Narrative:

Event description: I was the captain of a flight on the evening of jan/thu/96. The flight was scheduled to operate from dca to mht. FAA inspector X boarded the aircraft in dca for an in-flight no-notice line check. First, his boarding procedure was not in accordance with company policy, ie, instead of presenting his identify to the lead flight attendant to be then forwarded to me (the captain) he brushed by her and entered the cockpit unannounced. This was after he stowed his personal belongings in the first class overhead compartment. This is, according to company policy, to be available only to first class passenger. During the flight, inspector X directed my first officer to stow a 2 inch styrofoam salad container that was placed on the cockpit floor next to his seat. It was explained that he thought this created an unsafe situation. He stated the styrofoam plate could conceivably slip into the rudder controls, thereby jamming them! As a side note, there is a 2 inch step before the rudder pedal platform, and another 6 inch clearance from the bottom of the rudder pedals to the base of this next higher platform on the B737-200. Any slippage of this so perceived safety hazard would have been highly improbable, and even if it did, the worst event would have been 'tossed salad.' the copilot was one of the most dedicated and conscientious I have had the privilege of working along side. Every aspect of the flight was conducted in a highly professional manner in strict accordance with both company and FAA policies. For this reason we were taken aback when at the conclusion of the flight we were debriefed that we had missed several 'required' altitude callouts. We were cited for not having the PNF confirming the call made by the PF when reaching 1000 ft above/below the assigned altitude. This is not required by company policy. The PNF is required to verbally confirm the altitudes only when cleared to a new altitude and this altitude is set into the altitude window. When we disagreed with his summation, stating we were unaware of any callouts missed, X became self defensive and stated he had been doing his job for many years and knew what he was talking about. With that he abruptly left the cockpit and aircraft, giving us no further indication of further actions or intentions on his part. I felt the demeanor of this inspector was not conducive to a harmonious and productive working relationship. In fact it was very counter-productive. His approach created a very tense, uncomfortable cockpit atmosphere. Little was learned or rectified. I suggest this individual be counseled on cockpit etiquette and company procedures before making erroneous accusations.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLC OF AN MLG COMPLAINT ABOUT AN ACI INSPECTOR ATTITUDE AND DEMEANOR DURING AND AFTER AN ENRTE INSPECTION CHK.

Narrative: EVENT DESCRIPTION: I WAS THE CAPT OF A FLT ON THE EVENING OF JAN/THU/96. THE FLT WAS SCHEDULED TO OPERATE FROM DCA TO MHT. FAA INSPECTOR X BOARDED THE ACFT IN DCA FOR AN INFLT NO-NOTICE LINE CHK. FIRST, HIS BOARDING PROC WAS NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH COMPANY POLICY, IE, INSTEAD OF PRESENTING HIS IDENT TO THE LEAD FLT ATTENDANT TO BE THEN FORWARDED TO ME (THE CAPT) HE BRUSHED BY HER AND ENTERED THE COCKPIT UNANNOUNCED. THIS WAS AFTER HE STOWED HIS PERSONAL BELONGINGS IN THE FIRST CLASS OVERHEAD COMPARTMENT. THIS IS, ACCORDING TO COMPANY POLICY, TO BE AVAILABLE ONLY TO FIRST CLASS PAX. DURING THE FLT, INSPECTOR X DIRECTED MY FO TO STOW A 2 INCH STYROFOAM SALAD CONTAINER THAT WAS PLACED ON THE COCKPIT FLOOR NEXT TO HIS SEAT. IT WAS EXPLAINED THAT HE THOUGHT THIS CREATED AN UNSAFE SIT. HE STATED THE STYROFOAM PLATE COULD CONCEIVABLY SLIP INTO THE RUDDER CTLS, THEREBY JAMMING THEM! AS A SIDE NOTE, THERE IS A 2 INCH STEP BEFORE THE RUDDER PEDAL PLATFORM, AND ANOTHER 6 INCH CLRNC FROM THE BOTTOM OF THE RUDDER PEDALS TO THE BASE OF THIS NEXT HIGHER PLATFORM ON THE B737-200. ANY SLIPPAGE OF THIS SO PERCEIVED SAFETY HAZARD WOULD HAVE BEEN HIGHLY IMPROBABLE, AND EVEN IF IT DID, THE WORST EVENT WOULD HAVE BEEN 'TOSSED SALAD.' THE COPLT WAS ONE OF THE MOST DEDICATED AND CONSCIENTIOUS I HAVE HAD THE PRIVILEGE OF WORKING ALONG SIDE. EVERY ASPECT OF THE FLT WAS CONDUCTED IN A HIGHLY PROFESSIONAL MANNER IN STRICT ACCORDANCE WITH BOTH COMPANY AND FAA POLICIES. FOR THIS REASON WE WERE TAKEN ABACK WHEN AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE FLT WE WERE DEBRIEFED THAT WE HAD MISSED SEVERAL 'REQUIRED' ALT CALLOUTS. WE WERE CITED FOR NOT HAVING THE PNF CONFIRMING THE CALL MADE BY THE PF WHEN REACHING 1000 FT ABOVE/BELOW THE ASSIGNED ALT. THIS IS NOT REQUIRED BY COMPANY POLICY. THE PNF IS REQUIRED TO VERBALLY CONFIRM THE ALTS ONLY WHEN CLRED TO A NEW ALT AND THIS ALT IS SET INTO THE ALT WINDOW. WHEN WE DISAGREED WITH HIS SUMMATION, STATING WE WERE UNAWARE OF ANY CALLOUTS MISSED, X BECAME SELF DEFENSIVE AND STATED HE HAD BEEN DOING HIS JOB FOR MANY YEARS AND KNEW WHAT HE WAS TALKING ABOUT. WITH THAT HE ABRUPTLY LEFT THE COCKPIT AND ACFT, GIVING US NO FURTHER INDICATION OF FURTHER ACTIONS OR INTENTIONS ON HIS PART. I FELT THE DEMEANOR OF THIS INSPECTOR WAS NOT CONDUCIVE TO A HARMONIOUS AND PRODUCTIVE WORKING RELATIONSHIP. IN FACT IT WAS VERY COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE. HIS APCH CREATED A VERY TENSE, UNCOMFORTABLE COCKPIT ATMOSPHERE. LITTLE WAS LEARNED OR RECTIFIED. I SUGGEST THIS INDIVIDUAL BE COUNSELED ON COCKPIT ETIQUETTE AND COMPANY PROCS BEFORE MAKING ERRONEOUS ACCUSATIONS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.