Narrative:

On the morning of the day in question, our first segment of the flight, omaha to des moines, my captain and I were to be observed by an FAA inspector. I was told that this was a routine route check and that mr. X would be riding with us to des moines and would be completing his route check upon reaching this intermediate stopping point. Everything was going well during the initial phases of the flight. However, after leveling off at our assigned altitude, the left engine torque indications began to fluctuate. Before I could reach up and check to make sure the right power lever was set properly, the captain had shut off the single red line computer. This computer governs the amount of fuel that its respective engine receives based on factors such as outside air temperature and density altitude. The aircraft engine will continue to operate after the single red line computers are shut off. However, the power levers must be readjusted due to difference in fuel metering. When the captain shut the right single red line computer off, the master caution warning light as well as the single red line caution annunciator illuminated. The captain tried to cancel (extinguish) the master caution light, but was unsuccessful. Additionally, I noticed that the captain was covering the annunciator panel with his left hand, probably to conceal the nature of the problem that the master caution warning light was trying to warn of. The approach to des moines was uneventful. After engine shutdown, the inspector began to ask the captain about the master caution warning light and why it had illuminated. The captain responded by saying that there had been an intermittent problem within the warning light itself and that he thought that the company mechanic had repaired the light. The inspector then asked the captain if there could have been a system failure that caused the master caution warning light to illuminate. The captain responded and reassured the inspector that there were no system failures and that the master caution warning light was illuminating at random thus falsely indicating a system malfunction. The captain then restated that this problem has occurred before and the company mechanic had repaired the wiring in the master caution warning light weeks before. The FAA inspector began to ask the question of whether the broken master caution warning light was a grounding item and if the light was in the MEL. The captain responded that he was not sure and that he would look it up in the company operations manual which was on board the aircraft at all times. At this point in the conversation, I got out of the aircraft and went to complete a postflt inspection of the aircraft. A few moments later, the captain walked over to where the inspector and I were standing and informed the inspector that the master caution warning light was not listed in the MEL. The captain then added that the exclusion of an inoperative component of the aircraft from the MEL meant that the aircraft was unairworthy until it was replaced or removed from the aircraft. The FAA inspector agreed and the captain left for a brief moment to make a phone call to the company dispatcher. The captain stated to me that he was instructed by the company to fly on to chicago after the inspector had left the area. At this point, I began to question the captain about flying the aircraft when it had been deemed unairworthy. He then told me that the freight had to be there as soon as possible and that we had to fly it to chicago. At that point, out of fear of being reprimanded and left in des moines with no way home, I decided to go along with him to chicago. Now that the event is in the past, I do see that I should have stayed in des moines and found another way home. I see now how I allowed myself to be led into a bad situation. I have learned that a copilot must stand up for what he or she believes to be right, especially in the interest of safety. But more importantly, the copilot must be willing to follow through with his or her thoughts in spite of any threat of reprimand.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FO OF AN ATX TURBOPROP RPTS HIS CAPT AND COMPANY FOR KNOWINGLY OPERATING ACFT IN AN UNWORTHY CONDITION.

Narrative: ON THE MORNING OF THE DAY IN QUESTION, OUR FIRST SEGMENT OF THE FLT, OMAHA TO DES MOINES, MY CAPT AND I WERE TO BE OBSERVED BY AN FAA INSPECTOR. I WAS TOLD THAT THIS WAS A ROUTINE RTE CHK AND THAT MR. X WOULD BE RIDING WITH US TO DES MOINES AND WOULD BE COMPLETING HIS RTE CHK UPON REACHING THIS INTERMEDIATE STOPPING POINT. EVERYTHING WAS GOING WELL DURING THE INITIAL PHASES OF THE FLT. HOWEVER, AFTER LEVELING OFF AT OUR ASSIGNED ALT, THE L ENG TORQUE INDICATIONS BEGAN TO FLUCTUATE. BEFORE I COULD REACH UP AND CHK TO MAKE SURE THE R PWR LEVER WAS SET PROPERLY, THE CAPT HAD SHUT OFF THE SINGLE RED LINE COMPUTER. THIS COMPUTER GOVERNS THE AMOUNT OF FUEL THAT ITS RESPECTIVE ENG RECEIVES BASED ON FACTORS SUCH AS OUTSIDE AIR TEMP AND DENSITY ALT. THE ACFT ENG WILL CONTINUE TO OPERATE AFTER THE SINGLE RED LINE COMPUTERS ARE SHUT OFF. HOWEVER, THE PWR LEVERS MUST BE READJUSTED DUE TO DIFFERENCE IN FUEL METERING. WHEN THE CAPT SHUT THE R SINGLE RED LINE COMPUTER OFF, THE MASTER CAUTION WARNING LIGHT AS WELL AS THE SINGLE RED LINE CAUTION ANNUNCIATOR ILLUMINATED. THE CAPT TRIED TO CANCEL (EXTINGUISH) THE MASTER CAUTION LIGHT, BUT WAS UNSUCCESSFUL. ADDITIONALLY, I NOTICED THAT THE CAPT WAS COVERING THE ANNUNCIATOR PANEL WITH HIS L HAND, PROBABLY TO CONCEAL THE NATURE OF THE PROB THAT THE MASTER CAUTION WARNING LIGHT WAS TRYING TO WARN OF. THE APCH TO DES MOINES WAS UNEVENTFUL. AFTER ENG SHUTDOWN, THE INSPECTOR BEGAN TO ASK THE CAPT ABOUT THE MASTER CAUTION WARNING LIGHT AND WHY IT HAD ILLUMINATED. THE CAPT RESPONDED BY SAYING THAT THERE HAD BEEN AN INTERMITTENT PROB WITHIN THE WARNING LIGHT ITSELF AND THAT HE THOUGHT THAT THE COMPANY MECH HAD REPAIRED THE LIGHT. THE INSPECTOR THEN ASKED THE CAPT IF THERE COULD HAVE BEEN A SYS FAILURE THAT CAUSED THE MASTER CAUTION WARNING LIGHT TO ILLUMINATE. THE CAPT RESPONDED AND REASSURED THE INSPECTOR THAT THERE WERE NO SYS FAILURES AND THAT THE MASTER CAUTION WARNING LIGHT WAS ILLUMINATING AT RANDOM THUS FALSELY INDICATING A SYS MALFUNCTION. THE CAPT THEN RESTATED THAT THIS PROB HAS OCCURRED BEFORE AND THE COMPANY MECH HAD REPAIRED THE WIRING IN THE MASTER CAUTION WARNING LIGHT WKS BEFORE. THE FAA INSPECTOR BEGAN TO ASK THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THE BROKEN MASTER CAUTION WARNING LIGHT WAS A GNDING ITEM AND IF THE LIGHT WAS IN THE MEL. THE CAPT RESPONDED THAT HE WAS NOT SURE AND THAT HE WOULD LOOK IT UP IN THE COMPANY OPS MANUAL WHICH WAS ON BOARD THE ACFT AT ALL TIMES. AT THIS POINT IN THE CONVERSATION, I GOT OUT OF THE ACFT AND WENT TO COMPLETE A POSTFLT INSPECTION OF THE ACFT. A FEW MOMENTS LATER, THE CAPT WALKED OVER TO WHERE THE INSPECTOR AND I WERE STANDING AND INFORMED THE INSPECTOR THAT THE MASTER CAUTION WARNING LIGHT WAS NOT LISTED IN THE MEL. THE CAPT THEN ADDED THAT THE EXCLUSION OF AN INOP COMPONENT OF THE ACFT FROM THE MEL MEANT THAT THE ACFT WAS UNAIRWORTHY UNTIL IT WAS REPLACED OR REMOVED FROM THE ACFT. THE FAA INSPECTOR AGREED AND THE CAPT LEFT FOR A BRIEF MOMENT TO MAKE A PHONE CALL TO THE COMPANY DISPATCHER. THE CAPT STATED TO ME THAT HE WAS INSTRUCTED BY THE COMPANY TO FLY ON TO CHICAGO AFTER THE INSPECTOR HAD LEFT THE AREA. AT THIS POINT, I BEGAN TO QUESTION THE CAPT ABOUT FLYING THE ACFT WHEN IT HAD BEEN DEEMED UNAIRWORTHY. HE THEN TOLD ME THAT THE FREIGHT HAD TO BE THERE ASAP AND THAT WE HAD TO FLY IT TO CHICAGO. AT THAT POINT, OUT OF FEAR OF BEING REPRIMANDED AND LEFT IN DES MOINES WITH NO WAY HOME, I DECIDED TO GO ALONG WITH HIM TO CHICAGO. NOW THAT THE EVENT IS IN THE PAST, I DO SEE THAT I SHOULD HAVE STAYED IN DES MOINES AND FOUND ANOTHER WAY HOME. I SEE NOW HOW I ALLOWED MYSELF TO BE LED INTO A BAD SIT. I HAVE LEARNED THAT A COPLT MUST STAND UP FOR WHAT HE OR SHE BELIEVES TO BE RIGHT, ESPECIALLY IN THE INTEREST OF SAFETY. BUT MORE IMPORTANTLY, THE COPLT MUST BE WILLING TO FOLLOW THROUGH WITH HIS OR HER THOUGHTS IN SPITE OF ANY THREAT OF REPRIMAND.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.