Narrative:

We switched over to final radar controller to land on runway 22 lga, abeam the field 2.5 mi 4000 ft 210 KTS. Controller offered the visual approach to runway 22, if we had it in sight, we accepted. Then the controller issued clearance for visual runway 22 with the following restrs: do not descend below 2500 ft until past the 060 degree radial stay within 7 mi. The captain accepted the clearance. I was confused on the 060 degree flying. Once accepted I was trying my best to get down and slowed down to land on a short, noise restr runway. I basically disregarded the 060 degree altitude because I was focused on getting down. At 3 DME I remember seeing that we were on the 090 degree radial from lga. The stay within 7 mi was easy. How far, in mi, was I from the 060 degree radial? I defy anyone to hand fly an airplane from where I was without ever hearing the clearance issued before and make it work out smoothly. The winds were strong out of the west (approximately 260 degree/25 KTS) pushing us away from the field. This helped us to make it down in time, but while I lost sight of the field I descended too low for our range to the field and the tower issued a low altitude alert. I doubt if I complied with the 2500 ft restr and when the low altitude alert was issued I had already leveled off at 1100 ft and had reacquired sight of the field. We were still 5 mi from the airport though and this set off the alarm. We stayed within 7 mi. Point: I question whether this clearance should ever be given. After a few days of thinking about it I came up with a plan on how I could have successfully and legally complied. In the heat of battle I was unable to. On a visual to runway 22, are you supposed to follow the lda a course? (Which was on the ATIS as the approach in use) or can you line up on the centerline? Without either the 7 DME restr or the 2500 ft restr I would have been ok. With both it is nearly impossible to do right in my opinion as rushed as we were to get the gear down, alert flight attendants, do checklists, switch to tower etc. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: this first officer was faced with an unexpected visual that had restrs that he admits that he did not understand. The captain was not much help because he was involved in reading the checklist and warning the cabin attendants that they should prepare for landing. The reporter admits that he got so engrossed in trying to calculate (incorrectly it turned out/based on incomplete information) the required flight path that he allowed the aircraft to get too low and that triggered the tower's alarm. The required flight path is really rather simple if one has the correct information. The captain should have assisted the first officer by putting in the key restrictive radial in the course window of the HSI. The first officer said that he requested more information from the captain several times, but did not get what he needed. The flight crew did talk about the incident and the captain could not recall hearing the requests and said that he must have been too busy.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ALTDEV XING RESTR - NOISE ABATEMENT POLICY PROC - ACR MAKING A VISUAL APCH GETS TOO LOW AND VIOLATES NOISE AND OPERATIONAL STANDARDS.

Narrative: WE SWITCHED OVER TO FINAL RADAR CTLR TO LAND ON RWY 22 LGA, ABEAM THE FIELD 2.5 MI 4000 FT 210 KTS. CTLR OFFERED THE VISUAL APCH TO RWY 22, IF WE HAD IT IN SIGHT, WE ACCEPTED. THEN THE CTLR ISSUED CLRNC FOR VISUAL RWY 22 WITH THE FOLLOWING RESTRS: DO NOT DSND BELOW 2500 FT UNTIL PAST THE 060 DEG RADIAL STAY WITHIN 7 MI. THE CAPT ACCEPTED THE CLRNC. I WAS CONFUSED ON THE 060 DEG FLYING. ONCE ACCEPTED I WAS TRYING MY BEST TO GET DOWN AND SLOWED DOWN TO LAND ON A SHORT, NOISE RESTR RWY. I BASICALLY DISREGARDED THE 060 DEG ALT BECAUSE I WAS FOCUSED ON GETTING DOWN. AT 3 DME I REMEMBER SEEING THAT WE WERE ON THE 090 DEG RADIAL FROM LGA. THE STAY WITHIN 7 MI WAS EASY. HOW FAR, IN MI, WAS I FROM THE 060 DEG RADIAL? I DEFY ANYONE TO HAND FLY AN AIRPLANE FROM WHERE I WAS WITHOUT EVER HEARING THE CLRNC ISSUED BEFORE AND MAKE IT WORK OUT SMOOTHLY. THE WINDS WERE STRONG OUT OF THE W (APPROX 260 DEG/25 KTS) PUSHING US AWAY FROM THE FIELD. THIS HELPED US TO MAKE IT DOWN IN TIME, BUT WHILE I LOST SIGHT OF THE FIELD I DSNDED TOO LOW FOR OUR RANGE TO THE FIELD AND THE TWR ISSUED A LOW ALT ALERT. I DOUBT IF I COMPLIED WITH THE 2500 FT RESTR AND WHEN THE LOW ALT ALERT WAS ISSUED I HAD ALREADY LEVELED OFF AT 1100 FT AND HAD REACQUIRED SIGHT OF THE FIELD. WE WERE STILL 5 MI FROM THE ARPT THOUGH AND THIS SET OFF THE ALARM. WE STAYED WITHIN 7 MI. POINT: I QUESTION WHETHER THIS CLRNC SHOULD EVER BE GIVEN. AFTER A FEW DAYS OF THINKING ABOUT IT I CAME UP WITH A PLAN ON HOW I COULD HAVE SUCCESSFULLY AND LEGALLY COMPLIED. IN THE HEAT OF BATTLE I WAS UNABLE TO. ON A VISUAL TO RWY 22, ARE YOU SUPPOSED TO FOLLOW THE LDA A COURSE? (WHICH WAS ON THE ATIS AS THE APCH IN USE) OR CAN YOU LINE UP ON THE CTRLINE? WITHOUT EITHER THE 7 DME RESTR OR THE 2500 FT RESTR I WOULD HAVE BEEN OK. WITH BOTH IT IS NEARLY IMPOSSIBLE TO DO RIGHT IN MY OPINION AS RUSHED AS WE WERE TO GET THE GEAR DOWN, ALERT FLT ATTENDANTS, DO CHKLISTS, SWITCH TO TWR ETC. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THIS FO WAS FACED WITH AN UNEXPECTED VISUAL THAT HAD RESTRS THAT HE ADMITS THAT HE DID NOT UNDERSTAND. THE CAPT WAS NOT MUCH HELP BECAUSE HE WAS INVOLVED IN READING THE CHKLIST AND WARNING THE CABIN ATTENDANTS THAT THEY SHOULD PREPARE FOR LNDG. THE RPTR ADMITS THAT HE GOT SO ENGROSSED IN TRYING TO CALCULATE (INCORRECTLY IT TURNED OUT/BASED ON INCOMPLETE INFO) THE REQUIRED FLT PATH THAT HE ALLOWED THE ACFT TO GET TOO LOW AND THAT TRIGGERED THE TWR'S ALARM. THE REQUIRED FLT PATH IS REALLY RATHER SIMPLE IF ONE HAS THE CORRECT INFO. THE CAPT SHOULD HAVE ASSISTED THE FO BY PUTTING IN THE KEY RESTRICTIVE RADIAL IN THE COURSE WINDOW OF THE HSI. THE FO SAID THAT HE REQUESTED MORE INFO FROM THE CAPT SEVERAL TIMES, BUT DID NOT GET WHAT HE NEEDED. THE FLC DID TALK ABOUT THE INCIDENT AND THE CAPT COULD NOT RECALL HEARING THE REQUESTS AND SAID THAT HE MUST HAVE BEEN TOO BUSY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.