that he intended to have the mu 2 traffic behind us land on the intersecting runway 13 and asked us if we would be able to hold short of the intersection. When the captain replied affirmative, I prepared to relinquish the control of the aircraft as this was beyond my abilities. As if reading my mind the captain called out 'my airplane, my trim.' we then received landing clearance and I called out our final check confirming gear down landing clearance etc. My concentration then was directed to the airspeed indicator to call out the reference speeds to the captain. We held reference speed down most of the final and as we approached the approach light system the speed dropped down to minus 5 reference and then as we touched down I called out minus 10 reference. It is my estimation that the captain in trying to make a short field landing, touched the gear down before the pavement. However, on inspection of the lights, all were intact, proving neither that we had or had not touched down before the runway. In any case, it is evident to me that our concern with both assisting the controller and our desire to arrive home quickly, caused us to make a poor decision. I am not sure if I had expressed my concern when the situation first arose if the captain would have made a different decision, however in hindsight I wish I had. In regards to expressing concerns of ability, it is foolish and tempting to keep quite. In the future I would express my concern with accepting a clearance that made me feel uncomfortable.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: SA227 SUFFERS GEAR DAMAGE AFTER HAVING EXPERIENCED A HARD LNDG AT THE HANDS OF THE PIC. PLT DEV.

Narrative: WE WERE RELOCATING THE ACFT FROM FLL TO FXE, A 5 MINS FLT IN VFR CONDITIONS. THE COPLT WAS FLYING THE AIRPLANE, AS WE APCHED FXE, THE TWR ASKED US IF WE WOULD LIKE RWY 13 WHICH IS A SHORTER RWY THAN RWY 8, WHICH WE WERE SETTING UP FOR. I TURNED THAT DOWN AND WE CONTINUED IN FOR RWY 8. THE TWR ASKED US TO KEEP IT IN CLOSE DUE TO A PLANE ON LONG FINAL. THEN ON BASE TWR ASKED IF WE COULD MAKE A SHORT LNDG, PREFERABLE HOLD SHORT OF THE XING RWY 13. AT THIS POINT I TOOK OVER CTL OF THE ACFT AND CONTINUED ON APCH. THE COPLT WAS READING OUT REF SPDS ON FINAL. ON THE CALLOUT 'REF MINUS 10' THE AIRPLANE TOUCHED DOWN HARD ON THE R SIDE, FOLLOWED BY A NORMAL TOUCHDOWN ON THE L SIDE. AFTER TOUCHDOWN THE PLANE YAWED TO THE R AND I REALIZED WE HAD BLOWN THE MAIN TIRES ON THE R SIDE. I COUNTERACTED WITH L REVERSE AND NOSEGEAR-STEERING TO KEEP THE PLANE ON THE RWY. AFTER CLRING THE RWY, I SHUT DOWN THE ENGS, AND THE MECHS CAME OUT TO CHANGE THE TIRES. THAT WAS WHEN WE REALIZED THERE HAD ALSO BEEN SOME DAMAGE TO THE R LNDG GEAR SUPPORT. A R XWIND AT THE TIME OF LNDG IS THE REASON THE R GEAR TOOK THE FULL IMPACT OF THE HARD LNDG. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS ARE THAT THE DECISION OF TAKING OVER THE CTL WAS DONE AT A LATE STAGE IN THE APCH, SO THERE WAS NOT A LOT OF TIME TO SET MYSELF UP FOR THE LNDG. THE INCIDENT OCCURRED AFTER A 12 HR DUTY DAY, SO FATIGUE WAS VERY LIKELY A FACTOR. THE SIT COULD PROBABLY HAVE BEEN AVOIDED BY REFUSING THE SHORT LNDG AND INSTEAD MAKE A GAR AND REENTER THE TFC PATTERN AGAIN TO GIVE MYSELF BETTER TIME. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 302462: I AM A NEW FO ON A METRO III. ALTHOUGH I FEEL FULLY CAPABLE OF FLYING THE ACFT IN THE ENVIRONMENT OF A 135 OP, I AM STILL LEARNING THE DIFFERENT CAPABILITIES OF THIS NEW ACFT. FOR THIS REASON I FIND MYSELF HAVING TO BE RELIANT ON THE DECISION OF THE CAPT IN MANY INSTANCES AS I LEARN WHAT TO DO IN SITS NOT PRESENTED TO ME IN TRAINING. FOR INSTANCE ON ALL OF THE 5 FLTS I HAVE HAD SO FAR THE CAPTS HAVE BEEN ABLE TO ACCEPT CLRNCS WHICH REQUIRED FLYING SKILLS NOT PRESENTED OR REQUIRED BY NORMAL APCHS. IN EACH CASE THIS EXPEDITED TFC FLOW AND EASED THE MANY TIMES HVY BURDEN PLACED ON THE CTLRS. UNFORTUNATELY IT WAS THIS DESIRE TO ACCOMMODATE A CTLR'S NEEDS THAT PLAYED A LARGE FACTOR IN THE FOLLOWING EVENT. JUST AS WE TURNED BASE FOR RWY 8 THE CTLR ADVISED US THAT HE INTENDED TO HAVE THE MU 2 TFC BEHIND US LAND ON THE INTERSECTING RWY 13 AND ASKED US IF WE WOULD BE ABLE TO HOLD SHORT OF THE INTXN. WHEN THE CAPT REPLIED AFFIRMATIVE, I PREPARED TO RELINQUISH THE CTL OF THE ACFT AS THIS WAS BEYOND MY ABILITIES. AS IF READING MY MIND THE CAPT CALLED OUT 'MY AIRPLANE, MY TRIM.' WE THEN RECEIVED LNDG CLRNC AND I CALLED OUT OUR FINAL CHK CONFIRMING GEAR DOWN LNDG CLRNC ETC. MY CONCENTRATION THEN WAS DIRECTED TO THE AIRSPD INDICATOR TO CALL OUT THE REF SPDS TO THE CAPT. WE HELD REF SPD DOWN MOST OF THE FINAL AND AS WE APCHED THE APCH LIGHT SYS THE SPD DROPPED DOWN TO MINUS 5 REF AND THEN AS WE TOUCHED DOWN I CALLED OUT MINUS 10 REF. IT IS MY ESTIMATION THAT THE CAPT IN TRYING TO MAKE A SHORT FIELD LNDG, TOUCHED THE GEAR DOWN BEFORE THE PAVEMENT. HOWEVER, ON INSPECTION OF THE LIGHTS, ALL WERE INTACT, PROVING NEITHER THAT WE HAD OR HAD NOT TOUCHED DOWN BEFORE THE RWY. IN ANY CASE, IT IS EVIDENT TO ME THAT OUR CONCERN WITH BOTH ASSISTING THE CTLR AND OUR DESIRE TO ARRIVE HOME QUICKLY, CAUSED US TO MAKE A POOR DECISION. I AM NOT SURE IF I HAD EXPRESSED MY CONCERN WHEN THE SIT FIRST AROSE IF THE CAPT WOULD HAVE MADE A DIFFERENT DECISION, HOWEVER IN HINDSIGHT I WISH I HAD. IN REGARDS TO EXPRESSING CONCERNS OF ABILITY, IT IS FOOLISH AND TEMPTING TO KEEP QUITE. IN THE FUTURE I WOULD EXPRESS MY CONCERN WITH ACCEPTING A CLRNC THAT MADE ME FEEL UNCOMFORTABLE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.