Narrative:

A DC9-32 was scheduled to depart atl for bna at XA55 EST. Due to WX delays throughout the day, we departed the gate at XC25 EST. The aircraft was cleared to taxi to runway 26. Due to the amount of ice and snow on the taxiway, we elected to hold before-takeoff checks until reaching the end of the runway to preclude any ice and snow contamination to the flaps. A snowplow with a mechanical problem blocked access to the runway on taxiway east. ATC cleared us to back-taxi via the runway at intersection dixie. Since the runway was mostly clear of contamination, before-takeoff checks were accomplished during back-taxi. I was assigned to fly the leg to bna by the captain. Takeoff and rotation were normal. After the call of positive rate of climb, I requested gear up. The gear lever was moved to retract by the captain. He experienced difficulty raising the gear lever and attempted a second time to raise the gear lever. The captain tested the nose steering wheel for movement and noted no movement. Gear retraction was accomplished by pressing the gear handle release button as described in the QRH section A-28: unable to raise gear lever. After successful retraction of the gear, and during retraction of the flaps and slats, the takeoff alert horn began sounding and a note was made of the cabin not pressurizing. The captain took control of the aircraft at this point, reduced power for a quiet climb, and instructed me to read the steps in the unable to raise gear lever checklist. The checklist instructed us to pull the ground control relay circuit breakers (H20 and J20) in order to place the aircraft in flight mode. I pulled the breakers at which time the aircraft began to pressurize and the takeoff warning horn stopped sounding. The captain flew the aircraft to 10000 ft while I performed the climb checklist. Once above 10000 ft and on automatic pilot, the captain transferred control of the aircraft to me and asked for the QRH to ensure full completion of the checklist and to study further the actions that were necessary to safely land the aircraft. Discussion ensued between the captain and myself as to the nature of the problem and we agreed to continue to bna. We informed her that maintenance in bna would correct the problem. Normal descent and approach checks were accomplished and the APU was started in anticipation of the approach and landing in icing conditions. ATIS was received indicating marginal VFR conditions and strong surface winds. ATC instructed us to expect an ILS to runway 2R. Normal before-landing checks were accomplished and the ILS to runway 2R bna was flown by me to visual conditions. Airfoil and airframe ice protection were used during the approach. Additional airspeed was carried throughout the approach due to a strong crosswind. At an altitude of approximately 100 ft AGL, the captain verified a 0 psi differential on the cabin differential pressure gauge and reset the ground control relay circuit breakers (H20 and J20). The cabin outflow valve began to move to full open and I noted this to the captain. At the same time the aircraft began an excessive sink rate as I heard the sound of the ground spoilers deploying. I shouted, 'ground spoilers!' and attempted to arrest the excessive sink rate with back pressure on the control column and the addition of power. The aircraft impacted the runway in the vicinity of the threshold with a high pitch angle and engines accelerating. The aircraft bounced airborne to an altitude of about 100 ft AGL at which time the captain assumed control of the aircraft. I immediately checked the airspeed and thrust and advised the captain that the aircraft was flying and to keep going. Attempts to contact ATC and advise them of our situation were unsuccessful as was the attempt to tune my navigation radio to the missed approach frequency. I advised the captain to attempt to stay VFR since we could not communicate or navigation due to radio failures. The captain elected to stay VFR and make an immediate return to the airfield. I accomplished the climb checklist as he began a right turn back to the airport. This was the initial direction of the missed approach procedure. The decision was made to leave the landing gear down due to possible damage. The flaps and slats were not retracted beyond the takeoff position. I located the bna tower atadistance to the southwest and advised the captain of a course to steer to set the aircraft in position for the right base and turn to final for runway 31. The transponder was set to emergency at the command of the captain. I advised him of the relative position of the aircraft to the runway and the length of the runway. Before-landing checks were completed prior to landing. Crash and rescue equipment were observed rushing to the runway as we made our final approach. Touchdown was made on the main gear in the center of the runway. The ground spoilers were manually deployed. When the nosewheel touched the runway, a loud grinding sound was heard and felt. The aircraft began a slight left drift and correction was made back toward the centerline. The aircraft stopped west of the runway 2L intersection. The engines were stopped and the after-landing items were completed with the exception of full flap retraction due to possible slat/flap damage and the possibility of an emergency evacuate/evacuation. Crash and rescue equipment arrived in a very short time and I opened my direct vision window to communicate with the crash crew. An assessment was made by the crash crew as to any potential fire hazard due to fuel leakage. We were informed that there were no leaks and that the area appeared safe. We were also informed that the nosewheel was gone. At this time the captain made an announcement to the passenger to remain seated. We asked if there were any injuries to passenger and inquired about the condition of the cabin. We were told that everyone was all right and the cabin was secure. Rescue personnel brought a ladder to the airplane and I made a quick exterior post-landing inspection of the aircraft. I noted damage to the underside empennage area of the tail section and engine cowl damage to the underside of the left engine. I noted a fluid leaking from the area of the APU and sampled the fluid in my hand. It was not jet fuel and appeared to be water. I reported back to the captain the extent of the damage observed and recommended that deplaning not be accomplished via the aft stairway due to damage in this area. The forward stairs were lowered and locked in place. The decision was made by the captain to keep the passenger aboard the aircraft until they could be placed on buses that had been requested. The APU was shut down and the cockpit secured. The captain made a call to system operations control to report the incident.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: THE LNDG GEAR HANDLE WOULD NOT RAISE TO RETRACT THE LNDG GEAR AFTER TKOF. THE QRH WAS CONSULTED FOR OVERRIDING THE GEAR HANDLE UP. THE QRH PROCS WERE FOLLOWED TO PULL CIRCUIT BREAKERS TO PLACE THE ACFT LOGIC IN THE AIR AS PER THE QRH. PRIOR TO LNDG THE FLC FOLLOWED THE QRH PROCS TO PLACE THE ACFT LOGIC ON THE GND. THE GND SPOILERS DEPLOYED RESULTING IN A HARD LNDG WHICH WAS BALKED AND A GAR ENSUED WITH A RETURN TO A SAFE LNDG.

Narrative: A DC9-32 WAS SCHEDULED TO DEPART ATL FOR BNA AT XA55 EST. DUE TO WX DELAYS THROUGHOUT THE DAY, WE DEPARTED THE GATE AT XC25 EST. THE ACFT WAS CLRED TO TAXI TO RWY 26. DUE TO THE AMOUNT OF ICE AND SNOW ON THE TXWY, WE ELECTED TO HOLD BEFORE-TKOF CHKS UNTIL REACHING THE END OF THE RWY TO PRECLUDE ANY ICE AND SNOW CONTAMINATION TO THE FLAPS. A SNOWPLOW WITH A MECHANICAL PROB BLOCKED ACCESS TO THE RWY ON TXWY E. ATC CLRED US TO BACK-TAXI VIA THE RWY AT INTXN DIXIE. SINCE THE RWY WAS MOSTLY CLR OF CONTAMINATION, BEFORE-TKOF CHKS WERE ACCOMPLISHED DURING BACK-TAXI. I WAS ASSIGNED TO FLY THE LEG TO BNA BY THE CAPT. TKOF AND ROTATION WERE NORMAL. AFTER THE CALL OF POSITIVE RATE OF CLB, I REQUESTED GEAR UP. THE GEAR LEVER WAS MOVED TO RETRACT BY THE CAPT. HE EXPERIENCED DIFFICULTY RAISING THE GEAR LEVER AND ATTEMPTED A SECOND TIME TO RAISE THE GEAR LEVER. THE CAPT TESTED THE NOSE STEERING WHEEL FOR MOVEMENT AND NOTED NO MOVEMENT. GEAR RETRACTION WAS ACCOMPLISHED BY PRESSING THE GEAR HANDLE RELEASE BUTTON AS DESCRIBED IN THE QRH SECTION A-28: UNABLE TO RAISE GEAR LEVER. AFTER SUCCESSFUL RETRACTION OF THE GEAR, AND DURING RETRACTION OF THE FLAPS AND SLATS, THE TKOF ALERT HORN BEGAN SOUNDING AND A NOTE WAS MADE OF THE CABIN NOT PRESSURIZING. THE CAPT TOOK CTL OF THE ACFT AT THIS POINT, REDUCED PWR FOR A QUIET CLB, AND INSTRUCTED ME TO READ THE STEPS IN THE UNABLE TO RAISE GEAR LEVER CHKLIST. THE CHKLIST INSTRUCTED US TO PULL THE GND CTL RELAY CIRCUIT BREAKERS (H20 AND J20) IN ORDER TO PLACE THE ACFT IN FLT MODE. I PULLED THE BREAKERS AT WHICH TIME THE ACFT BEGAN TO PRESSURIZE AND THE TKOF WARNING HORN STOPPED SOUNDING. THE CAPT FLEW THE ACFT TO 10000 FT WHILE I PERFORMED THE CLB CHKLIST. ONCE ABOVE 10000 FT AND ON AUTOMATIC PLT, THE CAPT TRANSFERRED CTL OF THE ACFT TO ME AND ASKED FOR THE QRH TO ENSURE FULL COMPLETION OF THE CHKLIST AND TO STUDY FURTHER THE ACTIONS THAT WERE NECESSARY TO SAFELY LAND THE ACFT. DISCUSSION ENSUED BTWN THE CAPT AND MYSELF AS TO THE NATURE OF THE PROB AND WE AGREED TO CONTINUE TO BNA. WE INFORMED HER THAT MAINT IN BNA WOULD CORRECT THE PROB. NORMAL DSCNT AND APCH CHKS WERE ACCOMPLISHED AND THE APU WAS STARTED IN ANTICIPATION OF THE APCH AND LNDG IN ICING CONDITIONS. ATIS WAS RECEIVED INDICATING MARGINAL VFR CONDITIONS AND STRONG SURFACE WINDS. ATC INSTRUCTED US TO EXPECT AN ILS TO RWY 2R. NORMAL BEFORE-LNDG CHKS WERE ACCOMPLISHED AND THE ILS TO RWY 2R BNA WAS FLOWN BY ME TO VISUAL CONDITIONS. AIRFOIL AND AIRFRAME ICE PROTECTION WERE USED DURING THE APCH. ADDITIONAL AIRSPD WAS CARRIED THROUGHOUT THE APCH DUE TO A STRONG XWIND. AT AN ALT OF APPROX 100 FT AGL, THE CAPT VERIFIED A 0 PSI DIFFERENTIAL ON THE CABIN DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE GAUGE AND RESET THE GND CTL RELAY CIRCUIT BREAKERS (H20 AND J20). THE CABIN OUTFLOW VALVE BEGAN TO MOVE TO FULL OPEN AND I NOTED THIS TO THE CAPT. AT THE SAME TIME THE ACFT BEGAN AN EXCESSIVE SINK RATE AS I HEARD THE SOUND OF THE GND SPOILERS DEPLOYING. I SHOUTED, 'GND SPOILERS!' AND ATTEMPTED TO ARREST THE EXCESSIVE SINK RATE WITH BACK PRESSURE ON THE CTL COLUMN AND THE ADDITION OF PWR. THE ACFT IMPACTED THE RWY IN THE VICINITY OF THE THRESHOLD WITH A HIGH PITCH ANGLE AND ENGS ACCELERATING. THE ACFT BOUNCED AIRBORNE TO AN ALT OF ABOUT 100 FT AGL AT WHICH TIME THE CAPT ASSUMED CTL OF THE ACFT. I IMMEDIATELY CHKED THE AIRSPD AND THRUST AND ADVISED THE CAPT THAT THE ACFT WAS FLYING AND TO KEEP GOING. ATTEMPTS TO CONTACT ATC AND ADVISE THEM OF OUR SIT WERE UNSUCCESSFUL AS WAS THE ATTEMPT TO TUNE MY NAV RADIO TO THE MISSED APCH FREQ. I ADVISED THE CAPT TO ATTEMPT TO STAY VFR SINCE WE COULD NOT COMMUNICATE OR NAV DUE TO RADIO FAILURES. THE CAPT ELECTED TO STAY VFR AND MAKE AN IMMEDIATE RETURN TO THE AIRFIELD. I ACCOMPLISHED THE CLB CHKLIST AS HE BEGAN A R TURN BACK TO THE ARPT. THIS WAS THE INITIAL DIRECTION OF THE MISSED APCH PROC. THE DECISION WAS MADE TO LEAVE THE LNDG GEAR DOWN DUE TO POSSIBLE DAMAGE. THE FLAPS AND SLATS WERE NOT RETRACTED BEYOND THE TKOF POS. I LOCATED THE BNA TWR ATADISTANCE TO THE SW AND ADVISED THE CAPT OF A COURSE TO STEER TO SET THE ACFT IN POS FOR THE R BASE AND TURN TO FINAL FOR RWY 31. THE XPONDER WAS SET TO EMER AT THE COMMAND OF THE CAPT. I ADVISED HIM OF THE RELATIVE POS OF THE ACFT TO THE RWY AND THE LENGTH OF THE RWY. BEFORE-LNDG CHKS WERE COMPLETED PRIOR TO LNDG. CRASH AND RESCUE EQUIP WERE OBSERVED RUSHING TO THE RWY AS WE MADE OUR FINAL APCH. TOUCHDOWN WAS MADE ON THE MAIN GEAR IN THE CTR OF THE RWY. THE GND SPOILERS WERE MANUALLY DEPLOYED. WHEN THE NOSEWHEEL TOUCHED THE RWY, A LOUD GRINDING SOUND WAS HEARD AND FELT. THE ACFT BEGAN A SLIGHT L DRIFT AND CORRECTION WAS MADE BACK TOWARD THE CTRLINE. THE ACFT STOPPED W OF THE RWY 2L INTXN. THE ENGS WERE STOPPED AND THE AFTER-LNDG ITEMS WERE COMPLETED WITH THE EXCEPTION OF FULL FLAP RETRACTION DUE TO POSSIBLE SLAT/FLAP DAMAGE AND THE POSSIBILITY OF AN EMER EVAC. CRASH AND RESCUE EQUIP ARRIVED IN A VERY SHORT TIME AND I OPENED MY DIRECT VISION WINDOW TO COMMUNICATE WITH THE CRASH CREW. AN ASSESSMENT WAS MADE BY THE CRASH CREW AS TO ANY POTENTIAL FIRE HAZARD DUE TO FUEL LEAKAGE. WE WERE INFORMED THAT THERE WERE NO LEAKS AND THAT THE AREA APPEARED SAFE. WE WERE ALSO INFORMED THAT THE NOSEWHEEL WAS GONE. AT THIS TIME THE CAPT MADE AN ANNOUNCEMENT TO THE PAX TO REMAIN SEATED. WE ASKED IF THERE WERE ANY INJURIES TO PAX AND INQUIRED ABOUT THE CONDITION OF THE CABIN. WE WERE TOLD THAT EVERYONE WAS ALL RIGHT AND THE CABIN WAS SECURE. RESCUE PERSONNEL BROUGHT A LADDER TO THE AIRPLANE AND I MADE A QUICK EXTERIOR POST-LNDG INSPECTION OF THE ACFT. I NOTED DAMAGE TO THE UNDERSIDE EMPENNAGE AREA OF THE TAIL SECTION AND ENG COWL DAMAGE TO THE UNDERSIDE OF THE L ENG. I NOTED A FLUID LEAKING FROM THE AREA OF THE APU AND SAMPLED THE FLUID IN MY HAND. IT WAS NOT JET FUEL AND APPEARED TO BE WATER. I RPTED BACK TO THE CAPT THE EXTENT OF THE DAMAGE OBSERVED AND RECOMMENDED THAT DEPLANING NOT BE ACCOMPLISHED VIA THE AFT STAIRWAY DUE TO DAMAGE IN THIS AREA. THE FORWARD STAIRS WERE LOWERED AND LOCKED IN PLACE. THE DECISION WAS MADE BY THE CAPT TO KEEP THE PAX ABOARD THE ACFT UNTIL THEY COULD BE PLACED ON BUSES THAT HAD BEEN REQUESTED. THE APU WAS SHUT DOWN AND THE COCKPIT SECURED. THE CAPT MADE A CALL TO SYS OPS CTL TO RPT THE INCIDENT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.