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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 324760 |
Time | |
Date | 199601 |
Day | Thu |
Local Time Of Day | 1801 To 2400 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : sea |
State Reference | WA |
Altitude | agl bound lower : 0 agl bound upper : 0 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | IMC |
Light | Night |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | tracon : sea tower : sea artcc : zdc |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | Commercial Fixed Wing |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Navigation In Use | Other Other |
Flight Phase | climbout : initial climbout : intermediate altitude ground : preflight |
Route In Use | departure other departure sid : sid |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : atp pilot : commercial pilot : instrument |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 150 flight time total : 9500 flight time type : 3500 |
ASRS Report | 324760 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Qualification | pilot : instrument pilot : commercial |
Events | |
Anomaly | non adherence : far non adherence : published procedure other anomaly other other spatial deviation |
Independent Detector | other controllera |
Resolutory Action | controller : issued new clearance flight crew : returned to intended course or assigned course other |
Consequence | faa : reviewed incident with flight crew |
Supplementary | |
Primary Problem | Flight Crew Human Performance |
Air Traffic Incident | Pilot Deviation |
Narrative:
We were running late and in a hurry, already 8 hours into our scheduled 11 hour 20 min crew day, we were trying to recover time lost earlier in the day. The first officer needed something to eat so while he was getting dinner I got our outbound clearance (usually the first officer's responsibility) and read back our clearance for the summa 5 departure. Upon the first officer's return I briefed him that we were cleared by the elmma 5 departure. Neither of us caught the error, although, while I was reviewing elmma 5 I questioned in my mind the routing (I did not ask the first officer his opinion of our routing, which probably would have caught my error). We departed using the elmma departure, and upon making our turn out of the airport area, seattle approach idented our error and asked if we were flying the summa 5. We immediately realized our error and graciously accepted his vector toward our course. No conflict with other aircraft occurred and seattle departure did an excellent job of controling the situation. Two unfortunately typical things contributed to this event. 1) we (I) let the schedule influence our decisions. 2) when I first questioned our routing I did not verbalize my concern to the first officer. If we had slowed our pace and performed our normal duties the confusion would have been avoided.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: ACR FLC COPIED THE CORRECT SID, BUT BRIEFED AND FLEW THE WRONG SID. THE ALERT DEP CTLR INTERVENED AND VECTORED THE FLC TO THE CORRECT RTE.
Narrative: WE WERE RUNNING LATE AND IN A HURRY, ALREADY 8 HRS INTO OUR SCHEDULED 11 HR 20 MIN CREW DAY, WE WERE TRYING TO RECOVER TIME LOST EARLIER IN THE DAY. THE FO NEEDED SOMETHING TO EAT SO WHILE HE WAS GETTING DINNER I GOT OUR OUTBOUND CLRNC (USUALLY THE FO'S RESPONSIBILITY) AND READ BACK OUR CLRNC FOR THE SUMMA 5 DEP. UPON THE FO'S RETURN I BRIEFED HIM THAT WE WERE CLRED BY THE ELMMA 5 DEP. NEITHER OF US CAUGHT THE ERROR, ALTHOUGH, WHILE I WAS REVIEWING ELMMA 5 I QUESTIONED IN MY MIND THE ROUTING (I DID NOT ASK THE FO HIS OPINION OF OUR ROUTING, WHICH PROBABLY WOULD HAVE CAUGHT MY ERROR). WE DEPARTED USING THE ELMMA DEP, AND UPON MAKING OUR TURN OUT OF THE ARPT AREA, SEATTLE APCH IDENTED OUR ERROR AND ASKED IF WE WERE FLYING THE SUMMA 5. WE IMMEDIATELY REALIZED OUR ERROR AND GRACIOUSLY ACCEPTED HIS VECTOR TOWARD OUR COURSE. NO CONFLICT WITH OTHER ACFT OCCURRED AND SEATTLE DEP DID AN EXCELLENT JOB OF CTLING THE SIT. TWO UNFORTUNATELY TYPICAL THINGS CONTRIBUTED TO THIS EVENT. 1) WE (I) LET THE SCHEDULE INFLUENCE OUR DECISIONS. 2) WHEN I FIRST QUESTIONED OUR ROUTING I DID NOT VERBALIZE MY CONCERN TO THE FO. IF WE HAD SLOWED OUR PACE AND PERFORMED OUR NORMAL DUTIES THE CONFUSION WOULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.