Narrative:

We were descending to 3000 ft with the understanding that we were being vectored to intercept ngo (nagoya) runway 16R VOR/DME final approach course. Approach control vectored us west through final and then back. The approach was not in the FMS database and both pilots were using raw data. As we saw the deviation bar begin to center, the captain (who was hand flying) called 'airport in sight.' it was apparent that we were too high and a few seconds (5-10) later the first officer and I realized this was not the nagoya airport. The visual appearance was similar, but runway heading was 30 degrees off and now we were east of the final approach course, and still approximately 9 mi nne of ngo. We broke off the approach and shortly thereafter saw the ngo airport, but approach vectored us for another approach. Language and phraseology were definitely a factor. It was not quite clear, after several queries, if we were cleared for the approach or were still on vectors. A 'heads up' call that one might expect in continental united states such as 'airport at 2 O'clock, 9 mi,' is not used in japan or other asian countries that I'm aware of. The captain was new to international flying and to the aircraft (4 months approximately) and saw what he expected to see and made a quick decision based on limited information. Cockpit resource management is alive and well. Total crew involvement prevented an embarrassing situation. We were never close to landing at the wrong airport (gifu-rjng), but the potential was there. Other points to consider: 1) 1 pilot should be in map mode -- better graphic presentation. 2) approach plate should have other airport depicted. 3) autoplt should be used in unfamiliar areas (at least during early part of approach). Runway 16 is very rarely the active runway in ngo and normally a precision approach is then used.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: WDB ACFT SIGHTS WRONG ARPT, DISCOVERS ERROR AND DOES MISSED APCH.

Narrative: WE WERE DSNDING TO 3000 FT WITH THE UNDERSTANDING THAT WE WERE BEING VECTORED TO INTERCEPT NGO (NAGOYA) RWY 16R VOR/DME FINAL APCH COURSE. APCH CTL VECTORED US W THROUGH FINAL AND THEN BACK. THE APCH WAS NOT IN THE FMS DATABASE AND BOTH PLTS WERE USING RAW DATA. AS WE SAW THE DEV BAR BEGIN TO CTR, THE CAPT (WHO WAS HAND FLYING) CALLED 'ARPT IN SIGHT.' IT WAS APPARENT THAT WE WERE TOO HIGH AND A FEW SECONDS (5-10) LATER THE FO AND I REALIZED THIS WAS NOT THE NAGOYA ARPT. THE VISUAL APPEARANCE WAS SIMILAR, BUT RWY HDG WAS 30 DEGS OFF AND NOW WE WERE E OF THE FINAL APCH COURSE, AND STILL APPROX 9 MI NNE OF NGO. WE BROKE OFF THE APCH AND SHORTLY THEREAFTER SAW THE NGO ARPT, BUT APCH VECTORED US FOR ANOTHER APCH. LANGUAGE AND PHRASEOLOGY WERE DEFINITELY A FACTOR. IT WAS NOT QUITE CLR, AFTER SEVERAL QUERIES, IF WE WERE CLRED FOR THE APCH OR WERE STILL ON VECTORS. A 'HEADS UP' CALL THAT ONE MIGHT EXPECT IN CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES SUCH AS 'ARPT AT 2 O'CLOCK, 9 MI,' IS NOT USED IN JAPAN OR OTHER ASIAN COUNTRIES THAT I'M AWARE OF. THE CAPT WAS NEW TO INTL FLYING AND TO THE ACFT (4 MONTHS APPROX) AND SAW WHAT HE EXPECTED TO SEE AND MADE A QUICK DECISION BASED ON LIMITED INFO. COCKPIT RESOURCE MGMNT IS ALIVE AND WELL. TOTAL CREW INVOLVEMENT PREVENTED AN EMBARRASSING SIT. WE WERE NEVER CLOSE TO LNDG AT THE WRONG ARPT (GIFU-RJNG), BUT THE POTENTIAL WAS THERE. OTHER POINTS TO CONSIDER: 1) 1 PLT SHOULD BE IN MAP MODE -- BETTER GRAPHIC PRESENTATION. 2) APCH PLATE SHOULD HAVE OTHER ARPT DEPICTED. 3) AUTOPLT SHOULD BE USED IN UNFAMILIAR AREAS (AT LEAST DURING EARLY PART OF APCH). RWY 16 IS VERY RARELY THE ACTIVE RWY IN NGO AND NORMALLY A PRECISION APCH IS THEN USED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.