Narrative:

Immediately after takeoff power was applied, a cargo door light illuminated. The takeoff was discontinued and we returned to the ramp area where maintenance confirmed the cargo doors were closed and latched. (We were unsure as to which door had illuminated.) we departed again and attempted a second takeoff. With the application of takeoff power the forward cargo door light illuminated and we once again discontinued our takeoff and returned to a gate where we had maintenance inspect and placard the cargo door. What I have described sounds straight forward. However, the fact that this occurred in atl complicated events immensely. If we would have been at an out station, we would have had the time to work everything out in an unhurried and relaxed setting. In actuality, I spent a good amount of my time and thoughts on irrelevant, but necessary actions. At various times we talked to 5 different people -- ground personnel, ramp control, maintenance, dispatch and a mechanic through the headset. We were also keeping the passenger and flight attendants apprised of the situation. We moved the aircraft twice and at all times were carrying on at least 2 conversations on 2 different radios. This created a situation where I was ultimately uncomfortable with the outcome (the second light) and choose to stop everything and return to the gate. In the end, I think the desire to speed events up may have slowed them down. If we would have been allowed to return to the gate after our first rejected takeoff and met a mechanic face to face we may have eliminated some of the confusion and incurred less of a delay. As a pilot I am trained to deal with aircraft emergencys in a safe and timely manner. The questions in my mind in this situation were more towards whether or not, I was legal and had correctly done the paperwork. To this end, I needed more time to carefully work out the process. (As a note as part of cost-cutting, the pilots at our company are being asked to do many of the write-ups that mechanics used to do. It is now our job to make sure MEL items are correctly taken care of.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CAPT OF AN MLG MADE 2 ABORTED TKOFS DUE TO CARGO DOOR UNSAFE LIGHT ILLUMINATING.

Narrative: IMMEDIATELY AFTER TKOF PWR WAS APPLIED, A CARGO DOOR LIGHT ILLUMINATED. THE TKOF WAS DISCONTINUED AND WE RETURNED TO THE RAMP AREA WHERE MAINT CONFIRMED THE CARGO DOORS WERE CLOSED AND LATCHED. (WE WERE UNSURE AS TO WHICH DOOR HAD ILLUMINATED.) WE DEPARTED AGAIN AND ATTEMPTED A SECOND TKOF. WITH THE APPLICATION OF TKOF PWR THE FORWARD CARGO DOOR LIGHT ILLUMINATED AND WE ONCE AGAIN DISCONTINUED OUR TKOF AND RETURNED TO A GATE WHERE WE HAD MAINT INSPECT AND PLACARD THE CARGO DOOR. WHAT I HAVE DESCRIBED SOUNDS STRAIGHT FORWARD. HOWEVER, THE FACT THAT THIS OCCURRED IN ATL COMPLICATED EVENTS IMMENSELY. IF WE WOULD HAVE BEEN AT AN OUT STATION, WE WOULD HAVE HAD THE TIME TO WORK EVERYTHING OUT IN AN UNHURRIED AND RELAXED SETTING. IN ACTUALITY, I SPENT A GOOD AMOUNT OF MY TIME AND THOUGHTS ON IRRELEVANT, BUT NECESSARY ACTIONS. AT VARIOUS TIMES WE TALKED TO 5 DIFFERENT PEOPLE -- GND PERSONNEL, RAMP CTL, MAINT, DISPATCH AND A MECH THROUGH THE HEADSET. WE WERE ALSO KEEPING THE PAX AND FLT ATTENDANTS APPRISED OF THE SIT. WE MOVED THE ACFT TWICE AND AT ALL TIMES WERE CARRYING ON AT LEAST 2 CONVERSATIONS ON 2 DIFFERENT RADIOS. THIS CREATED A SIT WHERE I WAS ULTIMATELY UNCOMFORTABLE WITH THE OUTCOME (THE SECOND LIGHT) AND CHOOSE TO STOP EVERYTHING AND RETURN TO THE GATE. IN THE END, I THINK THE DESIRE TO SPD EVENTS UP MAY HAVE SLOWED THEM DOWN. IF WE WOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO RETURN TO THE GATE AFTER OUR FIRST REJECTED TKOF AND MET A MECH FACE TO FACE WE MAY HAVE ELIMINATED SOME OF THE CONFUSION AND INCURRED LESS OF A DELAY. AS A PLT I AM TRAINED TO DEAL WITH ACFT EMERS IN A SAFE AND TIMELY MANNER. THE QUESTIONS IN MY MIND IN THIS SIT WERE MORE TOWARDS WHETHER OR NOT, I WAS LEGAL AND HAD CORRECTLY DONE THE PAPERWORK. TO THIS END, I NEEDED MORE TIME TO CAREFULLY WORK OUT THE PROCESS. (AS A NOTE AS PART OF COST-CUTTING, THE PLTS AT OUR COMPANY ARE BEING ASKED TO DO MANY OF THE WRITE-UPS THAT MECHS USED TO DO. IT IS NOW OUR JOB TO MAKE SURE MEL ITEMS ARE CORRECTLY TAKEN CARE OF.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.