Narrative:

On takeoff at XXX we noticed the right wing was slightly heavy. This condition progressed during climb to FL330 requiring 3+ degrees of aileron trim. We contacted our maintenance facility regarding the trim problem. We decided to continue to YYY. Later, we discovered that fuel was being transferred out of the #3 tank. We had been dispatched with #1 tank gauge inoperative, so we could not be sure what was happening to #1 quantity, but suspected a transfer from #1 tank as well. All fuel should have been coming from #2 tank up to this point. We then suspected that the #2 fuel xfeed valve might be inoperative. We tested it and found that in fact it was inoperative. This meant we did not have access to that fuel to feed #1 and #3 engines. We estimated that we had enough fuel in #1 and #3 tanks to feed their respective engines for another 45-60 mins. We considered the distance to several alternates such as AAA, BBB and CCC. CCC was closest (80 NM) and VFR, so we elected to land there. After maintenance deferred the #2 xfeed valve in the open position, we made all necessary contacts with the company for re-dispatch to ord. All company refueling procedures and flight handbook procedures were followed to refuel the aircraft with an inoperative fuel gauge. We then proceeded to our destination (ord). The #2 xfeed valve was determined to have failed twice during the previous 2 weeks. As I pointed out to our company investigators during a debriefing of the incident, I questioned the wisdom of releasing an aircraft with a fuel quantity guage inoperative on a flight that required a fuel transfer when the #2 xfeed valve had already failed twice before in the past 2 weeks. Supplemental information from acn 325214: preflight procedures for fuel gauge inoperative followed by flight crew and no reason to suspect #1 fuel tank not full for takeoff. I personally suspect that the #1 fuel tank (with inoperative fuel gauge) wasn't fully fueled on the ground at XXX, even though our paperwork indicated that it was. Supplemental information from acn 325195: crew discussed possibilities: 1) overriding feature of #2 tank pumps themselves being overridden by #3 (frequently seen!). 2) possible in-flight fuel transfer (preflight good, panels secure). 3) raised spoiler (wings checked in flight). 4) crosschecked fuel sheet for possible fueler boarding error. At first chkpoint, an 'inoperative fuel gauge' fuel calculation revealed the appearance of more fuel than flight plan required, flagging an immediate need to xchk burn rates and duration of flight to this point to ascertain exactly what we needed. The results revealed a probable imbal between #1 and #3 tanks and an inoperative #2 xfeed vale, which was a repeat of a recently fixed discrepancy in the logbook. Wing bending moments, and imbal (best guess) limitations were checked, and maintenance was repeatedly contacted for expert advice and deferral and in particular for xchk of possible documented trim and fuel imbal correlations. None available. On ground at CCC captain and first officer worked with fueler to commence draining of #1 tank with inoperative fuel gauge. Vto on #3 tank (automatic shutoff) was not functioning. Then #1 fuel valve refused to open electrically. #3 surge tank spilled some fuel (quantity unk) before fueling stopped. This spill was quickly cleaned up by a fire truck standing by. The vto was deferred by maintenance. #1 fuel valve, too, was deferred. 2 requests for dripstick readings were made. Ultimately, in heat of battle to manage multitude of tasks on ground, final parking quantity in #1 tank remained unk.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B727 WAS DISPATCHED WITH A #1 FUEL QUANTITY INDICATOR INOP PER THE MEL. DURING THE CLB THE FLC NOTED EXCESSIVE AILERON TRIM (#1 AND #3 TANK IMBAL) AND THAT THE #2 XFEED VALVE WAS PROBABLY INOP. FUEL CALCULATIONS FOR ACCESS TO LIMITED FUEL DETERMINED THAT 60 MINS OR LESS OF FUEL REMAINED. THE FLT DIVERTED.

Narrative: ON TKOF AT XXX WE NOTICED THE R WING WAS SLIGHTLY HVY. THIS CONDITION PROGRESSED DURING CLB TO FL330 REQUIRING 3+ DEGS OF AILERON TRIM. WE CONTACTED OUR MAINT FACILITY REGARDING THE TRIM PROB. WE DECIDED TO CONTINUE TO YYY. LATER, WE DISCOVERED THAT FUEL WAS BEING TRANSFERRED OUT OF THE #3 TANK. WE HAD BEEN DISPATCHED WITH #1 TANK GAUGE INOP, SO WE COULD NOT BE SURE WHAT WAS HAPPENING TO #1 QUANTITY, BUT SUSPECTED A TRANSFER FROM #1 TANK AS WELL. ALL FUEL SHOULD HAVE BEEN COMING FROM #2 TANK UP TO THIS POINT. WE THEN SUSPECTED THAT THE #2 FUEL XFEED VALVE MIGHT BE INOP. WE TESTED IT AND FOUND THAT IN FACT IT WAS INOP. THIS MEANT WE DID NOT HAVE ACCESS TO THAT FUEL TO FEED #1 AND #3 ENGS. WE ESTIMATED THAT WE HAD ENOUGH FUEL IN #1 AND #3 TANKS TO FEED THEIR RESPECTIVE ENGS FOR ANOTHER 45-60 MINS. WE CONSIDERED THE DISTANCE TO SEVERAL ALTERNATES SUCH AS AAA, BBB AND CCC. CCC WAS CLOSEST (80 NM) AND VFR, SO WE ELECTED TO LAND THERE. AFTER MAINT DEFERRED THE #2 XFEED VALVE IN THE OPEN POS, WE MADE ALL NECESSARY CONTACTS WITH THE COMPANY FOR RE-DISPATCH TO ORD. ALL COMPANY REFUELING PROCS AND FLT HANDBOOK PROCS WERE FOLLOWED TO REFUEL THE ACFT WITH AN INOP FUEL GAUGE. WE THEN PROCEEDED TO OUR DEST (ORD). THE #2 XFEED VALVE WAS DETERMINED TO HAVE FAILED TWICE DURING THE PREVIOUS 2 WKS. AS I POINTED OUT TO OUR COMPANY INVESTIGATORS DURING A DEBRIEFING OF THE INCIDENT, I QUESTIONED THE WISDOM OF RELEASING AN ACFT WITH A FUEL QUANTITY GUAGE INOP ON A FLT THAT REQUIRED A FUEL TRANSFER WHEN THE #2 XFEED VALVE HAD ALREADY FAILED TWICE BEFORE IN THE PAST 2 WKS. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 325214: PREFLT PROCS FOR FUEL GAUGE INOP FOLLOWED BY FLC AND NO REASON TO SUSPECT #1 FUEL TANK NOT FULL FOR TKOF. I PERSONALLY SUSPECT THAT THE #1 FUEL TANK (WITH INOP FUEL GAUGE) WASN'T FULLY FUELED ON THE GND AT XXX, EVEN THOUGH OUR PAPERWORK INDICATED THAT IT WAS. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 325195: CREW DISCUSSED POSSIBILITIES: 1) OVERRIDING FEATURE OF #2 TANK PUMPS THEMSELVES BEING OVERRIDDEN BY #3 (FREQUENTLY SEEN!). 2) POSSIBLE INFLT FUEL TRANSFER (PREFLT GOOD, PANELS SECURE). 3) RAISED SPOILER (WINGS CHKED IN FLT). 4) XCHKED FUEL SHEET FOR POSSIBLE FUELER BOARDING ERROR. AT FIRST CHKPOINT, AN 'INOP FUEL GAUGE' FUEL CALCULATION REVEALED THE APPEARANCE OF MORE FUEL THAN FLT PLAN REQUIRED, FLAGGING AN IMMEDIATE NEED TO XCHK BURN RATES AND DURATION OF FLT TO THIS POINT TO ASCERTAIN EXACTLY WHAT WE NEEDED. THE RESULTS REVEALED A PROBABLE IMBAL BTWN #1 AND #3 TANKS AND AN INOP #2 XFEED VALE, WHICH WAS A REPEAT OF A RECENTLY FIXED DISCREPANCY IN THE LOGBOOK. WING BENDING MOMENTS, AND IMBAL (BEST GUESS) LIMITATIONS WERE CHKED, AND MAINT WAS REPEATEDLY CONTACTED FOR EXPERT ADVICE AND DEFERRAL AND IN PARTICULAR FOR XCHK OF POSSIBLE DOCUMENTED TRIM AND FUEL IMBAL CORRELATIONS. NONE AVAILABLE. ON GND AT CCC CAPT AND FO WORKED WITH FUELER TO COMMENCE DRAINING OF #1 TANK WITH INOP FUEL GAUGE. VTO ON #3 TANK (AUTO SHUTOFF) WAS NOT FUNCTIONING. THEN #1 FUEL VALVE REFUSED TO OPEN ELECTRICALLY. #3 SURGE TANK SPILLED SOME FUEL (QUANTITY UNK) BEFORE FUELING STOPPED. THIS SPILL WAS QUICKLY CLEANED UP BY A FIRE TRUCK STANDING BY. THE VTO WAS DEFERRED BY MAINT. #1 FUEL VALVE, TOO, WAS DEFERRED. 2 REQUESTS FOR DRIPSTICK READINGS WERE MADE. ULTIMATELY, IN HEAT OF BATTLE TO MANAGE MULTITUDE OF TASKS ON GND, FINAL PARKING QUANTITY IN #1 TANK REMAINED UNK.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.