Narrative:

Received a confirmation of our route clearance as a coatt 3 arrival, flat rock transition, expect radar vectors to manassas airport. A few mi south of brooke VOR, (brv), we received a vector of 320 degree to skirt the quantico restr areas to the south for our approach to manassas. About 15 mi to the southwest of manassas, we were cleared to 2000 ft and given a new heading of 030 degrees. A few mi later we were advised by dulles approach that manassas airport was in our 12:30 position at about 10 mi and requested to report airport in sight. Although the visibility at the time was in excess of 10 mi, we were not able to positively identify the airport until about 5 mi from it. But attempts to report that we had it in sight were prevented by continuing frequency congestion. Eventually we were able to report airport in sight at about 2 mi from the airport. After emphasizing (twice) that we must not descend below 2000 ft until receiving further instructions from manassas tower, radar services was terminated and we were instructed to change to manassas tower frequency. By the time we were able to make contact with manassas tower we were 1/2 mi west of the airport at 2000 ft and still heading 030 degrees, which we reported. Tower then instructed us to make some circuit entry procedure (the details of which we can no longer recall) which did not make sense to us considering our position at the time. Accordingly we reported to the tower that we were over the threshold of runway 16L still at 2000 ft and requested a l-hand tear-drop onto final runway 16R. At this point frequency congestion again became a factor and no reply was received from tower. We continued on the heading of 030 degrees, still maintaining 2000 ft, but after a couple of mi it was decided to commence a left turn in order to avoid any conflict with the dulles international departures traffic just to north of manassas. By the time we were able to get through to tower again, we gave our position as bearing 330 degrees from the field, 3 mi, 2000 ft and heading southwest. At that time tower instructed us to enter right base runway 16R and report 2 mi right base. (Our understanding of 2 mi right base is a base leg which will resultin our turning final 2 mi from the runway touchdown zone). The instruction to enter right base was easily met as it entailed only a simple l-hand 180 degree turn. It should be noted that until this time we were still an IFR flight not having canceled IFR nor having received clearance for a visual approach. We were aware of traffic operating in the l-hand circuit for runway 16L, but had heard no traffic operating on runway 16R. For this reason we had already briefed to take particular care not to overshoot the centerline of runway 16R and thus avoid the runway 16L traffic. We were given no traffic information on any other traffic, nor were we given a number in traffic. As a result, we concluded that we were the #1 traffic for runway 16R. When on a 2 mi right base, (about a min after receiving the clearance), we were once again prevented from making the report due to continuing frequency congestion. But as we had no clearance limit, we continued toward final, and were eventually able to report our position as turning final when about 2 mi from touchdown, and about 600 ft AGL. At that point we were advised that we were #2 to follow a cessna on left base runway 16R. We were aware of an aircraft about 1/2 mi to our left, but could not be sure whether it was our #1 traffic or traffic for runway 16L. Further, it was clearly further from touchdown that we were. We concluded therefore that there was probably another aircraft which we could not see. On this basis it was decided to make an emergency break-off to the right to clear the area of final approach. This we did, advising tower at the same time. We were then instructed to make a r- hand 360 degrees and re-join final. Once again, no traffic information or sequence number was given. Upon querying tower we were advised that the #1 traffic was over the numbers. An uneventful landing following although we never did see the #1 traffic at any time. It should be noted that during this entire procedure, the situation at manassas was very busy, as was evidenced by the frequency congestion. We also had the impression that the controller had lost the picture of the disposition of traffic under her control. There seemed to be no cohesive progression of events. It was also noted that toward the end of the sequence of events, another controller took over the radio. This suggested that the original controller may have been a trainee. If this was the case it should be stated that, whereas it is necessary to expose trainees to busy sits, it is equally necessary for the training controller to take over when safety looks like becoming jeopardized. In this case, having 2 aircraft arriving for the same runway, at about the same time, and on opposite base legs is clearly a very unsafe situation requiring immediate intervention. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: iad quality assurance specialist stated that the LOA with non gvt tower hef requires an estimate to be given to the tower. It does not require the controller to sequence the IFR visual approach aircraft. Quality assurance specialist stated the controller may have forgotten the small aircraft was IFR and that is the reason a visual approach clearance was not issued.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: SMA X POOR ATC HANDLING.

Narrative: RECEIVED A CONFIRMATION OF OUR RTE CLRNC AS A COATT 3 ARR, FLAT ROCK TRANSITION, EXPECT RADAR VECTORS TO MANASSAS ARPT. A FEW MI S OF BROOKE VOR, (BRV), WE RECEIVED A VECTOR OF 320 DEG TO SKIRT THE QUANTICO RESTR AREAS TO THE S FOR OUR APCH TO MANASSAS. ABOUT 15 MI TO THE SW OF MANASSAS, WE WERE CLRED TO 2000 FT AND GIVEN A NEW HDG OF 030 DEGS. A FEW MI LATER WE WERE ADVISED BY DULLES APCH THAT MANASSAS ARPT WAS IN OUR 12:30 POS AT ABOUT 10 MI AND REQUESTED TO RPT ARPT IN SIGHT. ALTHOUGH THE VISIBILITY AT THE TIME WAS IN EXCESS OF 10 MI, WE WERE NOT ABLE TO POSITIVELY IDENT THE ARPT UNTIL ABOUT 5 MI FROM IT. BUT ATTEMPTS TO RPT THAT WE HAD IT IN SIGHT WERE PREVENTED BY CONTINUING FREQ CONGESTION. EVENTUALLY WE WERE ABLE TO RPT ARPT IN SIGHT AT ABOUT 2 MI FROM THE ARPT. AFTER EMPHASIZING (TWICE) THAT WE MUST NOT DSND BELOW 2000 FT UNTIL RECEIVING FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS FROM MANASSAS TWR, RADAR SVCS WAS TERMINATED AND WE WERE INSTRUCTED TO CHANGE TO MANASSAS TWR FREQ. BY THE TIME WE WERE ABLE TO MAKE CONTACT WITH MANASSAS TWR WE WERE 1/2 MI W OF THE ARPT AT 2000 FT AND STILL HDG 030 DEGS, WHICH WE RPTED. TWR THEN INSTRUCTED US TO MAKE SOME CIRCUIT ENTRY PROC (THE DETAILS OF WHICH WE CAN NO LONGER RECALL) WHICH DID NOT MAKE SENSE TO US CONSIDERING OUR POS AT THE TIME. ACCORDINGLY WE RPTED TO THE TWR THAT WE WERE OVER THE THRESHOLD OF RWY 16L STILL AT 2000 FT AND REQUESTED A L-HAND TEAR-DROP ONTO FINAL RWY 16R. AT THIS POINT FREQ CONGESTION AGAIN BECAME A FACTOR AND NO REPLY WAS RECEIVED FROM TWR. WE CONTINUED ON THE HDG OF 030 DEGS, STILL MAINTAINING 2000 FT, BUT AFTER A COUPLE OF MI IT WAS DECIDED TO COMMENCE A L TURN IN ORDER TO AVOID ANY CONFLICT WITH THE DULLES INTL DEPS TFC JUST TO N OF MANASSAS. BY THE TIME WE WERE ABLE TO GET THROUGH TO TWR AGAIN, WE GAVE OUR POS AS BEARING 330 DEGS FROM THE FIELD, 3 MI, 2000 FT AND HDG SW. AT THAT TIME TWR INSTRUCTED US TO ENTER R BASE RWY 16R AND RPT 2 MI R BASE. (OUR UNDERSTANDING OF 2 MI R BASE IS A BASE LEG WHICH WILL RESULTIN OUR TURNING FINAL 2 MI FROM THE RWY TOUCHDOWN ZONE). THE INSTRUCTION TO ENTER R BASE WAS EASILY MET AS IT ENTAILED ONLY A SIMPLE L-HAND 180 DEG TURN. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT UNTIL THIS TIME WE WERE STILL AN IFR FLT NOT HAVING CANCELED IFR NOR HAVING RECEIVED CLRNC FOR A VISUAL APCH. WE WERE AWARE OF TFC OPERATING IN THE L-HAND CIRCUIT FOR RWY 16L, BUT HAD HEARD NO TFC OPERATING ON RWY 16R. FOR THIS REASON WE HAD ALREADY BRIEFED TO TAKE PARTICULAR CARE NOT TO OVERSHOOT THE CTRLINE OF RWY 16R AND THUS AVOID THE RWY 16L TFC. WE WERE GIVEN NO TFC INFO ON ANY OTHER TFC, NOR WERE WE GIVEN A NUMBER IN TFC. AS A RESULT, WE CONCLUDED THAT WE WERE THE #1 TFC FOR RWY 16R. WHEN ON A 2 MI R BASE, (ABOUT A MIN AFTER RECEIVING THE CLRNC), WE WERE ONCE AGAIN PREVENTED FROM MAKING THE RPT DUE TO CONTINUING FREQ CONGESTION. BUT AS WE HAD NO CLRNC LIMIT, WE CONTINUED TOWARD FINAL, AND WERE EVENTUALLY ABLE TO RPT OUR POS AS TURNING FINAL WHEN ABOUT 2 MI FROM TOUCHDOWN, AND ABOUT 600 FT AGL. AT THAT POINT WE WERE ADVISED THAT WE WERE #2 TO FOLLOW A CESSNA ON L BASE RWY 16R. WE WERE AWARE OF AN ACFT ABOUT 1/2 MI TO OUR L, BUT COULD NOT BE SURE WHETHER IT WAS OUR #1 TFC OR TFC FOR RWY 16L. FURTHER, IT WAS CLRLY FURTHER FROM TOUCHDOWN THAT WE WERE. WE CONCLUDED THEREFORE THAT THERE WAS PROBABLY ANOTHER ACFT WHICH WE COULD NOT SEE. ON THIS BASIS IT WAS DECIDED TO MAKE AN EMER BREAK-OFF TO THE R TO CLR THE AREA OF FINAL APCH. THIS WE DID, ADVISING TWR AT THE SAME TIME. WE WERE THEN INSTRUCTED TO MAKE A R- HAND 360 DEGS AND RE-JOIN FINAL. ONCE AGAIN, NO TFC INFO OR SEQUENCE NUMBER WAS GIVEN. UPON QUERYING TWR WE WERE ADVISED THAT THE #1 TFC WAS OVER THE NUMBERS. AN UNEVENTFUL LNDG FOLLOWING ALTHOUGH WE NEVER DID SEE THE #1 TFC AT ANY TIME. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT DURING THIS ENTIRE PROC, THE SIT AT MANASSAS WAS VERY BUSY, AS WAS EVIDENCED BY THE FREQ CONGESTION. WE ALSO HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT THE CTLR HAD LOST THE PICTURE OF THE DISPOSITION OF TFC UNDER HER CTL. THERE SEEMED TO BE NO COHESIVE PROGRESSION OF EVENTS. IT WAS ALSO NOTED THAT TOWARD THE END OF THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS, ANOTHER CTLR TOOK OVER THE RADIO. THIS SUGGESTED THAT THE ORIGINAL CTLR MAY HAVE BEEN A TRAINEE. IF THIS WAS THE CASE IT SHOULD BE STATED THAT, WHEREAS IT IS NECESSARY TO EXPOSE TRAINEES TO BUSY SITS, IT IS EQUALLY NECESSARY FOR THE TRAINING CTLR TO TAKE OVER WHEN SAFETY LOOKS LIKE BECOMING JEOPARDIZED. IN THIS CASE, HAVING 2 ACFT ARRIVING FOR THE SAME RWY, AT ABOUT THE SAME TIME, AND ON OPPOSITE BASE LEGS IS CLRLY A VERY UNSAFE SIT REQUIRING IMMEDIATE INTERVENTION. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: IAD QUALITY ASSURANCE SPECIALIST STATED THAT THE LOA WITH NON GVT TWR HEF REQUIRES AN ESTIMATE TO BE GIVEN TO THE TWR. IT DOES NOT REQUIRE THE CTLR TO SEQUENCE THE IFR VISUAL APCH ACFT. QUALITY ASSURANCE SPECIALIST STATED THE CTLR MAY HAVE FORGOTTEN THE SMA WAS IFR AND THAT IS THE REASON A VISUAL APCH CLRNC WAS NOT ISSUED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.