Narrative:

I, like many co-workers, have been transferred to a different base recently. 5 times in the last 6 yrs 'involuntary' and twice 'voluntarily' to be closer to home. The latest transfer was sudden and not expected, and my first officer with identical circumstances, and I were commuting to our new base together. This requires in good WX, 2 hours driving. We reported for 13 hours duty with 6 flts and 7 hours 15 mins of flying, thus causing the both of us to be working with little rest. I had about 3 1/2 hours sleep prior to starting the trip and my first officer only 2 hours. The early commute is, I believe, the single most important factor of this incident, however, it was a decision both me and my first officer made on our own and a poor one at that. Another factor is the lack of a standard way of doing such a vital support service. I also think that the fuelers at dulles will choose to fuel other aircraft before the D328 because it is a difficult airplane to fuel. The fuel panel is in the right wing, 'high wing,' and it does require a big ladder or lift. The sun was shining directly into the cockpit while we were doing the checklist, making the multi-function display's resolution poor at best. Contract service employee entered the flight deck and requested, how much fuel do you need? Both myself and the first officer responded, 'we aren't sure. We haven't received a release yet.' I then stated that we would need fuel probably around 4000 pounds. He then left the airplane and we started to set up the aircraft for departure. While the first officer worked on the ATIS and clearance, I set up the primary flight displays and reviewed the flight plan in the database. We noticed that it was an old routing that we no longer use but we needed a dispatch release to amend it to the current routing. I then left the aircraft to retrieve the paperwork and use the restroom inside the terminal. I was not successful in retrieving the paperwork because both computer terminals at the gate were in use. Both of the agents seemed very busy dealing with passenger and I didn't want to interrupt them. I walked up to the aircraft and was surprised by the way they parked the BE02 that was nearly blocking us in. I then completed the post/preflight walkaround for the first officer. In retrospect I remember someone telling me that we needed a fuel load of 5000 pounds. I do not remember if it was the first officer or agent that told me this number. Before entering the aircraft I told the same agent who already requested our fuel load that we would be taking on 5000 pounds of fuel. He wrote this down on a small slip of paper in the palm of his hand and then walked around the nose of the aircraft. I then entered the aircraft and began final preparations for our flight. At this point many of the passenger were already onboard. At my request we began the 'before starting checks' just prior to receiving the load report. We completed the checklist to the fuel quantity portion. I responded with 'well, we need 5000,' and then displayed the fuel page on my side as the first officer had already done. The first officer's response was, 'holding on the fuel.' very shortly after that the gate agent brought the load report out to us, once again without the WX or our releases. The first officer requested the missing documents and then gate agent stated that he had forgotten them. He then went back inside to get them. He came back out approximately 3 mins prior to our scheduled departure. I signed one release for the agent and gave the other one to the first officer so he could fill out the weight and balance form. I then reviewed the WX and gave the first officer information for our arrival into bdl. With the paperwork now complete and the cabin secure I called for the checklist from where we left off. The first officer's first response was 'fuel quantity.' as clearly as my memory serves me I read '5000 pounds checks with release left.' the first officer's response was standard for his side. The only thing that I can elaborate on about this is that we must have read the preselected quantity in error. Just after departing runway 19L and after we turned out to the west, I noticed the aircraft had not been fueled at all. We had approximately 1600 pounds of fuel onboard. I asked the first officer what the minimum fuel and burnoff would be. I don't recall what his response was but it wasn't enough to complete the flight safely with reserves. I asked the first officer to request a return to dulles and they promptly gave us the visual approach to runway 19R. I stated, 'you should work on your checklists, I'll call the flight attendant.' our conversation was very brief. I said, 'we have to return, we need additional fuel for the flight. It should only take about 10 mins.' since we were already on a very close turn to final I elected to make a PA announcement just after landing. The landing, although busy, proceeded normally. I then made a PA stating that our return to the airport was due to the fact that a switch in the fuel panel was in the wrong position. I stated that there was no danger but we both decided it would be safer to return and have it changed and because of the time we were in the air would be taking on additional fuel to get back on schedule to bdl. I also apologized for the inconvenience and that we would be back in the air in 10 mins. Supplemental information from acn 326216: somehow we ended up not receiving fuel at iad despite several requests for it. At approximately 3000 ft MSL we realized our error and returned to the field. I would cite 2 reasons for this problem. First of all, the station required us to preselect the fuel quantity in the computer. As a result, the flight crew was not used to seeing this displayed on the screens. We think we misread the preselected quantity for actual quantity and as a result missed it on our checklist. Secondly and not quite as important, crews should not have to request fuel 3-4 times a visit which, unfortunately, is normal for the iad station.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: THE FLC OF A D328 RETURNED TO LAND AFTER DEPARTING WITH LESS THAN THE REQUIRED FUEL LOAD. THE FLC HAD BEEN EXPERIENCING DIFFICULTY RETRIEVING THE FUEL LOAD AND DISPATCH INFO PRIOR TO THE INCIDENT, AND HAD ENTERED THE FUEL LOAD INTO THE COMPUTER WHEN IT WAS NOT LOADED ONTO THE ACFT. RETURN LAND.

Narrative: I, LIKE MANY CO-WORKERS, HAVE BEEN TRANSFERRED TO A DIFFERENT BASE RECENTLY. 5 TIMES IN THE LAST 6 YRS 'INVOLUNTARY' AND TWICE 'VOLUNTARILY' TO BE CLOSER TO HOME. THE LATEST TRANSFER WAS SUDDEN AND NOT EXPECTED, AND MY FO WITH IDENTICAL CIRCUMSTANCES, AND I WERE COMMUTING TO OUR NEW BASE TOGETHER. THIS REQUIRES IN GOOD WX, 2 HRS DRIVING. WE RPTED FOR 13 HRS DUTY WITH 6 FLTS AND 7 HRS 15 MINS OF FLYING, THUS CAUSING THE BOTH OF US TO BE WORKING WITH LITTLE REST. I HAD ABOUT 3 1/2 HRS SLEEP PRIOR TO STARTING THE TRIP AND MY FO ONLY 2 HRS. THE EARLY COMMUTE IS, I BELIEVE, THE SINGLE MOST IMPORTANT FACTOR OF THIS INCIDENT, HOWEVER, IT WAS A DECISION BOTH ME AND MY FO MADE ON OUR OWN AND A POOR ONE AT THAT. ANOTHER FACTOR IS THE LACK OF A STANDARD WAY OF DOING SUCH A VITAL SUPPORT SVC. I ALSO THINK THAT THE FUELERS AT DULLES WILL CHOOSE TO FUEL OTHER ACFT BEFORE THE D328 BECAUSE IT IS A DIFFICULT AIRPLANE TO FUEL. THE FUEL PANEL IS IN THE R WING, 'HIGH WING,' AND IT DOES REQUIRE A BIG LADDER OR LIFT. THE SUN WAS SHINING DIRECTLY INTO THE COCKPIT WHILE WE WERE DOING THE CHKLIST, MAKING THE MULTI-FUNCTION DISPLAY'S RESOLUTION POOR AT BEST. CONTRACT SVC EMPLOYEE ENTERED THE FLT DECK AND REQUESTED, HOW MUCH FUEL DO YOU NEED? BOTH MYSELF AND THE FO RESPONDED, 'WE AREN'T SURE. WE HAVEN'T RECEIVED A RELEASE YET.' I THEN STATED THAT WE WOULD NEED FUEL PROBABLY AROUND 4000 LBS. HE THEN LEFT THE AIRPLANE AND WE STARTED TO SET UP THE ACFT FOR DEP. WHILE THE FO WORKED ON THE ATIS AND CLRNC, I SET UP THE PRIMARY FLT DISPLAYS AND REVIEWED THE FLT PLAN IN THE DATABASE. WE NOTICED THAT IT WAS AN OLD ROUTING THAT WE NO LONGER USE BUT WE NEEDED A DISPATCH RELEASE TO AMEND IT TO THE CURRENT ROUTING. I THEN LEFT THE ACFT TO RETRIEVE THE PAPERWORK AND USE THE RESTROOM INSIDE THE TERMINAL. I WAS NOT SUCCESSFUL IN RETRIEVING THE PAPERWORK BECAUSE BOTH COMPUTER TERMINALS AT THE GATE WERE IN USE. BOTH OF THE AGENTS SEEMED VERY BUSY DEALING WITH PAX AND I DIDN'T WANT TO INTERRUPT THEM. I WALKED UP TO THE ACFT AND WAS SURPRISED BY THE WAY THEY PARKED THE BE02 THAT WAS NEARLY BLOCKING US IN. I THEN COMPLETED THE POST/PREFLT WALKAROUND FOR THE FO. IN RETROSPECT I REMEMBER SOMEONE TELLING ME THAT WE NEEDED A FUEL LOAD OF 5000 LBS. I DO NOT REMEMBER IF IT WAS THE FO OR AGENT THAT TOLD ME THIS NUMBER. BEFORE ENTERING THE ACFT I TOLD THE SAME AGENT WHO ALREADY REQUESTED OUR FUEL LOAD THAT WE WOULD BE TAKING ON 5000 LBS OF FUEL. HE WROTE THIS DOWN ON A SMALL SLIP OF PAPER IN THE PALM OF HIS HAND AND THEN WALKED AROUND THE NOSE OF THE ACFT. I THEN ENTERED THE ACFT AND BEGAN FINAL PREPARATIONS FOR OUR FLT. AT THIS POINT MANY OF THE PAX WERE ALREADY ONBOARD. AT MY REQUEST WE BEGAN THE 'BEFORE STARTING CHKS' JUST PRIOR TO RECEIVING THE LOAD RPT. WE COMPLETED THE CHKLIST TO THE FUEL QUANTITY PORTION. I RESPONDED WITH 'WELL, WE NEED 5000,' AND THEN DISPLAYED THE FUEL PAGE ON MY SIDE AS THE FO HAD ALREADY DONE. THE FO'S RESPONSE WAS, 'HOLDING ON THE FUEL.' VERY SHORTLY AFTER THAT THE GATE AGENT BROUGHT THE LOAD RPT OUT TO US, ONCE AGAIN WITHOUT THE WX OR OUR RELEASES. THE FO REQUESTED THE MISSING DOCUMENTS AND THEN GATE AGENT STATED THAT HE HAD FORGOTTEN THEM. HE THEN WENT BACK INSIDE TO GET THEM. HE CAME BACK OUT APPROX 3 MINS PRIOR TO OUR SCHEDULED DEP. I SIGNED ONE RELEASE FOR THE AGENT AND GAVE THE OTHER ONE TO THE FO SO HE COULD FILL OUT THE WT AND BAL FORM. I THEN REVIEWED THE WX AND GAVE THE FO INFO FOR OUR ARR INTO BDL. WITH THE PAPERWORK NOW COMPLETE AND THE CABIN SECURE I CALLED FOR THE CHKLIST FROM WHERE WE LEFT OFF. THE FO'S FIRST RESPONSE WAS 'FUEL QUANTITY.' AS CLRLY AS MY MEMORY SERVES ME I READ '5000 LBS CHKS WITH RELEASE LEFT.' THE FO'S RESPONSE WAS STANDARD FOR HIS SIDE. THE ONLY THING THAT I CAN ELABORATE ON ABOUT THIS IS THAT WE MUST HAVE READ THE PRESELECTED QUANTITY IN ERROR. JUST AFTER DEPARTING RWY 19L AND AFTER WE TURNED OUT TO THE W, I NOTICED THE ACFT HAD NOT BEEN FUELED AT ALL. WE HAD APPROX 1600 LBS OF FUEL ONBOARD. I ASKED THE FO WHAT THE MINIMUM FUEL AND BURNOFF WOULD BE. I DON'T RECALL WHAT HIS RESPONSE WAS BUT IT WASN'T ENOUGH TO COMPLETE THE FLT SAFELY WITH RESERVES. I ASKED THE FO TO REQUEST A RETURN TO DULLES AND THEY PROMPTLY GAVE US THE VISUAL APCH TO RWY 19R. I STATED, 'YOU SHOULD WORK ON YOUR CHKLISTS, I'LL CALL THE FLT ATTENDANT.' OUR CONVERSATION WAS VERY BRIEF. I SAID, 'WE HAVE TO RETURN, WE NEED ADDITIONAL FUEL FOR THE FLT. IT SHOULD ONLY TAKE ABOUT 10 MINS.' SINCE WE WERE ALREADY ON A VERY CLOSE TURN TO FINAL I ELECTED TO MAKE A PA ANNOUNCEMENT JUST AFTER LNDG. THE LNDG, ALTHOUGH BUSY, PROCEEDED NORMALLY. I THEN MADE A PA STATING THAT OUR RETURN TO THE ARPT WAS DUE TO THE FACT THAT A SWITCH IN THE FUEL PANEL WAS IN THE WRONG POS. I STATED THAT THERE WAS NO DANGER BUT WE BOTH DECIDED IT WOULD BE SAFER TO RETURN AND HAVE IT CHANGED AND BECAUSE OF THE TIME WE WERE IN THE AIR WOULD BE TAKING ON ADDITIONAL FUEL TO GET BACK ON SCHEDULE TO BDL. I ALSO APOLOGIZED FOR THE INCONVENIENCE AND THAT WE WOULD BE BACK IN THE AIR IN 10 MINS. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 326216: SOMEHOW WE ENDED UP NOT RECEIVING FUEL AT IAD DESPITE SEVERAL REQUESTS FOR IT. AT APPROX 3000 FT MSL WE REALIZED OUR ERROR AND RETURNED TO THE FIELD. I WOULD CITE 2 REASONS FOR THIS PROB. FIRST OF ALL, THE STATION REQUIRED US TO PRESELECT THE FUEL QUANTITY IN THE COMPUTER. AS A RESULT, THE FLC WAS NOT USED TO SEEING THIS DISPLAYED ON THE SCREENS. WE THINK WE MISREAD THE PRESELECTED QUANTITY FOR ACTUAL QUANTITY AND AS A RESULT MISSED IT ON OUR CHKLIST. SECONDLY AND NOT QUITE AS IMPORTANT, CREWS SHOULD NOT HAVE TO REQUEST FUEL 3-4 TIMES A VISIT WHICH, UNFORTUNATELY, IS NORMAL FOR THE IAD STATION.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.