Narrative:

The aircraft was on a post maintenance test flight for the purpose of conducting engine acceleration tests. At FL290, we experienced a flameout on the left engine, and although it was successfully relit, we requested a descent, and vectors back to our home base at yip. At the time of the flameout, we had been maneuvering in the vicinity of the mbs VOR. I (the first officer) had been flying the aircraft during the engine tests and was not monitoring our position or location, being concerned with simply flying the aircraft smoothly for the purposes of the tests and following vectors given by the captain. The captain took over flying the aircraft at the time of the flameout. Center issued the following clearance: 'fly heading 240 degrees, when able direct sprtn, cross sprtn at 9000 ft.' the captain, who was flying the aircraft, repeated the clearance to ATC and immediately attempted to select sprtn in the LORAN and GPS. I obtained the chart for the sprtn arrival and began to try to determine our position and the VOR's and radials that we would require. The captain asked how sprtn was spelled (in order to properly enter it into the LORAN and GPS). After trying to tell him, I finally dialed it into the unit for him and returned to tuning in the vors. The captain stated that he believed sprtn to be on a radial off lan VOR. I agreed, told him the radial 096 degree and DME 31 and tuned lansing in on both vors. We then realized that sprtn was not in the LORAN and GPS database. I was still confused as to our present position and tried repeatedly to communicate to the captain that the assigned heading did not make sense to me since our ultimate direction of flight was to be east of sprtn (southeast to willow run). We then tuned in the fnt 220 degree radial which also defines sprtn, and the captain turned to a heading of approximately 200 degrees to intercept that radial. Lansing 096 degree was still in the #2 VOR. Shortly after crossing the 096 degree radial, ATC inquired whether we were now turning toward sprtn and told us to depart sprtn on a 170 degree heading. The captain turned the aircraft to a 170 degree heading. Shortly thereafter we were handed off to another controller who asked our position. The captain answered the controller (I did not hear the communication). The controller replied that he showed us several mi southwest of sprtn and told us to steer heading 140 degrees for vectors to willow run. Because we were not RNAV equipped (or filed) center should not have assigned 'direct sprtn' and the captain should never have accepted the clearance. The captain was using headsets and the boom microphone, I had no headset and was using the hand microphone. In order for me to hear ATC over the aircraft speakers, the volume had to be so loud that captain could often hear nothing but ATC. Communication was very difficult between us. Additionally I could not hear xmissions made by the captain to ATC. Because the captain had accepted the initial clearance and periodically took over radio communications, I was unsure of my duties as the PNF and reluctant to take the initiative to question our clearance or clarify our position with ATC. I wrongly assumed that the captain was comfortable and in control of the situation or would have asked ATC himself (or directed me to do so). I feel there was a lack of situational awareness on my part and the captain's. I don't believe either of us was clear regarding our position relative to sprtn. I am a brand new first officer in this company, this aircraft and this area, and am unfamiliar with common local ATC procedures, and the relative location of various area navaids, intxns and airports. The captain is the director of operations and a company check airman. I made the mistake of doubting myself and assuming the captain was correct. I was not comfortable challenging his actions.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: WHILE TEST FLYING A DA20 AFTER MAINT, THE FLC EXPERIENCED AN ENG FAILURE. THEY REQUESTED VECTORS BACK TO THEIR HOME BASE, BUT INSTEAD RECEIVED A CLRNC DIRECT TO AN INTXN ON THE ARR. EVEN THOUGH THE ACFT WAS NOT EQUIPPED, THE FLC ESTIMATED THE LOCATION AND CROSSED SEVERAL MI SW. TRACK DEV.

Narrative: THE ACFT WAS ON A POST MAINT TEST FLT FOR THE PURPOSE OF CONDUCTING ENG ACCELERATION TESTS. AT FL290, WE EXPERIENCED A FLAMEOUT ON THE L ENG, AND ALTHOUGH IT WAS SUCCESSFULLY RELIT, WE REQUESTED A DSCNT, AND VECTORS BACK TO OUR HOME BASE AT YIP. AT THE TIME OF THE FLAMEOUT, WE HAD BEEN MANEUVERING IN THE VICINITY OF THE MBS VOR. I (THE FO) HAD BEEN FLYING THE ACFT DURING THE ENG TESTS AND WAS NOT MONITORING OUR POS OR LOCATION, BEING CONCERNED WITH SIMPLY FLYING THE ACFT SMOOTHLY FOR THE PURPOSES OF THE TESTS AND FOLLOWING VECTORS GIVEN BY THE CAPT. THE CAPT TOOK OVER FLYING THE ACFT AT THE TIME OF THE FLAMEOUT. CTR ISSUED THE FOLLOWING CLRNC: 'FLY HDG 240 DEGS, WHEN ABLE DIRECT SPRTN, CROSS SPRTN AT 9000 FT.' THE CAPT, WHO WAS FLYING THE ACFT, REPEATED THE CLRNC TO ATC AND IMMEDIATELY ATTEMPTED TO SELECT SPRTN IN THE LORAN AND GPS. I OBTAINED THE CHART FOR THE SPRTN ARR AND BEGAN TO TRY TO DETERMINE OUR POS AND THE VOR'S AND RADIALS THAT WE WOULD REQUIRE. THE CAPT ASKED HOW SPRTN WAS SPELLED (IN ORDER TO PROPERLY ENTER IT INTO THE LORAN AND GPS). AFTER TRYING TO TELL HIM, I FINALLY DIALED IT INTO THE UNIT FOR HIM AND RETURNED TO TUNING IN THE VORS. THE CAPT STATED THAT HE BELIEVED SPRTN TO BE ON A RADIAL OFF LAN VOR. I AGREED, TOLD HIM THE RADIAL 096 DEG AND DME 31 AND TUNED LANSING IN ON BOTH VORS. WE THEN REALIZED THAT SPRTN WAS NOT IN THE LORAN AND GPS DATABASE. I WAS STILL CONFUSED AS TO OUR PRESENT POS AND TRIED REPEATEDLY TO COMMUNICATE TO THE CAPT THAT THE ASSIGNED HDG DID NOT MAKE SENSE TO ME SINCE OUR ULTIMATE DIRECTION OF FLT WAS TO BE E OF SPRTN (SE TO WILLOW RUN). WE THEN TUNED IN THE FNT 220 DEG RADIAL WHICH ALSO DEFINES SPRTN, AND THE CAPT TURNED TO A HDG OF APPROX 200 DEGS TO INTERCEPT THAT RADIAL. LANSING 096 DEG WAS STILL IN THE #2 VOR. SHORTLY AFTER XING THE 096 DEG RADIAL, ATC INQUIRED WHETHER WE WERE NOW TURNING TOWARD SPRTN AND TOLD US TO DEPART SPRTN ON A 170 DEG HDG. THE CAPT TURNED THE ACFT TO A 170 DEG HDG. SHORTLY THEREAFTER WE WERE HANDED OFF TO ANOTHER CTLR WHO ASKED OUR POS. THE CAPT ANSWERED THE CTLR (I DID NOT HEAR THE COM). THE CTLR REPLIED THAT HE SHOWED US SEVERAL MI SW OF SPRTN AND TOLD US TO STEER HDG 140 DEGS FOR VECTORS TO WILLOW RUN. BECAUSE WE WERE NOT RNAV EQUIPPED (OR FILED) CTR SHOULD NOT HAVE ASSIGNED 'DIRECT SPRTN' AND THE CAPT SHOULD NEVER HAVE ACCEPTED THE CLRNC. THE CAPT WAS USING HEADSETS AND THE BOOM MIKE, I HAD NO HEADSET AND WAS USING THE HAND MIKE. IN ORDER FOR ME TO HEAR ATC OVER THE ACFT SPEAKERS, THE VOLUME HAD TO BE SO LOUD THAT CAPT COULD OFTEN HEAR NOTHING BUT ATC. COM WAS VERY DIFFICULT BTWN US. ADDITIONALLY I COULD NOT HEAR XMISSIONS MADE BY THE CAPT TO ATC. BECAUSE THE CAPT HAD ACCEPTED THE INITIAL CLRNC AND PERIODICALLY TOOK OVER RADIO COMS, I WAS UNSURE OF MY DUTIES AS THE PNF AND RELUCTANT TO TAKE THE INITIATIVE TO QUESTION OUR CLRNC OR CLARIFY OUR POS WITH ATC. I WRONGLY ASSUMED THAT THE CAPT WAS COMFORTABLE AND IN CTL OF THE SIT OR WOULD HAVE ASKED ATC HIMSELF (OR DIRECTED ME TO DO SO). I FEEL THERE WAS A LACK OF SITUATIONAL AWARENESS ON MY PART AND THE CAPT'S. I DON'T BELIEVE EITHER OF US WAS CLR REGARDING OUR POS RELATIVE TO SPRTN. I AM A BRAND NEW FO IN THIS COMPANY, THIS ACFT AND THIS AREA, AND AM UNFAMILIAR WITH COMMON LCL ATC PROCS, AND THE RELATIVE LOCATION OF VARIOUS AREA NAVAIDS, INTXNS AND ARPTS. THE CAPT IS THE DIRECTOR OF OPS AND A COMPANY CHK AIRMAN. I MADE THE MISTAKE OF DOUBTING MYSELF AND ASSUMING THE CAPT WAS CORRECT. I WAS NOT COMFORTABLE CHALLENGING HIS ACTIONS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.