Narrative:

Flight from den to mtj, SIGMET out for moderate to occasional severe ice, we were on top of most of the ice at FL240. Approximately 60 mi from mtj, we were issued a discretionary clearance to 17000 ft. We (my copilot and I) had decided to descend quickly through it so as to minimize our buildup. We did so. Level at 17000 ft, we were still in obscuration, but had intermittent ground contact. We were through all the ice and decided to boot. The left engine immediately failed. My first cockpit indication was that our electronic engine control (eec) had failed, then noticed zero oil pressure. We were approximately 40 mi from our destination, and proceeded with the precautionary engine shutdown checklist. I did it twice just to make sure! We were holding altitude fine (and airspeed) and I alerted ATC of our condition. We told our flight attendant everything is under control, landing in 5 mins. We descended into VMC conditions, and had good visual with terrain and airport. We canceled IFR, and landed single-engine uneventfully. No emergency was declared. When we alerted our company of the occurrence, we discovered that the same thing had happened to two other E120's in the last 2 days. This has since become a problem with our poi who has talked about the training of our brasilia pilots. Our cfm only suggests that 'ignition on' in icing conditions and turbulence, not stressed in training. Besides, we were not in icing conditions, just cycled the boots. Mixed ice might have caused flameout (I estimated 1/2 - 1 inch). I was questioned why I didn't attempt a restart? I didn't need it, and at the time wasn't sure why the engine quit (judgement). Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the engine failure was a result of a midair flameout, and since the flight crew was in the descent for the airport, and not aware that they had experienced a flameout, they did not think of attempting a relight. Not coincidentally, the questions that have been presented in the company and FAA follow-up about pilot performance, have evolved around an air start and the failure to activate the ignition in icing conditions. The regional airline has since issued a memo that requires the use of ignition in-flight through icing and turbulence. Reporter believes that a combination of the design of the inlet mass duct and the type and amount of icing, contributed to the failure. The two other flameouts involved flts into the same air mass as reporter's flight. Reporter thinks that the aircraft certification was inaccurately interpreted somewhere along the way. Since this incident, he has heard that other brasilia operators' policy is to turn ignition 'on' in critical phases of flight. The expanded normal section of the flight manual is the only reference to use of ignition. The flight manual doesn't include checklists that address engine flameout.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN E120 ENG FAILED AFTER DSCNT THROUGH ICING CONDITIONS. ATC ADVISED OF ACFT CONDITION.

Narrative: FLT FROM DEN TO MTJ, SIGMET OUT FOR MODERATE TO OCCASIONAL SEVERE ICE, WE WERE ON TOP OF MOST OF THE ICE AT FL240. APPROX 60 MI FROM MTJ, WE WERE ISSUED A DISCRETIONARY CLRNC TO 17000 FT. WE (MY COPLT AND I) HAD DECIDED TO DSND QUICKLY THROUGH IT SO AS TO MINIMIZE OUR BUILDUP. WE DID SO. LEVEL AT 17000 FT, WE WERE STILL IN OBSCURATION, BUT HAD INTERMITTENT GND CONTACT. WE WERE THROUGH ALL THE ICE AND DECIDED TO BOOT. THE L ENG IMMEDIATELY FAILED. MY FIRST COCKPIT INDICATION WAS THAT OUR ELECTRONIC ENG CTL (EEC) HAD FAILED, THEN NOTICED ZERO OIL PRESSURE. WE WERE APPROX 40 MI FROM OUR DEST, AND PROCEEDED WITH THE PRECAUTIONARY ENG SHUTDOWN CHKLIST. I DID IT TWICE JUST TO MAKE SURE! WE WERE HOLDING ALT FINE (AND AIRSPD) AND I ALERTED ATC OF OUR CONDITION. WE TOLD OUR FLT ATTENDANT EVERYTHING IS UNDER CTL, LNDG IN 5 MINS. WE DSNDED INTO VMC CONDITIONS, AND HAD GOOD VISUAL WITH TERRAIN AND ARPT. WE CANCELED IFR, AND LANDED SINGLE-ENG UNEVENTFULLY. NO EMER WAS DECLARED. WHEN WE ALERTED OUR COMPANY OF THE OCCURRENCE, WE DISCOVERED THAT THE SAME THING HAD HAPPENED TO TWO OTHER E120'S IN THE LAST 2 DAYS. THIS HAS SINCE BECOME A PROB WITH OUR POI WHO HAS TALKED ABOUT THE TRAINING OF OUR BRASILIA PLTS. OUR CFM ONLY SUGGESTS THAT 'IGNITION ON' IN ICING CONDITIONS AND TURB, NOT STRESSED IN TRAINING. BESIDES, WE WERE NOT IN ICING CONDITIONS, JUST CYCLED THE BOOTS. MIXED ICE MIGHT HAVE CAUSED FLAMEOUT (I ESTIMATED 1/2 - 1 INCH). I WAS QUESTIONED WHY I DIDN'T ATTEMPT A RESTART? I DIDN'T NEED IT, AND AT THE TIME WASN'T SURE WHY THE ENG QUIT (JUDGEMENT). CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE ENG FAILURE WAS A RESULT OF A MIDAIR FLAMEOUT, AND SINCE THE FLC WAS IN THE DSCNT FOR THE ARPT, AND NOT AWARE THAT THEY HAD EXPERIENCED A FLAMEOUT, THEY DID NOT THINK OF ATTEMPTING A RELIGHT. NOT COINCIDENTALLY, THE QUESTIONS THAT HAVE BEEN PRESENTED IN THE COMPANY AND FAA FOLLOW-UP ABOUT PLT PERFORMANCE, HAVE EVOLVED AROUND AN AIR START AND THE FAILURE TO ACTIVATE THE IGNITION IN ICING CONDITIONS. THE REGIONAL AIRLINE HAS SINCE ISSUED A MEMO THAT REQUIRES THE USE OF IGNITION INFLT THROUGH ICING AND TURB. RPTR BELIEVES THAT A COMBINATION OF THE DESIGN OF THE INLET MASS DUCT AND THE TYPE AND AMOUNT OF ICING, CONTRIBUTED TO THE FAILURE. THE TWO OTHER FLAMEOUTS INVOLVED FLTS INTO THE SAME AIR MASS AS RPTR'S FLT. RPTR THINKS THAT THE ACFT CERTIFICATION WAS INACCURATELY INTERPRETED SOMEWHERE ALONG THE WAY. SINCE THIS INCIDENT, HE HAS HEARD THAT OTHER BRASILIA OPERATORS' POLICY IS TO TURN IGNITION 'ON' IN CRITICAL PHASES OF FLT. THE EXPANDED NORMAL SECTION OF THE FLT MANUAL IS THE ONLY REF TO USE OF IGNITION. THE FLT MANUAL DOESN'T INCLUDE CHKLISTS THAT ADDRESS ENG FLAMEOUT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.