Narrative:

We were VMC at all times. Bay approach cleared us from 9000- 7000 ft and airspeed assigned to 210 KTS and intercept the route of a charted visual approach for runway 28R. The controller handed-us off to final controller. When we checked-in, the controller asked us to report a B-737 above us, 12 O'clock, 4 mi, and the airport. We reported both in sight and were immediately cleared for a visual approach to runway 28L the B-737 was on a visual approach to runway 28R. The controller told us to pick-up our airspeed to 230 KTS if able, to 'pair-up' with the B-737. He sounded as though faster would be better due to following traffic. We said we can do 250 KTS if needed. He sounded relieved as we accelerated and was assigned 250 KTS to FAF. We only reached 230 KTS at approximately 3 mi in parallel trail. I told the first officer to not pass the B-737. We were handed-off to tower at approximately 7-8 mi out and were cleared to land. At 2 mi in parallel trail I again told first officer to not pass the B-737. Each time he acknowledged. The b- 737 seemed to be slowing as were we, however the closure rate appeared to be increasing. I asked the first officer if he was going to slow further and not pass and he said yes. We were configuring for landing and checklist and tower asked for 150 KTS for space for departures. We did so with no difficulty. I could not see the B-737 on the right any longer so I said to the first officer 'do you still have the B-737' since we are now passing. He said that we passed him and can't see him. At this time it was too late to argue. No real conflict that required evasive action. After we parked, I asked the first officer, why he passed the B-737 as there are numerous memos out concerning lateral separation and passing of aircraft on the visual approach. He said he knew that, but thought I said 'to pass' the aircraft. He said he was tired from previous day. I feel it wasn't that he was tired, because he appeared alert at all times. His headset is a type that does not suppress noise and the noise in cockpit may have not allowed him to hear 'not' and he may have anticipated that he was to pass for whatever reason and it stuck in his head. I should have taken the aircraft away from him when 2 mi in parallel trail, in hindsight, however, every first officer that I have flown with, that was in the same locations and sits has not performed in the same manner.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLC DOES NOT COMPLY WITH PUBLISHED VISUAL APCH RESTRS.

Narrative: WE WERE VMC AT ALL TIMES. BAY APCH CLRED US FROM 9000- 7000 FT AND AIRSPD ASSIGNED TO 210 KTS AND INTERCEPT THE RTE OF A CHARTED VISUAL APCH FOR RWY 28R. THE CTLR HANDED-US OFF TO FINAL CTLR. WHEN WE CHKED-IN, THE CTLR ASKED US TO RPT A B-737 ABOVE US, 12 O'CLOCK, 4 MI, AND THE ARPT. WE RPTED BOTH IN SIGHT AND WERE IMMEDIATELY CLRED FOR A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 28L THE B-737 WAS ON A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 28R. THE CTLR TOLD US TO PICK-UP OUR AIRSPD TO 230 KTS IF ABLE, TO 'PAIR-UP' WITH THE B-737. HE SOUNDED AS THOUGH FASTER WOULD BE BETTER DUE TO FOLLOWING TFC. WE SAID WE CAN DO 250 KTS IF NEEDED. HE SOUNDED RELIEVED AS WE ACCELERATED AND WAS ASSIGNED 250 KTS TO FAF. WE ONLY REACHED 230 KTS AT APPROX 3 MI IN PARALLEL TRAIL. I TOLD THE FO TO NOT PASS THE B-737. WE WERE HANDED-OFF TO TWR AT APPROX 7-8 MI OUT AND WERE CLRED TO LAND. AT 2 MI IN PARALLEL TRAIL I AGAIN TOLD FO TO NOT PASS THE B-737. EACH TIME HE ACKNOWLEDGED. THE B- 737 SEEMED TO BE SLOWING AS WERE WE, HOWEVER THE CLOSURE RATE APPEARED TO BE INCREASING. I ASKED THE FO IF HE WAS GOING TO SLOW FURTHER AND NOT PASS AND HE SAID YES. WE WERE CONFIGURING FOR LNDG AND CHKLIST AND TWR ASKED FOR 150 KTS FOR SPACE FOR DEPS. WE DID SO WITH NO DIFFICULTY. I COULD NOT SEE THE B-737 ON THE R ANY LONGER SO I SAID TO THE FO 'DO YOU STILL HAVE THE B-737' SINCE WE ARE NOW PASSING. HE SAID THAT WE PASSED HIM AND CAN'T SEE HIM. AT THIS TIME IT WAS TOO LATE TO ARGUE. NO REAL CONFLICT THAT REQUIRED EVASIVE ACTION. AFTER WE PARKED, I ASKED THE FO, WHY HE PASSED THE B-737 AS THERE ARE NUMEROUS MEMOS OUT CONCERNING LATERAL SEPARATION AND PASSING OF ACFT ON THE VISUAL APCH. HE SAID HE KNEW THAT, BUT THOUGHT I SAID 'TO PASS' THE ACFT. HE SAID HE WAS TIRED FROM PREVIOUS DAY. I FEEL IT WASN'T THAT HE WAS TIRED, BECAUSE HE APPEARED ALERT AT ALL TIMES. HIS HEADSET IS A TYPE THAT DOES NOT SUPPRESS NOISE AND THE NOISE IN COCKPIT MAY HAVE NOT ALLOWED HIM TO HEAR 'NOT' AND HE MAY HAVE ANTICIPATED THAT HE WAS TO PASS FOR WHATEVER REASON AND IT STUCK IN HIS HEAD. I SHOULD HAVE TAKEN THE ACFT AWAY FROM HIM WHEN 2 MI IN PARALLEL TRAIL, IN HINDSIGHT, HOWEVER, EVERY FO THAT I HAVE FLOWN WITH, THAT WAS IN THE SAME LOCATIONS AND SITS HAS NOT PERFORMED IN THE SAME MANNER.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.