Narrative:

On arrival to the aircraft I performed my preflight duties as per company procedures. On my cockpit set up I found the alpc airport laptop performance computer was inoperative due to a recurring problem. After numerous attempts to correct the situation I was forced to collect all available data and run to the operations office to do the performance calculations over the telephone. Before I left, the aircraft was still fueling due to an incorrect fuel load. I also picked up our clearance that included a different departure than we had filed on the flight plan route. The dispatcher was new to the laptop so I had to talk him through the steps 3 times before correct numbers were produced. At this point we were 2 mins late. I had to physically run to the aircraft in an effort to stay on time. I feel that the fact that all my normal flows in the aircraft were now totally disrupted was the first in a long line or errors. The captain was also new to the aircraft and was not in a position to let me takeoff or land so before leaving the aircraft to work the performance problem I set up my instruments to support his departure as per the clearance. On return I had to enter and send 3 fuel tickets through the ACARS system due to a fueling error and we had to input the takeoff performance numbers into the FMS and company forms. I also had to finish my set up, close the aircraft doors, return the company forms to the ramp agent and do the final check. On return to the cockpit we ran the checklists and obtained clearance to push back and start. It was at this time I found out that I would have control of the aircraft at gear retraction. We were 5 mins late and rushing to do the checklists and depart. No changes were made to the set up from the original set up to fly departure from the captain's side. Our clearance on the departure was to cross the pom VOR at 8000 ft and then to continue climb to be at or above 14000 ft at froun intersection. The captain had set in 14000 ft into the altitude select window and neither of us caught this. By doing this the automation and FMS would not respect the programmed limit of 8000 ft at pom. It effectively disappeared. This was a major error on our part. Had we set in 8000 ft in the window regardless of how the departure was flown we would not have exceeded the altitude at pom. The flight control panel was set up as per my request on taxi out with navigation and profile selected. I expected to see flight guidance from the flight director appropriate for the programmed departure. On taking control of the aircraft at approximately 500 ft I realized that I would be unable to see the intercept of the 114 degree radial on my side. We were changing frequencys and reconfiguring the aircraft at this time. We had a climb rate of approximately 6000 FPM. We also had a climb out speed restr of 250 KTS. The autoplt was not engaged. I selected arc mode on my navigation display so that I could see a case brake on the radial and asked the captain for the inbound radial. This request came at a point where he was moving flaps and changing frequencys, he either did not hear the request or was unable to comply. On seeing me in the arc mode selection he asked if I would like VOR/localizer and selected this on the fcp. On doing this the flight director commanded a left turn to intercept the radial. Knowing that this was incorrect I had to fly through the flight director commands. This is the point where the radial was intercepted and I was in the turn. This information I had off my RMI. Due to the fact the VOR/localizer mode had been selected and was commanding the wrong turn I was unable to engage the autoplt from that point on. At this point ATC called us to remind us that we had an 8000 ft restr at pom VOR. Our altitude was 8000 ft at that time with approximately a 6000 FPM rate of climb. I reached 8700 ft and 260 KTS on the push over recovery. We showed that we were at the pom VOR and the captain reported that fact to ATC. ATC thought that we were still 1 NM south and said not to worry about it. I feel that a combination of automation overload, disrupted flows and departure time pressure contributed to this error. I feel that the fact that the FMS will erase all restraints built into the departure when a higher altitude is set into the window can lead a pilot into this situation. Had I had the time to situation down and study the departure that was given to use on receipt of the clearance I would not have made this mistake. I also would have been set up to fly the aircraft had, for one, I known that I would fly, and two, would not have had to run 100 yards to do a performance problem.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ALTDEV ALT OVERSHOT XING RESTR -- SPD DEV -- ACR CLBED THROUGH A PUBLISHED 'STAR' XING RESTR AND THE SPD RESTR WAS EXCEEDED DURING THE ATTEMPT TO CORRECT THE CLB.

Narrative: ON ARR TO THE ACFT I PERFORMED MY PREFLT DUTIES AS PER COMPANY PROCS. ON MY COCKPIT SET UP I FOUND THE ALPC ARPT LAPTOP PERFORMANCE COMPUTER WAS INOP DUE TO A RECURRING PROB. AFTER NUMEROUS ATTEMPTS TO CORRECT THE SIT I WAS FORCED TO COLLECT ALL AVAILABLE DATA AND RUN TO THE OPS OFFICE TO DO THE PERFORMANCE CALCULATIONS OVER THE TELEPHONE. BEFORE I LEFT, THE ACFT WAS STILL FUELING DUE TO AN INCORRECT FUEL LOAD. I ALSO PICKED UP OUR CLRNC THAT INCLUDED A DIFFERENT DEP THAN WE HAD FILED ON THE FLT PLAN RTE. THE DISPATCHER WAS NEW TO THE LAPTOP SO I HAD TO TALK HIM THROUGH THE STEPS 3 TIMES BEFORE CORRECT NUMBERS WERE PRODUCED. AT THIS POINT WE WERE 2 MINS LATE. I HAD TO PHYSICALLY RUN TO THE ACFT IN AN EFFORT TO STAY ON TIME. I FEEL THAT THE FACT THAT ALL MY NORMAL FLOWS IN THE ACFT WERE NOW TOTALLY DISRUPTED WAS THE FIRST IN A LONG LINE OR ERRORS. THE CAPT WAS ALSO NEW TO THE ACFT AND WAS NOT IN A POS TO LET ME TKOF OR LAND SO BEFORE LEAVING THE ACFT TO WORK THE PERFORMANCE PROB I SET UP MY INSTS TO SUPPORT HIS DEP AS PER THE CLRNC. ON RETURN I HAD TO ENTER AND SEND 3 FUEL TICKETS THROUGH THE ACARS SYS DUE TO A FUELING ERROR AND WE HAD TO INPUT THE TKOF PERFORMANCE NUMBERS INTO THE FMS AND COMPANY FORMS. I ALSO HAD TO FINISH MY SET UP, CLOSE THE ACFT DOORS, RETURN THE COMPANY FORMS TO THE RAMP AGENT AND DO THE FINAL CHK. ON RETURN TO THE COCKPIT WE RAN THE CHKLISTS AND OBTAINED CLRNC TO PUSH BACK AND START. IT WAS AT THIS TIME I FOUND OUT THAT I WOULD HAVE CTL OF THE ACFT AT GEAR RETRACTION. WE WERE 5 MINS LATE AND RUSHING TO DO THE CHKLISTS AND DEPART. NO CHANGES WERE MADE TO THE SET UP FROM THE ORIGINAL SET UP TO FLY DEP FROM THE CAPT'S SIDE. OUR CLRNC ON THE DEP WAS TO CROSS THE POM VOR AT 8000 FT AND THEN TO CONTINUE CLB TO BE AT OR ABOVE 14000 FT AT FROUN INTXN. THE CAPT HAD SET IN 14000 FT INTO THE ALT SELECT WINDOW AND NEITHER OF US CAUGHT THIS. BY DOING THIS THE AUTOMATION AND FMS WOULD NOT RESPECT THE PROGRAMMED LIMIT OF 8000 FT AT POM. IT EFFECTIVELY DISAPPEARED. THIS WAS A MAJOR ERROR ON OUR PART. HAD WE SET IN 8000 FT IN THE WINDOW REGARDLESS OF HOW THE DEP WAS FLOWN WE WOULD NOT HAVE EXCEEDED THE ALT AT POM. THE FLT CTL PANEL WAS SET UP AS PER MY REQUEST ON TAXI OUT WITH NAV AND PROFILE SELECTED. I EXPECTED TO SEE FLT GUIDANCE FROM THE FLT DIRECTOR APPROPRIATE FOR THE PROGRAMMED DEP. ON TAKING CTL OF THE ACFT AT APPROX 500 FT I REALIZED THAT I WOULD BE UNABLE TO SEE THE INTERCEPT OF THE 114 DEG RADIAL ON MY SIDE. WE WERE CHANGING FREQS AND RECONFIGURING THE ACFT AT THIS TIME. WE HAD A CLB RATE OF APPROX 6000 FPM. WE ALSO HAD A CLB OUT SPD RESTR OF 250 KTS. THE AUTOPLT WAS NOT ENGAGED. I SELECTED ARC MODE ON MY NAV DISPLAY SO THAT I COULD SEE A CASE BRAKE ON THE RADIAL AND ASKED THE CAPT FOR THE INBOUND RADIAL. THIS REQUEST CAME AT A POINT WHERE HE WAS MOVING FLAPS AND CHANGING FREQS, HE EITHER DID NOT HEAR THE REQUEST OR WAS UNABLE TO COMPLY. ON SEEING ME IN THE ARC MODE SELECTION HE ASKED IF I WOULD LIKE VOR/LOC AND SELECTED THIS ON THE FCP. ON DOING THIS THE FLT DIRECTOR COMMANDED A L TURN TO INTERCEPT THE RADIAL. KNOWING THAT THIS WAS INCORRECT I HAD TO FLY THROUGH THE FLT DIRECTOR COMMANDS. THIS IS THE POINT WHERE THE RADIAL WAS INTERCEPTED AND I WAS IN THE TURN. THIS INFO I HAD OFF MY RMI. DUE TO THE FACT THE VOR/LOC MODE HAD BEEN SELECTED AND WAS COMMANDING THE WRONG TURN I WAS UNABLE TO ENGAGE THE AUTOPLT FROM THAT POINT ON. AT THIS POINT ATC CALLED US TO REMIND US THAT WE HAD AN 8000 FT RESTR AT POM VOR. OUR ALT WAS 8000 FT AT THAT TIME WITH APPROX A 6000 FPM RATE OF CLB. I REACHED 8700 FT AND 260 KTS ON THE PUSH OVER RECOVERY. WE SHOWED THAT WE WERE AT THE POM VOR AND THE CAPT RPTED THAT FACT TO ATC. ATC THOUGHT THAT WE WERE STILL 1 NM S AND SAID NOT TO WORRY ABOUT IT. I FEEL THAT A COMBINATION OF AUTOMATION OVERLOAD, DISRUPTED FLOWS AND DEP TIME PRESSURE CONTRIBUTED TO THIS ERROR. I FEEL THAT THE FACT THAT THE FMS WILL ERASE ALL RESTRAINTS BUILT INTO THE DEP WHEN A HIGHER ALT IS SET INTO THE WINDOW CAN LEAD A PLT INTO THIS SIT. HAD I HAD THE TIME TO SIT DOWN AND STUDY THE DEP THAT WAS GIVEN TO USE ON RECEIPT OF THE CLRNC I WOULD NOT HAVE MADE THIS MISTAKE. I ALSO WOULD HAVE BEEN SET UP TO FLY THE ACFT HAD, FOR ONE, I KNOWN THAT I WOULD FLY, AND TWO, WOULD NOT HAVE HAD TO RUN 100 YARDS TO DO A PERFORMANCE PROB.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.