Narrative:

The day of the accident approximately lunch time I asked the chief pilot if I could return to baltimore early, leave fri night not sat morning. Within the past week my grandfather had died and my girlfriend was also suffering personal problems. Needing to return to baltimore I anxiously awaited XX30 hours when the chief pilot advised I could call dispatch and request early release. At XX25 I was called for a trip. It was a long evening to syr, to bmi with a freight delay at syr. I believe it was a combination of factors which led to the following events. Environmental stress (actual WX 3.0 and night), acute fatigue (14 hours mostly night), and chronic stress (death in family and relationship) all had a contributing role. After clearance for ILS runway 010 (sdf) normal indications continued through the approach until the flare. As power was reduced during the flare, the gear warning horn sounded. Full power was applied as a scratching sound was heard from the aft section. As the aircraft was leveled to avoid a stall, contact was made with the runway by the nosewheel. I announced a go around to the tower and asked if the gear could be seen. Tower stated he couldn't see, likely due to reduced ambient light and fog. 2 company pilots on line-up stated that it appeared the nose gear was down but no landing gear visible. I selected gear-up position after passing tower, followed by amber gear-up light. Gear down position was selected well before glide slope intercept. The amber light followed and I visually checked to ensure main gear down. I landed slightly long as a company pilot on line-up observed and stated 'gear down.' landing and taxi was without incident. Maintenance was able to duplicate nose gear down, main gear up only after placing gear handle down using moderate force, greater force needed to place gear handle full down. This explains the familiar proprioceptive (seat of pants) sensing of 'feeling gear down' and using familiar power setting, not a lesser power setting that would be used to maintain glide slope with gear up. If clean (no gear) power required for approach would have been reduced to a mp to sound the gear unsafe horn earlier than flare.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: PART 135 OP HAS GEAR PROB, MAKES A GAR.

Narrative: THE DAY OF THE ACCIDENT APPROX LUNCH TIME I ASKED THE CHIEF PLT IF I COULD RETURN TO BALTIMORE EARLY, LEAVE FRI NIGHT NOT SAT MORNING. WITHIN THE PAST WK MY GRANDFATHER HAD DIED AND MY GIRLFRIEND WAS ALSO SUFFERING PERSONAL PROBS. NEEDING TO RETURN TO BALTIMORE I ANXIOUSLY AWAITED XX30 HRS WHEN THE CHIEF PLT ADVISED I COULD CALL DISPATCH AND REQUEST EARLY RELEASE. AT XX25 I WAS CALLED FOR A TRIP. IT WAS A LONG EVENING TO SYR, TO BMI WITH A FREIGHT DELAY AT SYR. I BELIEVE IT WAS A COMBINATION OF FACTORS WHICH LED TO THE FOLLOWING EVENTS. ENVIRONMENTAL STRESS (ACTUAL WX 3.0 AND NIGHT), ACUTE FATIGUE (14 HRS MOSTLY NIGHT), AND CHRONIC STRESS (DEATH IN FAMILY AND RELATIONSHIP) ALL HAD A CONTRIBUTING ROLE. AFTER CLRNC FOR ILS RWY 010 (SDF) NORMAL INDICATIONS CONTINUED THROUGH THE APCH UNTIL THE FLARE. AS PWR WAS REDUCED DURING THE FLARE, THE GEAR WARNING HORN SOUNDED. FULL PWR WAS APPLIED AS A SCRATCHING SOUND WAS HEARD FROM THE AFT SECTION. AS THE ACFT WAS LEVELED TO AVOID A STALL, CONTACT WAS MADE WITH THE RWY BY THE NOSEWHEEL. I ANNOUNCED A GAR TO THE TWR AND ASKED IF THE GEAR COULD BE SEEN. TWR STATED HE COULDN'T SEE, LIKELY DUE TO REDUCED AMBIENT LIGHT AND FOG. 2 COMPANY PLTS ON LINE-UP STATED THAT IT APPEARED THE NOSE GEAR WAS DOWN BUT NO LNDG GEAR VISIBLE. I SELECTED GEAR-UP POS AFTER PASSING TWR, FOLLOWED BY AMBER GEAR-UP LIGHT. GEAR DOWN POS WAS SELECTED WELL BEFORE GLIDE SLOPE INTERCEPT. THE AMBER LIGHT FOLLOWED AND I VISUALLY CHKED TO ENSURE MAIN GEAR DOWN. I LANDED SLIGHTLY LONG AS A COMPANY PLT ON LINE-UP OBSERVED AND STATED 'GEAR DOWN.' LNDG AND TAXI WAS WITHOUT INCIDENT. MAINT WAS ABLE TO DUPLICATE NOSE GEAR DOWN, MAIN GEAR UP ONLY AFTER PLACING GEAR HANDLE DOWN USING MODERATE FORCE, GREATER FORCE NEEDED TO PLACE GEAR HANDLE FULL DOWN. THIS EXPLAINS THE FAMILIAR PROPRIOCEPTIVE (SEAT OF PANTS) SENSING OF 'FEELING GEAR DOWN' AND USING FAMILIAR PWR SETTING, NOT A LESSER PWR SETTING THAT WOULD BE USED TO MAINTAIN GLIDE SLOPE WITH GEAR UP. IF CLEAN (NO GEAR) PWR REQUIRED FOR APCH WOULD HAVE BEEN REDUCED TO A MP TO SOUND THE GEAR UNSAFE HORN EARLIER THAN FLARE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.