Narrative:

On dec/xx/95, an incident occurred aboard flight between london (gatwick) and minneapolis involving several passenger who got drunk and extremely rowdy in the coach cabin. I was serving as so in the cockpit. The captain of the aircraft was required to visit the cabin more than once to warn these passenger and finally restrained one of them. The flight was subsequently met in minneapolis by federal law enforcement agents. The facts of this episode are no doubt clearly related in the report of captain X. As I did not depart the cockpit for any dealings with these passenger, this report will focus mostly on what went on in the cockpit during the captain's required absences. In my judgement, the presence of the captain in the cabin was absolutely necessary to deal with the escalating level of disturbance there. He met this disturbance with a gradually escalating and appropriate response. Since there were no physical injuries at any time during the flight, and since there was no safety threat to the aircraft, the captain's decision to continue to minneapolis, especially in light of our position over the northeast portions of canada and the lack of optimum landing sites is, in my mind, wholly justified. What fell to the first officer and me was to make sure the aircraft was properly flown in accordance with all FAA and air carrier procedures. We established an understanding between ourselves in the following areas: the captain might be away for some time, and decision-making in his absence would fall to the first officer, then to me. It was absolutely imperative that one of us stay out of the passenger problem and concentrate on flying the aircraft, obviously this was going to be the first officer. I handled all communications arranging for the gathering of forces to meet the flight and exploring WX at possible divert airfields. In addition, I backed up the first officer with a listening watch on ATC frequency. It was going to be crucial not to stray from our planned course through inattn to the navigation of the aircraft, so we crosschecked our position constantly in accordance with procedures. We discussed the possibility that the captain might be injured or even incapacitated, and began considering what the first officer's decisions might be, in terms of diverting, in this event. He selected a divert field and we investigated the WX there. At no time was the flight in danger or off course during the captain's absences from the cockpit. We received no calls from ATC other than routine communication, and in my judgement we succeeded in conducting the flight safely during a very difficult situation in the cabin.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: DRUNK AND UNRULY PAX REQUIRE THE CAPT'S PRESENCE IN CABIN FOR ULTIMATE RESTRAINING OF ONE PAX.

Narrative: ON DEC/XX/95, AN INCIDENT OCCURRED ABOARD FLT BTWN LONDON (GATWICK) AND MINNEAPOLIS INVOLVING SEVERAL PAX WHO GOT DRUNK AND EXTREMELY ROWDY IN THE COACH CABIN. I WAS SERVING AS SO IN THE COCKPIT. THE CAPT OF THE ACFT WAS REQUIRED TO VISIT THE CABIN MORE THAN ONCE TO WARN THESE PAX AND FINALLY RESTRAINED ONE OF THEM. THE FLT WAS SUBSEQUENTLY MET IN MINNEAPOLIS BY FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENTS. THE FACTS OF THIS EPISODE ARE NO DOUBT CLRLY RELATED IN THE RPT OF CAPT X. AS I DID NOT DEPART THE COCKPIT FOR ANY DEALINGS WITH THESE PAX, THIS RPT WILL FOCUS MOSTLY ON WHAT WENT ON IN THE COCKPIT DURING THE CAPT'S REQUIRED ABSENCES. IN MY JUDGEMENT, THE PRESENCE OF THE CAPT IN THE CABIN WAS ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY TO DEAL WITH THE ESCALATING LEVEL OF DISTURBANCE THERE. HE MET THIS DISTURBANCE WITH A GRADUALLY ESCALATING AND APPROPRIATE RESPONSE. SINCE THERE WERE NO PHYSICAL INJURIES AT ANY TIME DURING THE FLT, AND SINCE THERE WAS NO SAFETY THREAT TO THE ACFT, THE CAPT'S DECISION TO CONTINUE TO MINNEAPOLIS, ESPECIALLY IN LIGHT OF OUR POS OVER THE NE PORTIONS OF CANADA AND THE LACK OF OPTIMUM LNDG SITES IS, IN MY MIND, WHOLLY JUSTIFIED. WHAT FELL TO THE FO AND ME WAS TO MAKE SURE THE ACFT WAS PROPERLY FLOWN IN ACCORDANCE WITH ALL FAA AND ACR PROCS. WE ESTABLISHED AN UNDERSTANDING BTWN OURSELVES IN THE FOLLOWING AREAS: THE CAPT MIGHT BE AWAY FOR SOME TIME, AND DECISION-MAKING IN HIS ABSENCE WOULD FALL TO THE FO, THEN TO ME. IT WAS ABSOLUTELY IMPERATIVE THAT ONE OF US STAY OUT OF THE PAX PROB AND CONCENTRATE ON FLYING THE ACFT, OBVIOUSLY THIS WAS GOING TO BE THE FO. I HANDLED ALL COMS ARRANGING FOR THE GATHERING OF FORCES TO MEET THE FLT AND EXPLORING WX AT POSSIBLE DIVERT AIRFIELDS. IN ADDITION, I BACKED UP THE FO WITH A LISTENING WATCH ON ATC FREQ. IT WAS GOING TO BE CRUCIAL NOT TO STRAY FROM OUR PLANNED COURSE THROUGH INATTN TO THE NAV OF THE ACFT, SO WE XCHKED OUR POS CONSTANTLY IN ACCORDANCE WITH PROCS. WE DISCUSSED THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE CAPT MIGHT BE INJURED OR EVEN INCAPACITATED, AND BEGAN CONSIDERING WHAT THE FO'S DECISIONS MIGHT BE, IN TERMS OF DIVERTING, IN THIS EVENT. HE SELECTED A DIVERT FIELD AND WE INVESTIGATED THE WX THERE. AT NO TIME WAS THE FLT IN DANGER OR OFF COURSE DURING THE CAPT'S ABSENCES FROM THE COCKPIT. WE RECEIVED NO CALLS FROM ATC OTHER THAN ROUTINE COM, AND IN MY JUDGEMENT WE SUCCEEDED IN CONDUCTING THE FLT SAFELY DURING A VERY DIFFICULT SIT IN THE CABIN.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.