Narrative:

I contacted ground to determine local field conditions and active runway. Ground nonchalantly responded with 'they're all active.' this was the last contact that I had with ground even though I remained on the frequency. I proceeded to taxi to runway 1 (because it was most convenient), did a run-up at the hash line. After the run-up, I checked for aircraft in the pattern (there were none). At this point I forgot that I was at a controled field, and then announced on the tower frequency that I was departing runway 1. While I was rolling, the tower came back and asked why I was on the runway without clearance. I immediately realized my error, aborted takeoff (at request of tower), pulled off and discussed the matter with the controller. There were no incidents as a result of my error and no other aircraft were affected. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter 'just forgot' to call the tower. After the tower directed abort, the tower controller was initially rather harsh with the reporter. There was a controller in the aircraft with the reporter who thought that the tower controller might have been 'having a bad day' as he made such a point of the transgression. The reporter has not heard from the FAA since this incident and the FBO that owns the aircraft has not heard either. The reporter was able to minimize the situation by not further aggravating the tower controller.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN SMA PLT 'FORGOT' TO CALL THE ATCT PRIOR TO TKOF.

Narrative: I CONTACTED GND TO DETERMINE LCL FIELD CONDITIONS AND ACTIVE RWY. GND NONCHALANTLY RESPONDED WITH 'THEY'RE ALL ACTIVE.' THIS WAS THE LAST CONTACT THAT I HAD WITH GND EVEN THOUGH I REMAINED ON THE FREQ. I PROCEEDED TO TAXI TO RWY 1 (BECAUSE IT WAS MOST CONVENIENT), DID A RUN-UP AT THE HASH LINE. AFTER THE RUN-UP, I CHKED FOR ACFT IN THE PATTERN (THERE WERE NONE). AT THIS POINT I FORGOT THAT I WAS AT A CTLED FIELD, AND THEN ANNOUNCED ON THE TWR FREQ THAT I WAS DEPARTING RWY 1. WHILE I WAS ROLLING, THE TWR CAME BACK AND ASKED WHY I WAS ON THE RWY WITHOUT CLRNC. I IMMEDIATELY REALIZED MY ERROR, ABORTED TKOF (AT REQUEST OF TWR), PULLED OFF AND DISCUSSED THE MATTER WITH THE CTLR. THERE WERE NO INCIDENTS AS A RESULT OF MY ERROR AND NO OTHER ACFT WERE AFFECTED. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR 'JUST FORGOT' TO CALL THE TWR. AFTER THE TWR DIRECTED ABORT, THE TWR CTLR WAS INITIALLY RATHER HARSH WITH THE RPTR. THERE WAS A CTLR IN THE ACFT WITH THE RPTR WHO THOUGHT THAT THE TWR CTLR MIGHT HAVE BEEN 'HAVING A BAD DAY' AS HE MADE SUCH A POINT OF THE TRANSGRESSION. THE RPTR HAS NOT HEARD FROM THE FAA SINCE THIS INCIDENT AND THE FBO THAT OWNS THE ACFT HAS NOT HEARD EITHER. THE RPTR WAS ABLE TO MINIMIZE THE SIT BY NOT FURTHER AGGRAVATING THE TWR CTLR.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.