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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 319299 |
Time | |
Date | 199510 |
Day | Wed |
Local Time Of Day | 0001 To 0600 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : sps |
State Reference | TX |
Altitude | agl bound lower : 0 agl bound upper : 0 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Night |
Aircraft 1 | |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | Commercial Fixed Wing |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | climbout : takeoff ground other : taxi |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Qualification | pilot : commercial pilot : atp pilot : cfi pilot : instrument |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 224 flight time total : 3098 flight time type : 962 |
ASRS Report | 319299 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : atp |
Events | |
Anomaly | other anomaly other |
Independent Detector | other controllera |
Resolutory Action | none taken : detected after the fact |
Consequence | faa : reviewed incident with flight crew |
Supplementary | |
Air Traffic Incident | other |
Narrative:
On oct/xa/95 at approximately XX10 local we took off from wichita falls airport, tx (sps), en route to dallas/ft worth international airport (dfw). Because the tower was closed all our intentions were announced on the CTAF. The captain (PF) decided to use runway 17 because the winds were 150 degrees 08 KTS and the performance data report (vaq report) was adequate for that runway. Our station ground personnel and our company's field condition report indicated all runways open and dry (including runway 17). The ATIS report (monitored prior to departure) did not differ from our company's report. There were no NOTAM reports, at the time of our departure, to dispute the information given to us by our company or the ATIS broadcast. With all this information in hand the captain's decision to use runway 17 was not disputed. The departure was initiated VFR because we were unable to establish radio contact with ATC (all of the reported frequencys were attempted). Shortly after the takeoff roll was initiated it was discovered that the runway lights were inoperative (the lights from the txwys surrounding the area together with the illumination effect created by the lights of the huge military ramp just north of the departure end of runway 17 resulted in the appearance of a perfectly lit runway). It was decided to continue because we had adequate WX (VMC)/visibility, field condition reports, runway markings, and the aircraft's taxi and landing lights were illuminating the runway adequately. After departure we establish radio contact with ZFW and proceeded IFR to dfw. On the en route portion of our flight we received a company message via ACARS. The dispatcher informed us that somebody at sps had called the company to inquire as to the utilization of runway 17 for departure. After contacting dispatch the captain was able to contact sps military personnel and discuss the matter further. The military controller (the controller was apparently in the tower and saw our departure) informed us that while it was true that the ATIS broadcast did not indicate that runway 17 was closed (he informed us that he had reviewed the ATIS broadcast prior to contacting our company, had found it inadequate and had changed it immediately after our departure) it was the military's understanding that any time the runway lights to a runway were turned off, the runway was closed. This information was never passed on to us at any point or in any form. In my opinion, this situation took place because of the following factors: one, the military did not report the alleged runway closure to anybody. Therefore, none of the reports used to disseminate valuable information to airmen were ever issued. Two, the military also failed to prepare a proper ATIS broadcast to ensure that the runway in question was never used. In retrospect, I think the military needs to participate very closely with the commercial/civilian sector of the aviation community in order to ensure the safety of the flying public. In this particular situation it did not.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: FLC TAKES OFF AT NIGHT ACR ACFT FROM UNLIGHTED RWY.
Narrative: ON OCT/XA/95 AT APPROX XX10 LCL WE TOOK OFF FROM WICHITA FALLS ARPT, TX (SPS), ENRTE TO DALLAS/FT WORTH INTL ARPT (DFW). BECAUSE THE TWR WAS CLOSED ALL OUR INTENTIONS WERE ANNOUNCED ON THE CTAF. THE CAPT (PF) DECIDED TO USE RWY 17 BECAUSE THE WINDS WERE 150 DEGS 08 KTS AND THE PERFORMANCE DATA RPT (VAQ RPT) WAS ADEQUATE FOR THAT RWY. OUR STATION GND PERSONNEL AND OUR COMPANY'S FIELD CONDITION RPT INDICATED ALL RWYS OPEN AND DRY (INCLUDING RWY 17). THE ATIS RPT (MONITORED PRIOR TO DEP) DID NOT DIFFER FROM OUR COMPANY'S RPT. THERE WERE NO NOTAM RPTS, AT THE TIME OF OUR DEP, TO DISPUTE THE INFO GIVEN TO US BY OUR COMPANY OR THE ATIS BROADCAST. WITH ALL THIS INFO IN HAND THE CAPT'S DECISION TO USE RWY 17 WAS NOT DISPUTED. THE DEP WAS INITIATED VFR BECAUSE WE WERE UNABLE TO ESTABLISH RADIO CONTACT WITH ATC (ALL OF THE RPTED FREQS WERE ATTEMPTED). SHORTLY AFTER THE TKOF ROLL WAS INITIATED IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT THE RWY LIGHTS WERE INOP (THE LIGHTS FROM THE TXWYS SURROUNDING THE AREA TOGETHER WITH THE ILLUMINATION EFFECT CREATED BY THE LIGHTS OF THE HUGE MIL RAMP JUST N OF THE DEP END OF RWY 17 RESULTED IN THE APPEARANCE OF A PERFECTLY LIT RWY). IT WAS DECIDED TO CONTINUE BECAUSE WE HAD ADEQUATE WX (VMC)/VISIBILITY, FIELD CONDITION RPTS, RWY MARKINGS, AND THE ACFT'S TAXI AND LNDG LIGHTS WERE ILLUMINATING THE RWY ADEQUATELY. AFTER DEP WE ESTABLISH RADIO CONTACT WITH ZFW AND PROCEEDED IFR TO DFW. ON THE ENRTE PORTION OF OUR FLT WE RECEIVED A COMPANY MESSAGE VIA ACARS. THE DISPATCHER INFORMED US THAT SOMEBODY AT SPS HAD CALLED THE COMPANY TO INQUIRE AS TO THE UTILIZATION OF RWY 17 FOR DEP. AFTER CONTACTING DISPATCH THE CAPT WAS ABLE TO CONTACT SPS MIL PERSONNEL AND DISCUSS THE MATTER FURTHER. THE MIL CTLR (THE CTLR WAS APPARENTLY IN THE TWR AND SAW OUR DEP) INFORMED US THAT WHILE IT WAS TRUE THAT THE ATIS BROADCAST DID NOT INDICATE THAT RWY 17 WAS CLOSED (HE INFORMED US THAT HE HAD REVIEWED THE ATIS BROADCAST PRIOR TO CONTACTING OUR COMPANY, HAD FOUND IT INADEQUATE AND HAD CHANGED IT IMMEDIATELY AFTER OUR DEP) IT WAS THE MIL'S UNDERSTANDING THAT ANY TIME THE RWY LIGHTS TO A RWY WERE TURNED OFF, THE RWY WAS CLOSED. THIS INFO WAS NEVER PASSED ON TO US AT ANY POINT OR IN ANY FORM. IN MY OPINION, THIS SIT TOOK PLACE BECAUSE OF THE FOLLOWING FACTORS: ONE, THE MIL DID NOT RPT THE ALLEGED RWY CLOSURE TO ANYBODY. THEREFORE, NONE OF THE RPTS USED TO DISSEMINATE VALUABLE INFO TO AIRMEN WERE EVER ISSUED. TWO, THE MIL ALSO FAILED TO PREPARE A PROPER ATIS BROADCAST TO ENSURE THAT THE RWY IN QUESTION WAS NEVER USED. IN RETROSPECT, I THINK THE MIL NEEDS TO PARTICIPATE VERY CLOSELY WITH THE COMMERCIAL/CIVILIAN SECTOR OF THE AVIATION COMMUNITY IN ORDER TO ENSURE THE SAFETY OF THE FLYING PUBLIC. IN THIS PARTICULAR SIT IT DID NOT.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.