Narrative:

Aircraft was late leaving the gate because ground crew was still loading the aircraft. (Contract employees) of service company. On takeoff roll, at rotation, captain had to roll in an additional 1 degree of nose trim to accomplish normal flight profile. Later in flight a holding clearance was given and crew noticed that aircraft clean speed for holding was approximately 12 KTS in error. A practice autoland was conducted and a difference of 4-5 KTS was observed in book approach speed and what was required to satisfy the alpha floor of the FMS system. When the aircraft arrived at the gate the captain requested a ramp supervisor verify the load against the computer weight and balance form. The supervisor informed the captain that not only were the weights incorrect, but the location of the load in specific bins was incorrect. The total gross weight was in error by several thousand pounds and the center of gravity was also incorrect. The captain asked the supervisor to make a written report and also reported the incident by phone to the supervisor of flight control (dispatchers) and to the company safety department by written report. Numerous errors by ramp employees have occurred in recent months as management continues to replace trained experienced employees with contract employees who have minimal training and even less experience. This type of error at lga at or near maximum gross weight could result in aircraft loss and significant death or injury to pilot/crew and passenger. It would be difficult to establish an incorrect load situation with wreckage scattered at a crash site. This captain has doubled his own personal fudge factor for accepting reduced power takeoffs and utilizing particular runways for departure.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: WT AND BAL -- ACR IS MIS-LOADED BY A CONTRACT GND CREW AND FLC DOES NOT REALIZE THE PROB UNTIL TKOF.

Narrative: ACFT WAS LATE LEAVING THE GATE BECAUSE GND CREW WAS STILL LOADING THE ACFT. (CONTRACT EMPLOYEES) OF SVC COMPANY. ON TKOF ROLL, AT ROTATION, CAPT HAD TO ROLL IN AN ADDITIONAL 1 DEG OF NOSE TRIM TO ACCOMPLISH NORMAL FLT PROFILE. LATER IN FLT A HOLDING CLRNC WAS GIVEN AND CREW NOTICED THAT ACFT CLEAN SPD FOR HOLDING WAS APPROX 12 KTS IN ERROR. A PRACTICE AUTOLAND WAS CONDUCTED AND A DIFFERENCE OF 4-5 KTS WAS OBSERVED IN BOOK APCH SPD AND WHAT WAS REQUIRED TO SATISFY THE ALPHA FLOOR OF THE FMS SYS. WHEN THE ACFT ARRIVED AT THE GATE THE CAPT REQUESTED A RAMP SUPVR VERIFY THE LOAD AGAINST THE COMPUTER WT AND BAL FORM. THE SUPVR INFORMED THE CAPT THAT NOT ONLY WERE THE WTS INCORRECT, BUT THE LOCATION OF THE LOAD IN SPECIFIC BINS WAS INCORRECT. THE TOTAL GROSS WT WAS IN ERROR BY SEVERAL THOUSAND LBS AND THE CTR OF GRAVITY WAS ALSO INCORRECT. THE CAPT ASKED THE SUPVR TO MAKE A WRITTEN RPT AND ALSO RPTED THE INCIDENT BY PHONE TO THE SUPVR OF FLT CTL (DISPATCHERS) AND TO THE COMPANY SAFETY DEPT BY WRITTEN RPT. NUMEROUS ERRORS BY RAMP EMPLOYEES HAVE OCCURRED IN RECENT MONTHS AS MGMNT CONTINUES TO REPLACE TRAINED EXPERIENCED EMPLOYEES WITH CONTRACT EMPLOYEES WHO HAVE MINIMAL TRAINING AND EVEN LESS EXPERIENCE. THIS TYPE OF ERROR AT LGA AT OR NEAR MAX GROSS WT COULD RESULT IN ACFT LOSS AND SIGNIFICANT DEATH OR INJURY TO PLT/CREW AND PAX. IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO ESTABLISH AN INCORRECT LOAD SIT WITH WRECKAGE SCATTERED AT A CRASH SITE. THIS CAPT HAS DOUBLED HIS OWN PERSONAL FUDGE FACTOR FOR ACCEPTING REDUCED PWR TKOFS AND UTILIZING PARTICULAR RWYS FOR DEP.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.