Narrative:

High oil temperature indication. Declared emergency, shut down engine, diverted to cle. Problem caused by corrosion in cannon plug or possible wire bundle chafing. 2 man crew very busy. We followed ECAM procedure. ECAM said nothing about analyzing any other indications, such as idg oil temperature to determine validity of warning. If it had we may not have had to shut engine down. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter had extensive communication with his air carrier training department concerning this engine oil high temperature. The ECAM (electronic centralized aircraft monitoring) action states, 'thrust lever idle, engine master switch off.' then, the training procedure calls for going to the cockpit operating manual for follow up action. The manual has a note that states, 'if this warning is not accompanied by any other engine oil warning and if the idg oil outlet temperature on the ECAM elec page is cooler than the engine oil temperature, disregard this warning. (Faulty sensor suspected.) continue to monitor engine operation.' so, by following ECAM action and shutting down the engine, and then finding in the cockpit operations manual that a shutdown may not have been necessary, raises some serious questions. The reporter's training department says that, though the ECAM action is not complete, ie, adding a note about the idg oil temperature, would require approval by both airbus and the FAA which is unlikely. But, as the reporter says, why expose the passenger and flight crew to an emergency shutdown, diversion and associated risks from an engine out, when it is not necessary? Reporter asks ASRS to contact his training department, but was advised that it is not possible because of ASRS anonymity guarantee, etc.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACFT EQUIP PROB. HIGH OIL TEMP ENG SHUTDOWN FAULTY ECAM ACTION.

Narrative: HIGH OIL TEMP INDICATION. DECLARED EMER, SHUT DOWN ENG, DIVERTED TO CLE. PROB CAUSED BY CORROSION IN CANNON PLUG OR POSSIBLE WIRE BUNDLE CHAFING. 2 MAN CREW VERY BUSY. WE FOLLOWED ECAM PROC. ECAM SAID NOTHING ABOUT ANALYZING ANY OTHER INDICATIONS, SUCH AS IDG OIL TEMP TO DETERMINE VALIDITY OF WARNING. IF IT HAD WE MAY NOT HAVE HAD TO SHUT ENG DOWN. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR HAD EXTENSIVE COM WITH HIS ACR TRAINING DEPT CONCERNING THIS ENG OIL HIGH TEMP. THE ECAM (ELECTRONIC CENTRALIZED ACFT MONITORING) ACTION STATES, 'THRUST LEVER IDLE, ENG MASTER SWITCH OFF.' THEN, THE TRAINING PROC CALLS FOR GOING TO THE COCKPIT OPERATING MANUAL FOR FOLLOW UP ACTION. THE MANUAL HAS A NOTE THAT STATES, 'IF THIS WARNING IS NOT ACCOMPANIED BY ANY OTHER ENG OIL WARNING AND IF THE IDG OIL OUTLET TEMP ON THE ECAM ELEC PAGE IS COOLER THAN THE ENG OIL TEMP, DISREGARD THIS WARNING. (FAULTY SENSOR SUSPECTED.) CONTINUE TO MONITOR ENG OP.' SO, BY FOLLOWING ECAM ACTION AND SHUTTING DOWN THE ENG, AND THEN FINDING IN THE COCKPIT OPS MANUAL THAT A SHUTDOWN MAY NOT HAVE BEEN NECESSARY, RAISES SOME SERIOUS QUESTIONS. THE RPTR'S TRAINING DEPT SAYS THAT, THOUGH THE ECAM ACTION IS NOT COMPLETE, IE, ADDING A NOTE ABOUT THE IDG OIL TEMP, WOULD REQUIRE APPROVAL BY BOTH AIRBUS AND THE FAA WHICH IS UNLIKELY. BUT, AS THE RPTR SAYS, WHY EXPOSE THE PAX AND FLC TO AN EMER SHUTDOWN, DIVERSION AND ASSOCIATED RISKS FROM AN ENG OUT, WHEN IT IS NOT NECESSARY? RPTR ASKS ASRS TO CONTACT HIS TRAINING DEPT, BUT WAS ADVISED THAT IT IS NOT POSSIBLE BECAUSE OF ASRS ANONYMITY GUARANTEE, ETC.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.