Narrative:

The WX at sea was ragged broken to overcast ceiling necessitating the requirement for instrument approachs. We were on base leg being vectored for the final approach to the ILS runway 16R at sea and in communications with sea approach control. We were given the following clearance: 'turn right heading 130 degrees, maintain 3200 ft until established on the localizer, cleared for the ILS runway 16R approach, maintain 170 KTS to parkk (LOM), tower at parkk (LOM.' we were given this clearance at approximately 12-13 mi DME out on the approach. Approaching and passing over parkk (LOM), located at 5.8 mi DME we were configuring the aircraft to the landing confign, utilizing the WX radar to confirm clearance from WX and maintaining attention to aircraft traffic at boeing field (parkk LOM) both visually and via TCASII. We continued the approach to landing and didn't realize we had not switched to tower for landing clearance until we had taxied off runway 16R and were holding short of runway 16L. This particular event could be classified as a case of being overloaded in a familiar surrounding. The multiple clearance we received was not unusual nor was the aircraft traffic located at boeing field which is located at the parkk (LOM) for the ILS runway 16R but in this case coupled with the WX in the area requiring the attention to the WX radar we became distracted. Although giving the PIC to contact tower at some future point helps to unload the approach controller it does set up the possibility of what occurred to us. A more authoritative type clearance such as 'contact tower' might reduce the possibility of a flight crew missing a requirement to switch like we did. It might be more appropriate for approach control not to tell the air crew to switch frequencys until it is desired. Also in our situation we did not receive a call from sea approach control reminding us to switch to tower once we were inside parkk (LOM) which led us to wonder afterwards how are the tower and approach able to talk with each other, or were they overloaded as well. This is not to say that they didn't try to contact us on the approach frequency but both the first officer and I did not hear a call from them to switch to tower. Supplemental information from acn 304739: checklists were delayed due to WX and TCASII targets but were completed on short final. After landing rollout, I discovered I was still on approach frequency. I then called tower both from the aircraft and later on the landline. The controller in charge said there was no conflict with any other aircraft and we were monitored on radar. This was also a 10.5 hour crew day (not counting get up and hotel routine), so fatigue played a factor.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN MD-80 FLC RECEIVED AN APCH CLRNC WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO CONTACT THE TWR AT THE LOM. AT THE LOM, THE FLC WAS ABSORBED IN NUMEROUS TASKS, AND FORGOT TO CONTACT THE TWR. ACR LANDED WITHOUT A CLRNC.

Narrative: THE WX AT SEA WAS RAGGED BROKEN TO OVCST CEILING NECESSITATING THE REQUIREMENT FOR INST APCHS. WE WERE ON BASE LEG BEING VECTORED FOR THE FINAL APCH TO THE ILS RWY 16R AT SEA AND IN COMS WITH SEA APCH CTL. WE WERE GIVEN THE FOLLOWING CLRNC: 'TURN R HDG 130 DEGS, MAINTAIN 3200 FT UNTIL ESTABLISHED ON THE LOC, CLRED FOR THE ILS RWY 16R APCH, MAINTAIN 170 KTS TO PARKK (LOM), TWR AT PARKK (LOM.' WE WERE GIVEN THIS CLRNC AT APPROX 12-13 MI DME OUT ON THE APCH. APCHING AND PASSING OVER PARKK (LOM), LOCATED AT 5.8 MI DME WE WERE CONFIGURING THE ACFT TO THE LNDG CONFIGN, UTILIZING THE WX RADAR TO CONFIRM CLRNC FROM WX AND MAINTAINING ATTN TO ACFT TFC AT BOEING FIELD (PARKK LOM) BOTH VISUALLY AND VIA TCASII. WE CONTINUED THE APCH TO LNDG AND DIDN'T REALIZE WE HAD NOT SWITCHED TO TWR FOR LNDG CLRNC UNTIL WE HAD TAXIED OFF RWY 16R AND WERE HOLDING SHORT OF RWY 16L. THIS PARTICULAR EVENT COULD BE CLASSIFIED AS A CASE OF BEING OVERLOADED IN A FAMILIAR SURROUNDING. THE MULTIPLE CLRNC WE RECEIVED WAS NOT UNUSUAL NOR WAS THE ACFT TFC LOCATED AT BOEING FIELD WHICH IS LOCATED AT THE PARKK (LOM) FOR THE ILS RWY 16R BUT IN THIS CASE COUPLED WITH THE WX IN THE AREA REQUIRING THE ATTN TO THE WX RADAR WE BECAME DISTRACTED. ALTHOUGH GIVING THE PIC TO CONTACT TWR AT SOME FUTURE POINT HELPS TO UNLOAD THE APCH CTLR IT DOES SET UP THE POSSIBILITY OF WHAT OCCURRED TO US. A MORE AUTHORITATIVE TYPE CLRNC SUCH AS 'CONTACT TWR' MIGHT REDUCE THE POSSIBILITY OF A FLC MISSING A REQUIREMENT TO SWITCH LIKE WE DID. IT MIGHT BE MORE APPROPRIATE FOR APCH CTL NOT TO TELL THE AIR CREW TO SWITCH FREQS UNTIL IT IS DESIRED. ALSO IN OUR SIT WE DID NOT RECEIVE A CALL FROM SEA APCH CTL REMINDING US TO SWITCH TO TWR ONCE WE WERE INSIDE PARKK (LOM) WHICH LED US TO WONDER AFTERWARDS HOW ARE THE TWR AND APCH ABLE TO TALK WITH EACH OTHER, OR WERE THEY OVERLOADED AS WELL. THIS IS NOT TO SAY THAT THEY DIDN'T TRY TO CONTACT US ON THE APCH FREQ BUT BOTH THE FO AND I DID NOT HEAR A CALL FROM THEM TO SWITCH TO TWR. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 304739: CHKLISTS WERE DELAYED DUE TO WX AND TCASII TARGETS BUT WERE COMPLETED ON SHORT FINAL. AFTER LNDG ROLLOUT, I DISCOVERED I WAS STILL ON APCH FREQ. I THEN CALLED TWR BOTH FROM THE ACFT AND LATER ON THE LANDLINE. THE CTLR IN CHARGE SAID THERE WAS NO CONFLICT WITH ANY OTHER ACFT AND WE WERE MONITORED ON RADAR. THIS WAS ALSO A 10.5 HR CREW DAY (NOT COUNTING GET UP AND HOTEL ROUTINE), SO FATIGUE PLAYED A FACTOR.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.