Narrative:

This flight was a ferry flight from msp to cle. Present on the flight deck were an IOE captain in the left seat, a check captain in the right seat, a so, and a flight mechanic on the jump seat. Climb out was normal with various vectors and intermediate level offs given because of other traffic in the area. During the latter part of our climb to FL410, a number of vectors were given to clear other traffic in the area which had been deviating for thunderstorms and moderate turbulence. We had not found it necessary to deviate for WX ourselves. As we were climbing through approximately FL390, we were finally given direct dll. Shortly thereafter in the area of dll and before reaching FL410, we were told by ZMP that we were going to be reclred to cle and that we should advise ready to copy. The IOE captain in the left seat was flying the aircraft with the autoplt and responded to ZMP because the check captain in the right seat had just taken a bite of food. The clearance was given so rapidly that the captain in the left seat and none of the others on the flight deck were able to copy or understand it. A repeat was requested and again a rapid delivery, with us still unsure of whether the fix after svm was yqc or yqg. On about the fourth try, the clearance was given slowly and clearly and we repeated the clearance back as we understood it. Direct salem, direct yqg, V103 dawn, direct cleveland. ZMP responded that the readback was correct. We later determined that dawn was gonne. None of this routing was in our flight plan or loaded into the GPS or ONS and the cockpit workload increased accordingly with the need to find the new fixes and the routing. Several more vectors were given and as the captain in the left seat continued to fly the aircraft with the autoplt and comply with the vectors, the captain in the right seat proceeded to get out the maps and look for salem, windsor, V103 and gonne since none of us were familiar with them. These fixes and route were found in a low altitude chart and a VOR frequency of 114.3 was found for salem. We were on a south easterly heading of approximately 120 degrees, as I recall, when 114.3 was put into the #2 VOR. The #2 VOR needle pointed slightly to the right of our heading and appeared to be a valid signal. Before we had time to aurally identify the #2 VOR, we were given an easterly heading. Shortly thereafter, with the #2 VOR not yet verified, we were told that we were cleared direct to salem, not to maintain a heading until receiving RNAV direct, as I recall. The captain in the right seat then went to the high altitude chart to further attempt to identify salem and get the coordinates to load into the GPS and ONS. As he was doing so, the captain in the left seat asked and was told that the salem VOR frequency was 114.3. He was also told the #2 VOR was receiving a signal and was pointing in a southerly direction. The captain in the left seat then began a turn toward the south and the #2 VOR needle. During the turn, the so noticed traffic at FL410 to the southeast. After rolling out on a southerly heading, the captain in the left seat gave control of the aircraft to the captain in the right seat and asked for and was given the charts to identify salem and load the coordinates into the GPS and ONS. The captain in the right seat then looked out and visually noted the traffic to be in his forward left quadrant and at approximately 25 mi on the TCASII at FL410. The captain in the right seat then asked for the coordinates of salem. At about this time the captain in the left seat had put 114.3 into the #1 VOR and stated that the identify was not correct and was loading the coordinates of salem and the other fixes into the GPS. During this period of time and since clearing us direct to salem, there was no communication to us from ZMP of any nature. As the traffic closed to under 20 NM and approached 15 NM, we initiated a call to ZMP and told them of the potential conflict. At this time, the captain in the left seat had finished loading the coordinates into the GPS and was beginning a turn direct salem to the e-se. ZMP quickly came back and instructed us to make an immediate left turn to 90 degrees. The captain in the right seat acknowledged the call and the captain in the left seat made the turn to 90 degrees. This turn was accomplished with the traffic in sight at all times and the closest passing distance, as I recall, was approximately 5 mi. A TCASII traffic resolution did enunciate during the turn. The other traffic was given a turn to 240 degrees. ATC then asked us where we were going and we responded that we believed that we were proceeding direct to salem as cleared. At this point, the captain in the right seat finished loading the salem coordinates into the ONS and noted salem to be in an e-s easterly direction and still at a distance of approximately 210 NM at this point. It was now abundantly clear that we had been unable to properly identify salem VOR on 114.3 because it was beyond the usable navigational range of our vors and that we had been receiving, discovered shortly thereafter, janesville on 114.3 (a fix also unfamiliar to us and much closer to us). ZMP then told us to maintain the 90 degree heading and contact chicago center. In closing, ZMP mentioned that he would have to file a report because of the traffic conflict alert. The remainder of the flight to cleveland was uneventful. Conclusion: we assumed the reason for our rerte was because of the traffic deviations for WX in the area. It did seem that we were receiving the majority of the vectors in deference to the other traffic. The rapidity at which our reclrnc was read to us on the first occasions was probably because of the workload imposed upon the controller by all the WX deviations. He may have also assumed that we were familiar with the area and fixes. His subsequent failure to notice our initial incorrect heading for salem was probably again due to his preoccupation with deviating traffic. On our part, we were unfamiliar with the reclrnc and the location of the fixes and our distance from salem when we were cleared direct. Nor were we aware that janesville was also on 114.3 and much closer than salem. As a point of information, the IOE captain's recent flying experience had been outside of the conus. Additionally, the IOE captain was concerned about the aircraft's performance at FL410 (new to him) and his concern was the focus of a good portion of the check captain's attention. After the event in question, we all agreed that 'vector until receiving or RNAV direct' should have been included with a VOR fix outside the ssv. I do not recall any such clearance other than direct salem being given.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLC BECAME DISORIENTED DURING VECTORED TURNS FOR TFC BY ATC AND THEIR OWN ERROR IN FOLLOWING AN UNIDENTED VOR RESULTING IN ATC INTERVENTION TO BRING THEM BACK TO THE CORRECT TRACK.

Narrative: THIS FLT WAS A FERRY FLT FROM MSP TO CLE. PRESENT ON THE FLT DECK WERE AN IOE CAPT IN THE L SEAT, A CHK CAPT IN THE R SEAT, A SO, AND A FLT MECH ON THE JUMP SEAT. CLBOUT WAS NORMAL WITH VARIOUS VECTORS AND INTERMEDIATE LEVEL OFFS GIVEN BECAUSE OF OTHER TFC IN THE AREA. DURING THE LATTER PART OF OUR CLB TO FL410, A NUMBER OF VECTORS WERE GIVEN TO CLR OTHER TFC IN THE AREA WHICH HAD BEEN DEVIATING FOR TSTMS AND MODERATE TURB. WE HAD NOT FOUND IT NECESSARY TO DEVIATE FOR WX OURSELVES. AS WE WERE CLBING THROUGH APPROX FL390, WE WERE FINALLY GIVEN DIRECT DLL. SHORTLY THEREAFTER IN THE AREA OF DLL AND BEFORE REACHING FL410, WE WERE TOLD BY ZMP THAT WE WERE GOING TO BE RECLRED TO CLE AND THAT WE SHOULD ADVISE READY TO COPY. THE IOE CAPT IN THE L SEAT WAS FLYING THE ACFT WITH THE AUTOPLT AND RESPONDED TO ZMP BECAUSE THE CHK CAPT IN THE R SEAT HAD JUST TAKEN A BITE OF FOOD. THE CLRNC WAS GIVEN SO RAPIDLY THAT THE CAPT IN THE L SEAT AND NONE OF THE OTHERS ON THE FLT DECK WERE ABLE TO COPY OR UNDERSTAND IT. A REPEAT WAS REQUESTED AND AGAIN A RAPID DELIVERY, WITH US STILL UNSURE OF WHETHER THE FIX AFTER SVM WAS YQC OR YQG. ON ABOUT THE FOURTH TRY, THE CLRNC WAS GIVEN SLOWLY AND CLRLY AND WE REPEATED THE CLRNC BACK AS WE UNDERSTOOD IT. DIRECT SALEM, DIRECT YQG, V103 DAWN, DIRECT CLEVELAND. ZMP RESPONDED THAT THE READBACK WAS CORRECT. WE LATER DETERMINED THAT DAWN WAS GONNE. NONE OF THIS ROUTING WAS IN OUR FLT PLAN OR LOADED INTO THE GPS OR ONS AND THE COCKPIT WORKLOAD INCREASED ACCORDINGLY WITH THE NEED TO FIND THE NEW FIXES AND THE ROUTING. SEVERAL MORE VECTORS WERE GIVEN AND AS THE CAPT IN THE L SEAT CONTINUED TO FLY THE ACFT WITH THE AUTOPLT AND COMPLY WITH THE VECTORS, THE CAPT IN THE R SEAT PROCEEDED TO GET OUT THE MAPS AND LOOK FOR SALEM, WINDSOR, V103 AND GONNE SINCE NONE OF US WERE FAMILIAR WITH THEM. THESE FIXES AND RTE WERE FOUND IN A LOW ALT CHART AND A VOR FREQ OF 114.3 WAS FOUND FOR SALEM. WE WERE ON A S EASTERLY HEADING OF APPROX 120 DEGS, AS I RECALL, WHEN 114.3 WAS PUT INTO THE #2 VOR. THE #2 VOR NEEDLE POINTED SLIGHTLY TO THE R OF OUR HEADING AND APPEARED TO BE A VALID SIGNAL. BEFORE WE HAD TIME TO AURALLY IDENT THE #2 VOR, WE WERE GIVEN AN EASTERLY HEADING. SHORTLY THEREAFTER, WITH THE #2 VOR NOT YET VERIFIED, WE WERE TOLD THAT WE WERE CLRED DIRECT TO SALEM, NOT TO MAINTAIN A HEADING UNTIL RECEIVING RNAV DIRECT, AS I RECALL. THE CAPT IN THE R SEAT THEN WENT TO THE HIGH ALT CHART TO FURTHER ATTEMPT TO IDENT SALEM AND GET THE COORDINATES TO LOAD INTO THE GPS AND ONS. AS HE WAS DOING SO, THE CAPT IN THE L SEAT ASKED AND WAS TOLD THAT THE SALEM VOR FREQ WAS 114.3. HE WAS ALSO TOLD THE #2 VOR WAS RECEIVING A SIGNAL AND WAS POINTING IN A SOUTHERLY DIRECTION. THE CAPT IN THE L SEAT THEN BEGAN A TURN TOWARD THE S AND THE #2 VOR NEEDLE. DURING THE TURN, THE SO NOTICED TFC AT FL410 TO THE SE. AFTER ROLLING OUT ON A SOUTHERLY HEADING, THE CAPT IN THE L SEAT GAVE CTL OF THE ACFT TO THE CAPT IN THE R SEAT AND ASKED FOR AND WAS GIVEN THE CHARTS TO IDENT SALEM AND LOAD THE COORDINATES INTO THE GPS AND ONS. THE CAPT IN THE R SEAT THEN LOOKED OUT AND VISUALLY NOTED THE TFC TO BE IN HIS FORWARD L QUADRANT AND AT APPROX 25 MI ON THE TCASII AT FL410. THE CAPT IN THE R SEAT THEN ASKED FOR THE COORDINATES OF SALEM. AT ABOUT THIS TIME THE CAPT IN THE L SEAT HAD PUT 114.3 INTO THE #1 VOR AND STATED THAT THE IDENT WAS NOT CORRECT AND WAS LOADING THE COORDINATES OF SALEM AND THE OTHER FIXES INTO THE GPS. DURING THIS PERIOD OF TIME AND SINCE CLRING US DIRECT TO SALEM, THERE WAS NO COM TO US FROM ZMP OF ANY NATURE. AS THE TFC CLOSED TO UNDER 20 NM AND APCHED 15 NM, WE INITIATED A CALL TO ZMP AND TOLD THEM OF THE POTENTIAL CONFLICT. AT THIS TIME, THE CAPT IN THE L SEAT HAD FINISHED LOADING THE COORDINATES INTO THE GPS AND WAS BEGINNING A TURN DIRECT SALEM TO THE E-SE. ZMP QUICKLY CAME BACK AND INSTRUCTED US TO MAKE AN IMMEDIATE L TURN TO 90 DEGS. THE CAPT IN THE R SEAT ACKNOWLEDGED THE CALL AND THE CAPT IN THE L SEAT MADE THE TURN TO 90 DEGS. THIS TURN WAS ACCOMPLISHED WITH THE TFC IN SIGHT AT ALL TIMES AND THE CLOSEST PASSING DISTANCE, AS I RECALL, WAS APPROX 5 MI. A TCASII TFC RESOLUTION DID ENUNCIATE DURING THE TURN. THE OTHER TFC WAS GIVEN A TURN TO 240 DEGS. ATC THEN ASKED US WHERE WE WERE GOING AND WE RESPONDED THAT WE BELIEVED THAT WE WERE PROCEEDING DIRECT TO SALEM AS CLRED. AT THIS POINT, THE CAPT IN THE R SEAT FINISHED LOADING THE SALEM COORDINATES INTO THE ONS AND NOTED SALEM TO BE IN AN E-S EASTERLY DIRECTION AND STILL AT A DISTANCE OF APPROX 210 NM AT THIS POINT. IT WAS NOW ABUNDANTLY CLR THAT WE HAD BEEN UNABLE TO PROPERLY IDENT SALEM VOR ON 114.3 BECAUSE IT WAS BEYOND THE USABLE NAVIGATIONAL RANGE OF OUR VORS AND THAT WE HAD BEEN RECEIVING, DISCOVERED SHORTLY THEREAFTER, JANESVILLE ON 114.3 (A FIX ALSO UNFAMILIAR TO US AND MUCH CLOSER TO US). ZMP THEN TOLD US TO MAINTAIN THE 90 DEG HDG AND CONTACT CHICAGO CTR. IN CLOSING, ZMP MENTIONED THAT HE WOULD HAVE TO FILE A RPT BECAUSE OF THE TFC CONFLICT ALERT. THE REMAINDER OF THE FLT TO CLEVELAND WAS UNEVENTFUL. CONCLUSION: WE ASSUMED THE REASON FOR OUR RERTE WAS BECAUSE OF THE TFC DEVS FOR WX IN THE AREA. IT DID SEEM THAT WE WERE RECEIVING THE MAJORITY OF THE VECTORS IN DEFERENCE TO THE OTHER TFC. THE RAPIDITY AT WHICH OUR RECLRNC WAS READ TO US ON THE FIRST OCCASIONS WAS PROBABLY BECAUSE OF THE WORKLOAD IMPOSED UPON THE CTLR BY ALL THE WX DEVS. HE MAY HAVE ALSO ASSUMED THAT WE WERE FAMILIAR WITH THE AREA AND FIXES. HIS SUBSEQUENT FAILURE TO NOTICE OUR INITIAL INCORRECT HEADING FOR SALEM WAS PROBABLY AGAIN DUE TO HIS PREOCCUPATION WITH DEVIATING TFC. ON OUR PART, WE WERE UNFAMILIAR WITH THE RECLRNC AND THE LOCATION OF THE FIXES AND OUR DISTANCE FROM SALEM WHEN WE WERE CLRED DIRECT. NOR WERE WE AWARE THAT JANESVILLE WAS ALSO ON 114.3 AND MUCH CLOSER THAN SALEM. AS A POINT OF INFO, THE IOE CAPT'S RECENT FLYING EXPERIENCE HAD BEEN OUTSIDE OF THE CONUS. ADDITIONALLY, THE IOE CAPT WAS CONCERNED ABOUT THE ACFT'S PERFORMANCE AT FL410 (NEW TO HIM) AND HIS CONCERN WAS THE FOCUS OF A GOOD PORTION OF THE CHK CAPT'S ATTN. AFTER THE EVENT IN QUESTION, WE ALL AGREED THAT 'VECTOR UNTIL RECEIVING OR RNAV DIRECT' SHOULD HAVE BEEN INCLUDED WITH A VOR FIX OUTSIDE THE SSV. I DO NOT RECALL ANY SUCH CLRNC OTHER THAN DIRECT SALEM BEING GIVEN.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.