Narrative:

I was working a low level sector that has a big VFR practice area. It was also combined with another sector which works the airspace under the class B. This is an unusual configuration that is generally only used when we're IFR and both sectors are not busy since the majority of the traffic in these sectors is VFR. Our terminal airspace was very busy with an IFR arrival bank. Aircraft X and aircraft Y were over-flights at 12;000 ft from the east transitioning west. We were getting moderate icing throughout the airspace. Aircraft Y did have anti-ice equipment and was still picking up ice. Aircraft X did not have anti-ice or de-ice equipment and was getting a lot of ice. Both aircraft requested to land at a satellite airport which only has one approach that can be used right now due to construction. I got both aircraft on my frequency on radar vectors for the VOR DME runway xx approach; circle runway yy. I asked each aircraft their icing situation. Aircraft Y was number one to the airport; but said he would hold out of the way to allow aircraft X to go first. He made it sound urgent that the other aircraft; aircraft X; get on the ground as soon as possible. I had to step aircraft X down; reference other aircraft. The pilot started to indicate he needed lower as soon as possible. I took him to 10;000 ft after I cleared the traffic from the north; then 6;500 ft when I got him clear of traffic from the south in the downwind level at 8;000 ft. He said he needed to get lower and turned to the airport. He said he would declare an emergency if he needed to. I turned him direct to the airport and gave him a descent to 6;000 ft; which is my MVA. The airport was reporting ceiling at 2;300 ft AGL. He said he needed lower and continued to 5;700 ft on his own. I advised him of my MVA and asked his flight conditions. He said he could see a lake below him and flight visibility of 3 miles. I told him to maintain his own terrain and obstruction clearance and pulled up my evom map just in case. I issued the airport direction and distance to see if he could get it in sight. He eventually reported airport in sight at about 6 miles. I cleared him for a visual approach. He also said the ice was starting to come off his wings. I then vectored the other aircraft for the VOR approach. When the pilot called in after he had landed; he said that he couldn't hold altitude and he had so much ice on the aircraft that his control inputs were not doing what expected. It took 2 hands on the stick to keep the aircraft level.we could have taken action sooner and probed the pilot for more information on the icing. I didn't know how bad his icing was till he said he needed lower now. I should have asked the question sooner and taken action to move aircraft to get this one on the ground.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: TRACON Controller described an emergency event where two aircraft were experiencing icing conditions and needed lower altitudes. The reporter noted that more information should have been obtained from the aircraft sooner.

Narrative: I was working a low level sector that has a big VFR practice area. It was also combined with another sector which works the airspace under the class B. This is an unusual configuration that is generally only used when we're IFR and both sectors are not busy since the majority of the traffic in these sectors is VFR. Our terminal airspace was very busy with an IFR arrival bank. Aircraft X and Aircraft Y were over-flights at 12;000 FT from the east transitioning west. We were getting moderate icing throughout the airspace. Aircraft Y did have anti-ice equipment and was still picking up ice. Aircraft X did not have anti-ice or de-ice equipment and was getting a lot of ice. Both aircraft requested to land at a satellite airport which only has one approach that can be used right now due to construction. I got both aircraft on my frequency on RADAR vectors for the VOR DME Runway XX approach; circle Runway YY. I asked each aircraft their icing situation. Aircraft Y was number one to the airport; but said he would hold out of the way to allow Aircraft X to go first. He made it sound urgent that the other aircraft; Aircraft X; get on the ground ASAP. I had to step Aircraft X down; reference other aircraft. The pilot started to indicate he needed lower ASAP. I took him to 10;000 FT after I cleared the traffic from the north; then 6;500 FT when I got him clear of traffic from the south in the downwind level at 8;000 FT. He said he needed to get lower and turned to the airport. He said he would declare an emergency if he needed to. I turned him direct to the airport and gave him a descent to 6;000 FT; which is my MVA. The airport was reporting ceiling at 2;300 FT AGL. He said he needed lower and continued to 5;700 FT on his own. I advised him of my MVA and asked his flight conditions. He said he could see a lake below him and flight visibility of 3 miles. I told him to maintain his own terrain and obstruction clearance and pulled up my EVOM map just in case. I issued the airport direction and distance to see if he could get it in sight. He eventually reported airport in sight at about 6 miles. I cleared him for a visual approach. He also said the ice was starting to come off his wings. I then vectored the other aircraft for the VOR approach. When the pilot called in after he had landed; he said that he couldn't hold altitude and he had so much ice on the aircraft that his control inputs were not doing what expected. It took 2 hands on the stick to keep the aircraft level.We could have taken action sooner and probed the pilot for more information on the icing. I didn't know how bad his icing was till he said he needed lower now. I should have asked the question sooner and taken action to move aircraft to get this one on the ground.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.