Narrative:

The attached statement gives the facts -- I think this incident was set up by my deciding to practice the emergency/engine out landing, without deciding at what point the practice would end and the gear should come out, power come up to go around, etc. In order to assure making the runway, I left the gear unextended twice, on the 'gump' checklist. -- See attached. Following the 3RD takeoff, I climbed to 400 ft AGL, started the crosswind leg, and climbed to 1000 ft AGL. I reduced power to attain pattern speed and announced position and the fact that this would be a full stop landing. As I neared a point abeam my intended touchdown point, I decided to execute a simulated loss of power. I turned toward the runway while lowering the nose to establish best glide speed (approximately 75 KIAS). I twice ran through the 'gump' checklist, but deciding to not extend the gear until reaching the runway was assured. I announced my position and the fact that I was making a 'short approach and final' to a full stop. I assessed that I had the runway made, and extended the flaps, first to 10 degrees and then on to 20 degrees. I was at that same moment turning on very close final and then over the runway and I established the desired pitch attitude for touchdown. My only sense of something being wrong was the fact I was 'floating' a long distance down the runway, and way in the background, outside the david clark headphones, I could hear a faint beeping that reminded me of a radio side-tone when the strobes or beacon are on. At that point the aircraft touched down in a slightly nose- high attitude, with the engine idling, and skidded on the belly perhaps 70 yards on the centerline of runway 18. I secured the fuel and electrical system, turned off the master switch and exited. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter stated he was flying a cessna 177 cardinal rg. He is an aviation attorney, a very conscientious pilot, and did not believe he would ever allow this to happen to him. The gear warning horn as heard through his noise suppressing headset was more like a radio side tone than a gear warning. He feels the warning horn should be routed through the avionics. He found the cost to be surprisingly small and is a must if one is using headsets. In other words, various noise canceling and noise suppressing headsets can obscure external aural warnings. But pilots should not be relying on aural warnings. He has been involved in remedial training and learned that he was doing checklists without actually accomplishing the actions. For example he would say 'fuel selected to the fullest tank' in response to the checklist, but in fact, while flying the airplane, and maintaining his xchk, the action would be said, but not done. He found there needed to be an actual physical touching of the item to focus his mind to seeing that it is actually accomplished. The break from the normal pattern resulted in eliminating the required actions.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: PLT LANDS GEAR UP.

Narrative: THE ATTACHED STATEMENT GIVES THE FACTS -- I THINK THIS INCIDENT WAS SET UP BY MY DECIDING TO PRACTICE THE EMER/ENG OUT LNDG, WITHOUT DECIDING AT WHAT POINT THE PRACTICE WOULD END AND THE GEAR SHOULD COME OUT, PWR COME UP TO GAR, ETC. IN ORDER TO ASSURE MAKING THE RWY, I LEFT THE GEAR UNEXTENDED TWICE, ON THE 'GUMP' CHKLIST. -- SEE ATTACHED. FOLLOWING THE 3RD TKOF, I CLBED TO 400 FT AGL, STARTED THE XWIND LEG, AND CLBED TO 1000 FT AGL. I REDUCED PWR TO ATTAIN PATTERN SPD AND ANNOUNCED POS AND THE FACT THAT THIS WOULD BE A FULL STOP LNDG. AS I NEARED A POINT ABEAM MY INTENDED TOUCHDOWN POINT, I DECIDED TO EXECUTE A SIMULATED LOSS OF PWR. I TURNED TOWARD THE RWY WHILE LOWERING THE NOSE TO ESTABLISH BEST GLIDE SPD (APPROX 75 KIAS). I TWICE RAN THROUGH THE 'GUMP' CHKLIST, BUT DECIDING TO NOT EXTEND THE GEAR UNTIL REACHING THE RWY WAS ASSURED. I ANNOUNCED MY POS AND THE FACT THAT I WAS MAKING A 'SHORT APCH AND FINAL' TO A FULL STOP. I ASSESSED THAT I HAD THE RWY MADE, AND EXTENDED THE FLAPS, FIRST TO 10 DEGS AND THEN ON TO 20 DEGS. I WAS AT THAT SAME MOMENT TURNING ON VERY CLOSE FINAL AND THEN OVER THE RWY AND I ESTABLISHED THE DESIRED PITCH ATTITUDE FOR TOUCHDOWN. MY ONLY SENSE OF SOMETHING BEING WRONG WAS THE FACT I WAS 'FLOATING' A LONG DISTANCE DOWN THE RWY, AND WAY IN THE BACKGROUND, OUTSIDE THE DAVID CLARK HEADPHONES, I COULD HEAR A FAINT BEEPING THAT REMINDED ME OF A RADIO SIDE-TONE WHEN THE STROBES OR BEACON ARE ON. AT THAT POINT THE ACFT TOUCHED DOWN IN A SLIGHTLY NOSE- HIGH ATTITUDE, WITH THE ENG IDLING, AND SKIDDED ON THE BELLY PERHAPS 70 YARDS ON THE CTRLINE OF RWY 18. I SECURED THE FUEL AND ELECTRICAL SYS, TURNED OFF THE MASTER SWITCH AND EXITED. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR STATED HE WAS FLYING A CESSNA 177 CARDINAL RG. HE IS AN AVIATION ATTORNEY, A VERY CONSCIENTIOUS PLT, AND DID NOT BELIEVE HE WOULD EVER ALLOW THIS TO HAPPEN TO HIM. THE GEAR WARNING HORN AS HEARD THROUGH HIS NOISE SUPPRESSING HEADSET WAS MORE LIKE A RADIO SIDE TONE THAN A GEAR WARNING. HE FEELS THE WARNING HORN SHOULD BE ROUTED THROUGH THE AVIONICS. HE FOUND THE COST TO BE SURPRISINGLY SMALL AND IS A MUST IF ONE IS USING HEADSETS. IN OTHER WORDS, VARIOUS NOISE CANCELING AND NOISE SUPPRESSING HEADSETS CAN OBSCURE EXTERNAL AURAL WARNINGS. BUT PLTS SHOULD NOT BE RELYING ON AURAL WARNINGS. HE HAS BEEN INVOLVED IN REMEDIAL TRAINING AND LEARNED THAT HE WAS DOING CHKLISTS WITHOUT ACTUALLY ACCOMPLISHING THE ACTIONS. FOR EXAMPLE HE WOULD SAY 'FUEL SELECTED TO THE FULLEST TANK' IN RESPONSE TO THE CHKLIST, BUT IN FACT, WHILE FLYING THE AIRPLANE, AND MAINTAINING HIS XCHK, THE ACTION WOULD BE SAID, BUT NOT DONE. HE FOUND THERE NEEDED TO BE AN ACTUAL PHYSICAL TOUCHING OF THE ITEM TO FOCUS HIS MIND TO SEEING THAT IT IS ACTUALLY ACCOMPLISHED. THE BREAK FROM THE NORMAL PATTERN RESULTED IN ELIMINATING THE REQUIRED ACTIONS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.