Narrative:

As vr speed was called on takeoff roll, I (PF) observed a red left engine overtemp light and a left engine itt of 952 degrees C. I rotated normally as the first officer retarded the left power lever and itt decreased. No words were spoken other than the required calls as we configured and conducted the climb checklist. After climb checklist completion and climb pwrs set, the first officer confirmed a reading of 952 degree itt and his immediate action to retard power. Both engines were not operating within limits with climb power set. The takeoff had been performed with maximum power and engine anti-ice on as required by recently revised operating procedures for the environmental conditions present at takeoff. When reaching VMC conditions and above 10000 ft, I cycled the left engine anti-ice system to observe its operation. I then contacted maintenance control on the radio and advised them of the excessive torque drop and itt rise with left engine anti-ice selected. We concluded that the problem was a valve within the bleed air system and that it was safe to continue to destination and return. I did not address the 952 degree itt experienced on takeoff as I viewed this as a consequence of the maximum power takeoff with engine anti-ice on at relatively high outside air temperature. The saab 340 flight standards manual limitation section states a takeoff power or maximum power limit of 930 degrees itt. It further states a transient power limitation of 960 degrees itt for 12 seconds. This transient power limit is qualified with the words 'except takeoff.' I conducted the flight to destination and then operated the return flight because in my mind the appropriate limitation was transient power of 960 degree itt for 12 seconds. I failed to consider the 'except takeoff' qualifier to the limitation. I compounded my error by exercising poor CRM with my first officer. He voiced his concern over the 952 degree itt experienced on takeoff, but my thought processes centered around evaluating the health of the left engine and providing maintenance with specifics to troubleshoot upon return. I did not 'hear' his concerns because in my mind no limitations had been exceeded. During the return flight, I finally took out my flight standards manual to review abnormal operations with engine anti-ice as engine anti-ice would be required for descent and landing. This was the first time that I became aware that the appropriate limit was 930 degree itt. I contacted maintenance again on the radio and notified them that maintenance would be required prior to further flight. I then wrote 2 maintenance discrepancies, one concerning the left engine anti-ice operation observed in flight and one addressing the 952 degree itt on takeoff.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ACR FLC HAS THE L ENG EXCEED THE TEMP LIMITS FOR TKOF, BUT THEY CONTINUE THE FLT. ONLY ON THE RETURN DOES THE CAPT INFORM MAINT AND MAKE AN ENTRY IN THE MAINT LOG.

Narrative: AS VR SPD WAS CALLED ON TKOF ROLL, I (PF) OBSERVED A RED L ENG OVERTEMP LIGHT AND A L ENG ITT OF 952 DEGS C. I ROTATED NORMALLY AS THE FO RETARDED THE L PWR LEVER AND ITT DECREASED. NO WORDS WERE SPOKEN OTHER THAN THE REQUIRED CALLS AS WE CONFIGURED AND CONDUCTED THE CLB CHKLIST. AFTER CLB CHKLIST COMPLETION AND CLB PWRS SET, THE FO CONFIRMED A READING OF 952 DEG ITT AND HIS IMMEDIATE ACTION TO RETARD PWR. BOTH ENGS WERE NOT OPERATING WITHIN LIMITS WITH CLB PWR SET. THE TKOF HAD BEEN PERFORMED WITH MAX PWR AND ENG ANTI-ICE ON AS REQUIRED BY RECENTLY REVISED OPERATING PROCS FOR THE ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS PRESENT AT TKOF. WHEN REACHING VMC CONDITIONS AND ABOVE 10000 FT, I CYCLED THE L ENG ANTI-ICE SYS TO OBSERVE ITS OP. I THEN CONTACTED MAINT CTL ON THE RADIO AND ADVISED THEM OF THE EXCESSIVE TORQUE DROP AND ITT RISE WITH L ENG ANTI-ICE SELECTED. WE CONCLUDED THAT THE PROB WAS A VALVE WITHIN THE BLEED AIR SYS AND THAT IT WAS SAFE TO CONTINUE TO DEST AND RETURN. I DID NOT ADDRESS THE 952 DEG ITT EXPERIENCED ON TKOF AS I VIEWED THIS AS A CONSEQUENCE OF THE MAX PWR TKOF WITH ENG ANTI-ICE ON AT RELATIVELY HIGH OUTSIDE AIR TEMP. THE SAAB 340 FLT STANDARDS MANUAL LIMITATION SECTION STATES A TKOF PWR OR MAX PWR LIMIT OF 930 DEGS ITT. IT FURTHER STATES A TRANSIENT PWR LIMITATION OF 960 DEGS ITT FOR 12 SECONDS. THIS TRANSIENT PWR LIMIT IS QUALIFIED WITH THE WORDS 'EXCEPT TKOF.' I CONDUCTED THE FLT TO DEST AND THEN OPERATED THE RETURN FLT BECAUSE IN MY MIND THE APPROPRIATE LIMITATION WAS TRANSIENT PWR OF 960 DEG ITT FOR 12 SECONDS. I FAILED TO CONSIDER THE 'EXCEPT TKOF' QUALIFIER TO THE LIMITATION. I COMPOUNDED MY ERROR BY EXERCISING POOR CRM WITH MY FO. HE VOICED HIS CONCERN OVER THE 952 DEG ITT EXPERIENCED ON TKOF, BUT MY THOUGHT PROCESSES CTRED AROUND EVALUATING THE HEALTH OF THE L ENG AND PROVIDING MAINT WITH SPECIFICS TO TROUBLESHOOT UPON RETURN. I DID NOT 'HEAR' HIS CONCERNS BECAUSE IN MY MIND NO LIMITATIONS HAD BEEN EXCEEDED. DURING THE RETURN FLT, I FINALLY TOOK OUT MY FLT STANDARDS MANUAL TO REVIEW ABNORMAL OPS WITH ENG ANTI-ICE AS ENG ANTI-ICE WOULD BE REQUIRED FOR DSCNT AND LNDG. THIS WAS THE FIRST TIME THAT I BECAME AWARE THAT THE APPROPRIATE LIMIT WAS 930 DEG ITT. I CONTACTED MAINT AGAIN ON THE RADIO AND NOTIFIED THEM THAT MAINT WOULD BE REQUIRED PRIOR TO FURTHER FLT. I THEN WROTE 2 MAINT DISCREPANCIES, ONE CONCERNING THE L ENG ANTI-ICE OP OBSERVED IN FLT AND ONE ADDRESSING THE 952 DEG ITT ON TKOF.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.