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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 325378 |
Time | |
Date | 199601 |
Day | Thu |
Local Time Of Day | 1801 To 2400 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : ewr |
State Reference | NJ |
Altitude | agl bound lower : 0 agl bound upper : 0 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Dusk |
Aircraft 1 | |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | Commercial Fixed Wing |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | ground : preflight ground other : taxi |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : atp |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 190 flight time total : 20800 flight time type : 15400 |
ASRS Report | 325378 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : second officer |
Qualification | pilot : commercial pilot : cfi pilot : instrument pilot : flight engineer |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 240 flight time total : 10000 flight time type : 7000 |
ASRS Report | 326361 |
Events | |
Anomaly | conflict : ground critical other anomaly other |
Independent Detector | other other : unspecified |
Resolutory Action | none taken : detected after the fact |
Consequence | other |
Supplementary | |
Primary Problem | Flight Crew Human Performance |
Air Traffic Incident | other |
Narrative:
After extended delay in push back and taxi out of the gate because of ramp congestion, 1 ramp person, on a tug, with baggage cart attached came to left forward position in front of the captain's window, as I was slowly advancing in my taxi outbound. He jumped off the tug, waving to obtain my attention, continuing his communication with confusing nonstandard hand signals. I interpreted his signals to mean that he needed access to the baggage compartment to load extra baggage. He did this by a crossed arms signal, and holding up a bag and pointing to the area of the cargo compartment. I reluctantly acknowledged his confusing signal with a 'closed hands' signal indicating that the brakes were set, followed by a forward nod of my head. This ramp person then proceeded with a bag to the right side of the aircraft where the cargo doors are located. Very soon he returned and gave me another signal which I interpreted to mean that he was finished loading bags and I saluted/waved him off. He departed on the tug with the cart proceeding left to right in a prompt manner and disappeared out the right wing area. We were then delayed in our taxi for another 8-10 mins by alley congestion and ATC delays before receiving clearance to proceed with our taxi out. I commenced my taxi very slowly again for a short distance when I felt something unusual. I thought perhaps the scissors on the nosewheel had been improperly installed. I stopped. Once again this same ramp person appeared in front of the aircraft waving and yelling to stop. I set the brakes. We were shortly told via maintenance and by company radio that a baggage cart and a tug were lodged beneath our right wing area near the right landing gear. After several mins, maintenance crews pulled the cart free of the aircraft and we returned to a gate and deplaned. Conclusion: it was XA06 pm when we proceeded with our push back. We were delayed in our actual final taxi out instructions from ground control until XB00 pm because of ramp congestion, ATC delays, lack of ramp personnel and this additional baggage loading. The baggage loading happened at XB52 pm. This was some 40 plus mins after we blocked out of the gate. The additional baggage loading after any initial push back is a bad idea that should not be allowed except under specific rules. If it is allowed, it should be done with 2 ramp persons in attendance, and should be done only via headset verbal communication between the ramp people and the cockpit. 1 person should remain in front of the aircraft to guard against any kind of possible misunderstood communication or other possible unforeseeable problem. In this case it was done with no verbal communication, and signals used were not standard hand signals. The ramp person evidently did not know the proper hand signals, and there was no one in attendance to stand guard against the unforeseeable. Evidently what happened was that the ramp person decided after loading the 1 bag onto the aircraft, he would drive the tug up beside the aircraft by himself, and proceed to load several other bags onto the aircraft. He thought he had communicated to the cockpit that he wanted them to hold longer so he could accomplish this. The cockpit did not interpret his signal that way and concluded the ramp tug driver had completed his baggage loading and was finished. Upon verbal communication from maintenance and via company radio was the first indication that there was a problem with the tug and cart in the right wing area. Improper communication led to this situation which was completely avoidable.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: THE CAPT AUTH VIA HAND SIGNALS AND A NOTE FOR RAMP PERSON TO LOAD A LAST MIN BAG. THE RAMP PERSON INDICATED WITH A SALUTE HE WAS THROUGH. THE RAMP PERSON THEN GOT SOME MORE BAGS AND ELECTED TO LOAD THEM WITHOUT COORDINATING WITH THE CAPT. THE CAPT RAN OVER THE BAGGAGE CART AND TUG.
Narrative: AFTER EXTENDED DELAY IN PUSH BACK AND TAXI OUT OF THE GATE BECAUSE OF RAMP CONGESTION, 1 RAMP PERSON, ON A TUG, WITH BAGGAGE CART ATTACHED CAME TO L FORWARD POS IN FRONT OF THE CAPT'S WINDOW, AS I WAS SLOWLY ADVANCING IN MY TAXI OUTBOUND. HE JUMPED OFF THE TUG, WAVING TO OBTAIN MY ATTN, CONTINUING HIS COM WITH CONFUSING NONSTANDARD HAND SIGNALS. I INTERPRETED HIS SIGNALS TO MEAN THAT HE NEEDED ACCESS TO THE BAGGAGE COMPARTMENT TO LOAD EXTRA BAGGAGE. HE DID THIS BY A CROSSED ARMS SIGNAL, AND HOLDING UP A BAG AND POINTING TO THE AREA OF THE CARGO COMPARTMENT. I RELUCTANTLY ACKNOWLEDGED HIS CONFUSING SIGNAL WITH A 'CLOSED HANDS' SIGNAL INDICATING THAT THE BRAKES WERE SET, FOLLOWED BY A FORWARD NOD OF MY HEAD. THIS RAMP PERSON THEN PROCEEDED WITH A BAG TO THE R SIDE OF THE ACFT WHERE THE CARGO DOORS ARE LOCATED. VERY SOON HE RETURNED AND GAVE ME ANOTHER SIGNAL WHICH I INTERPRETED TO MEAN THAT HE WAS FINISHED LOADING BAGS AND I SALUTED/WAVED HIM OFF. HE DEPARTED ON THE TUG WITH THE CART PROCEEDING L TO R IN A PROMPT MANNER AND DISAPPEARED OUT THE R WING AREA. WE WERE THEN DELAYED IN OUR TAXI FOR ANOTHER 8-10 MINS BY ALLEY CONGESTION AND ATC DELAYS BEFORE RECEIVING CLRNC TO PROCEED WITH OUR TAXI OUT. I COMMENCED MY TAXI VERY SLOWLY AGAIN FOR A SHORT DISTANCE WHEN I FELT SOMETHING UNUSUAL. I THOUGHT PERHAPS THE SCISSORS ON THE NOSEWHEEL HAD BEEN IMPROPERLY INSTALLED. I STOPPED. ONCE AGAIN THIS SAME RAMP PERSON APPEARED IN FRONT OF THE ACFT WAVING AND YELLING TO STOP. I SET THE BRAKES. WE WERE SHORTLY TOLD VIA MAINT AND BY COMPANY RADIO THAT A BAGGAGE CART AND A TUG WERE LODGED BENEATH OUR R WING AREA NEAR THE R LNDG GEAR. AFTER SEVERAL MINS, MAINT CREWS PULLED THE CART FREE OF THE ACFT AND WE RETURNED TO A GATE AND DEPLANED. CONCLUSION: IT WAS XA06 PM WHEN WE PROCEEDED WITH OUR PUSH BACK. WE WERE DELAYED IN OUR ACTUAL FINAL TAXI OUT INSTRUCTIONS FROM GND CTL UNTIL XB00 PM BECAUSE OF RAMP CONGESTION, ATC DELAYS, LACK OF RAMP PERSONNEL AND THIS ADDITIONAL BAGGAGE LOADING. THE BAGGAGE LOADING HAPPENED AT XB52 PM. THIS WAS SOME 40 PLUS MINS AFTER WE BLOCKED OUT OF THE GATE. THE ADDITIONAL BAGGAGE LOADING AFTER ANY INITIAL PUSH BACK IS A BAD IDEA THAT SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED EXCEPT UNDER SPECIFIC RULES. IF IT IS ALLOWED, IT SHOULD BE DONE WITH 2 RAMP PERSONS IN ATTENDANCE, AND SHOULD BE DONE ONLY VIA HEADSET VERBAL COM BTWN THE RAMP PEOPLE AND THE COCKPIT. 1 PERSON SHOULD REMAIN IN FRONT OF THE ACFT TO GUARD AGAINST ANY KIND OF POSSIBLE MISUNDERSTOOD COM OR OTHER POSSIBLE UNFORESEEABLE PROB. IN THIS CASE IT WAS DONE WITH NO VERBAL COM, AND SIGNALS USED WERE NOT STANDARD HAND SIGNALS. THE RAMP PERSON EVIDENTLY DID NOT KNOW THE PROPER HAND SIGNALS, AND THERE WAS NO ONE IN ATTENDANCE TO STAND GUARD AGAINST THE UNFORESEEABLE. EVIDENTLY WHAT HAPPENED WAS THAT THE RAMP PERSON DECIDED AFTER LOADING THE 1 BAG ONTO THE ACFT, HE WOULD DRIVE THE TUG UP BESIDE THE ACFT BY HIMSELF, AND PROCEED TO LOAD SEVERAL OTHER BAGS ONTO THE ACFT. HE THOUGHT HE HAD COMMUNICATED TO THE COCKPIT THAT HE WANTED THEM TO HOLD LONGER SO HE COULD ACCOMPLISH THIS. THE COCKPIT DID NOT INTERPRET HIS SIGNAL THAT WAY AND CONCLUDED THE RAMP TUG DRIVER HAD COMPLETED HIS BAGGAGE LOADING AND WAS FINISHED. UPON VERBAL COM FROM MAINT AND VIA COMPANY RADIO WAS THE FIRST INDICATION THAT THERE WAS A PROB WITH THE TUG AND CART IN THE R WING AREA. IMPROPER COM LED TO THIS SIT WHICH WAS COMPLETELY AVOIDABLE.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.