Narrative:

On the last leg of our day we had a trip to nassau, bahamas, from miami. The WX at NAS and mia was VFR, scattered clouds only. A forecast for nassau showed that the ceiling may possibly go to broken so our dispatch gave us an alternate of back to mia. 3100 pounds of fuel was required for the trip, including alternate, IFR reserve fuel and additional taxi fuel. We noticed on our descent check into NAS that we were not only way below the fuel amount we should have had, but we had left mia without being fueled at all. 1000 pounds of fuel was all that remained on the aircraft. We had a strong tail wind and the VFR visibility was at least 20 plus mi, so we opted to continue and land at NAS, computing that our 20 min to go on the trip and our fuel burn was such that we could make NAS with VFR reserves. We landed with 850 pounds, approximately 1 hour of fuel. We determined that we had left mia with 1650 pounds of fuel from our previous trip leg, and ACARS confirmed. Luckily we had extra fuel on the aircraft due to possible alternate requirements from the previously flown leg. Events: we had not been following the complete before start checklist which addresses fuel amount. We were shortcutting by setting up our navigation radios and doing a before start memory box to start. Complacency and repetition of the same list 4-5 times a day. We had become reliant on the fuelers always fueling the aircraft. Neither of us checked the fuel amount on board versus the release fuel. On the after start, a challenge and response was given addressing fuel, but neither of us again actually looked at the gauges. Complacency.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLC FAILED TO CHK ACTUAL FUEL LOAD DURING PREFLT RESULTING IN THE ACFT DEPARTING WITHOUT THE PROPOSED AMOUNT OF FUEL FOR THE TRIP PLANNED.

Narrative: ON THE LAST LEG OF OUR DAY WE HAD A TRIP TO NASSAU, BAHAMAS, FROM MIAMI. THE WX AT NAS AND MIA WAS VFR, SCATTERED CLOUDS ONLY. A FORECAST FOR NASSAU SHOWED THAT THE CEILING MAY POSSIBLY GO TO BROKEN SO OUR DISPATCH GAVE US AN ALTERNATE OF BACK TO MIA. 3100 LBS OF FUEL WAS REQUIRED FOR THE TRIP, INCLUDING ALTERNATE, IFR RESERVE FUEL AND ADDITIONAL TAXI FUEL. WE NOTICED ON OUR DSCNT CHK INTO NAS THAT WE WERE NOT ONLY WAY BELOW THE FUEL AMOUNT WE SHOULD HAVE HAD, BUT WE HAD LEFT MIA WITHOUT BEING FUELED AT ALL. 1000 LBS OF FUEL WAS ALL THAT REMAINED ON THE ACFT. WE HAD A STRONG TAIL WIND AND THE VFR VISIBILITY WAS AT LEAST 20 PLUS MI, SO WE OPTED TO CONTINUE AND LAND AT NAS, COMPUTING THAT OUR 20 MIN TO GO ON THE TRIP AND OUR FUEL BURN WAS SUCH THAT WE COULD MAKE NAS WITH VFR RESERVES. WE LANDED WITH 850 LBS, APPROX 1 HR OF FUEL. WE DETERMINED THAT WE HAD LEFT MIA WITH 1650 LBS OF FUEL FROM OUR PREVIOUS TRIP LEG, AND ACARS CONFIRMED. LUCKILY WE HAD EXTRA FUEL ON THE ACFT DUE TO POSSIBLE ALTERNATE REQUIREMENTS FROM THE PREVIOUSLY FLOWN LEG. EVENTS: WE HAD NOT BEEN FOLLOWING THE COMPLETE BEFORE START CHKLIST WHICH ADDRESSES FUEL AMOUNT. WE WERE SHORTCUTTING BY SETTING UP OUR NAV RADIOS AND DOING A BEFORE START MEMORY BOX TO START. COMPLACENCY AND REPETITION OF THE SAME LIST 4-5 TIMES A DAY. WE HAD BECOME RELIANT ON THE FUELERS ALWAYS FUELING THE ACFT. NEITHER OF US CHKED THE FUEL AMOUNT ON BOARD VERSUS THE RELEASE FUEL. ON THE AFTER START, A CHALLENGE AND RESPONSE WAS GIVEN ADDRESSING FUEL, BUT NEITHER OF US AGAIN ACTUALLY LOOKED AT THE GAUGES. COMPLACENCY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.