Narrative:

I was flying a SA226-tc, metropolitan ii on an IFR flight plan from oak to slc. At FL190 and about 13 mins from slc VOR I requested lower from ZLC. Center kept me high then later cleared me to 17000 ft and later to 13000 ft. By the time center handed me off to slc approach I was already close to the airport and making a steeper than normal descent. Before I could contact slc approach I heard him give the following order to all aircraft, 'don't contact me. I'll contact you.' during the next several mins he repeated this order at least 2 times and at different times reprimanded pilots for initiating contact with him. Less than a min after the handoff from center, slc approach assigned me an altitude of 9000 ft and a heading stating this would be vectors for the visual approach to runway 17. At this point I was close to the airport and having to descend at 2000 FPM. A min later I was given a different heading which put me on a base for runway 17. I had the airport in sight but had been told not to initiate any communications with approach so I remained silent. At less than 5 mi from the airport I was on base at 9000 ft and still 5000 ft above the TDZ. There were several factors that contributed to my continued descent for the runway: I was on a visual approach in VMC with the airport in sight and with well over 25 mi flight visibility. I was unsure of how to respond with the unusual radio procedures in use. ATC had not reported any conflicting traffic to me. At 8400 ft ATC called 'what's your altitude? You were assigned 9000 ft.' it was at this point that I saw another metropolitan liner lower than me at 2 O'clock and 1 mi. Since ATC's transmission required a response I answered, 'returning to 9000 ft. Traffic in sight.' at the same time I pulled up and watched the other metropolitan pass approximately 600 ft below and behind me. I was then cleared for the visual approach to runway 17 and handed off to tower. I was high and had to cut the power to flight idle, bring in landing flaps and landing gear to get down and established on the approach. It was not until I was on a 1 mi final that I intercepted the VASI. I was at such a high descent rate that it was difficult to establish a stabilized approach. As I intercepted the VASI I went from flight idle to 1200 pounds torque and still descended to 3 red and 1 white on the VASI before arresting the descent. I leveled off and established a proper glide path at about 1/2 mi final. Fortunately the rest of the landing was uneventful. I believe that the factors that contributed to the incident were the restr to not initiate communication with ATC, the high altitude restr in such close proximity to the airport, and the other aircraft had not been called out as traffic to me. This combination of factors confused me about what to do because I was, in my opinion, too high, on vectors for a visual approach and in a position where I needed to start a descent in order to safely make that visual approach to the runway, and on ATC's restr, unable to communication my situation to the controller. I think there are several things that could have been done to help avoid this incident. By routing the departing traffic farther south of the airport and climbing them to a higher altitude before they cross the approach corridor, approaching traffic could come in below them, avoiding high altitude restr and excessive descent rates. ATC should have called out the other traffic to me. As it was I had no idea there was any conflict until I had a visual on him. ATC should not restrict traffic from initiating communication with them. This puts us in a difficult situation when we are closing rapidly on our clearance limits and need further clearance. (It seems odd that the controller felt he was so busy he had to enact this restr, yet he had time to scold 3 other pilots while I was waiting for him to clear me.) I should have contacted ATC, regardless of the communication restr, and asked him to clarify what he was expecting me to do.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: LESS THAN STANDARD SEPARATION -- ATX PLT ON A VECTOR FOR A VISUAL APCH LEAVES HIS ASSIGNED ALT AND CLOSES TO WITHIN 600 FT OF ANOTHER ACFT.

Narrative: I WAS FLYING A SA226-TC, METRO II ON AN IFR FLT PLAN FROM OAK TO SLC. AT FL190 AND ABOUT 13 MINS FROM SLC VOR I REQUESTED LOWER FROM ZLC. CTR KEPT ME HIGH THEN LATER CLRED ME TO 17000 FT AND LATER TO 13000 FT. BY THE TIME CTR HANDED ME OFF TO SLC APCH I WAS ALREADY CLOSE TO THE ARPT AND MAKING A STEEPER THAN NORMAL DSCNT. BEFORE I COULD CONTACT SLC APCH I HEARD HIM GIVE THE FOLLOWING ORDER TO ALL ACFT, 'DON'T CONTACT ME. I'LL CONTACT YOU.' DURING THE NEXT SEVERAL MINS HE REPEATED THIS ORDER AT LEAST 2 TIMES AND AT DIFFERENT TIMES REPRIMANDED PLTS FOR INITIATING CONTACT WITH HIM. LESS THAN A MIN AFTER THE HDOF FROM CTR, SLC APCH ASSIGNED ME AN ALT OF 9000 FT AND A HDG STATING THIS WOULD BE VECTORS FOR THE VISUAL APCH TO RWY 17. AT THIS POINT I WAS CLOSE TO THE ARPT AND HAVING TO DSND AT 2000 FPM. A MIN LATER I WAS GIVEN A DIFFERENT HDG WHICH PUT ME ON A BASE FOR RWY 17. I HAD THE ARPT IN SIGHT BUT HAD BEEN TOLD NOT TO INITIATE ANY COMS WITH APCH SO I REMAINED SILENT. AT LESS THAN 5 MI FROM THE ARPT I WAS ON BASE AT 9000 FT AND STILL 5000 FT ABOVE THE TDZ. THERE WERE SEVERAL FACTORS THAT CONTRIBUTED TO MY CONTINUED DSCNT FOR THE RWY: I WAS ON A VISUAL APCH IN VMC WITH THE ARPT IN SIGHT AND WITH WELL OVER 25 MI FLT VISIBILITY. I WAS UNSURE OF HOW TO RESPOND WITH THE UNUSUAL RADIO PROCS IN USE. ATC HAD NOT RPTED ANY CONFLICTING TFC TO ME. AT 8400 FT ATC CALLED 'WHAT'S YOUR ALT? YOU WERE ASSIGNED 9000 FT.' IT WAS AT THIS POINT THAT I SAW ANOTHER METRO LINER LOWER THAN ME AT 2 O'CLOCK AND 1 MI. SINCE ATC'S XMISSION REQUIRED A RESPONSE I ANSWERED, 'RETURNING TO 9000 FT. TFC IN SIGHT.' AT THE SAME TIME I PULLED UP AND WATCHED THE OTHER METRO PASS APPROX 600 FT BELOW AND BEHIND ME. I WAS THEN CLRED FOR THE VISUAL APCH TO RWY 17 AND HANDED OFF TO TWR. I WAS HIGH AND HAD TO CUT THE PWR TO FLT IDLE, BRING IN LNDG FLAPS AND LNDG GEAR TO GET DOWN AND ESTABLISHED ON THE APCH. IT WAS NOT UNTIL I WAS ON A 1 MI FINAL THAT I INTERCEPTED THE VASI. I WAS AT SUCH A HIGH DSCNT RATE THAT IT WAS DIFFICULT TO ESTABLISH A STABILIZED APCH. AS I INTERCEPTED THE VASI I WENT FROM FLT IDLE TO 1200 LBS TORQUE AND STILL DSNDED TO 3 RED AND 1 WHITE ON THE VASI BEFORE ARRESTING THE DSCNT. I LEVELED OFF AND ESTABLISHED A PROPER GLIDE PATH AT ABOUT 1/2 MI FINAL. FORTUNATELY THE REST OF THE LNDG WAS UNEVENTFUL. I BELIEVE THAT THE FACTORS THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THE INCIDENT WERE THE RESTR TO NOT INITIATE COM WITH ATC, THE HIGH ALT RESTR IN SUCH CLOSE PROX TO THE ARPT, AND THE OTHER ACFT HAD NOT BEEN CALLED OUT AS TFC TO ME. THIS COMBINATION OF FACTORS CONFUSED ME ABOUT WHAT TO DO BECAUSE I WAS, IN MY OPINION, TOO HIGH, ON VECTORS FOR A VISUAL APCH AND IN A POS WHERE I NEEDED TO START A DSCNT IN ORDER TO SAFELY MAKE THAT VISUAL APCH TO THE RWY, AND ON ATC'S RESTR, UNABLE TO COM MY SIT TO THE CTLR. I THINK THERE ARE SEVERAL THINGS THAT COULD HAVE BEEN DONE TO HELP AVOID THIS INCIDENT. BY ROUTING THE DEPARTING TFC FARTHER S OF THE ARPT AND CLBING THEM TO A HIGHER ALT BEFORE THEY CROSS THE APCH CORRIDOR, APCHING TFC COULD COME IN BELOW THEM, AVOIDING HIGH ALT RESTR AND EXCESSIVE DSCNT RATES. ATC SHOULD HAVE CALLED OUT THE OTHER TFC TO ME. AS IT WAS I HAD NO IDEA THERE WAS ANY CONFLICT UNTIL I HAD A VISUAL ON HIM. ATC SHOULD NOT RESTRICT TFC FROM INITIATING COM WITH THEM. THIS PUTS US IN A DIFFICULT SIT WHEN WE ARE CLOSING RAPIDLY ON OUR CLRNC LIMITS AND NEED FURTHER CLRNC. (IT SEEMS ODD THAT THE CTLR FELT HE WAS SO BUSY HE HAD TO ENACT THIS RESTR, YET HE HAD TIME TO SCOLD 3 OTHER PLTS WHILE I WAS WAITING FOR HIM TO CLR ME.) I SHOULD HAVE CONTACTED ATC, REGARDLESS OF THE COM RESTR, AND ASKED HIM TO CLARIFY WHAT HE WAS EXPECTING ME TO DO.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.