Narrative:

I was PIC for the part 91 trip that day. My company had 5 helicopters traveling from ny, nj and PA areas all going to a common landing site in salem, nj. The WX reports were far off from actual conditions, therefore, none of the 5 capts canceled their trips. My copilot for the day was a 30-yr veteran with over 26000 flight hours. We normally have an excellent working relationship, however, on this particular day, he was angry over a broken water hose in his car and he had also had a fight with our company dispatcher and the chief pilot. We started our aircraft and I realized that he was taking his anger out on me, ie, refusing to participate in the flight unless I gave him a direct command. I stopped taxiing long enough to tell him his anger was misdirected and unless we straightened this out, I was not going to depart. He apologized, said he was 'with me' and we departed. The WX was, as I said, less than forecast, but we managed to hold about 1200 ft coming off mmu. The visibility was about 3 mi. All the other helicopters for this trip were already in the air and we could hear them talking on the base frequency. We heard one ship say that ttn was IFR but that they had managed to climb through the cloud layer and maintain VFR on top. Since our flight path was taking us through ttn's airspace, we thought we were prepared. As we got closer to ttn, the best I could maintain was about 800 ft while the visibility went down to less than 1 mi. Ttn told us to stand by for other traffic. It was at this time that I decided to turn around. The WX was certainly getting worse. As I made a standard rate turn to the left at about 800 ft, we went inadvertent IFR. (The ship was a VFR agusta, I was the only current IFR pilot on board.) this condition lasted approximately 25-30 seconds. I realized during that time that my copilot was spending a lot of time conversing with my chief pilot on the base frequency and hadn't checked us out of ttn's airspace. It was also at this time that I heard ttn calling us. I checked out with trenton while attempting to getback to VFR conditions. Needless to say I was very busy. The talking continued between the aircraft with suggestions, conditions and position. We broke out overhead 39N. I radioed our position on princeton's frequency. My copilot, meantime, had dialed in the pottstown VOR and told me that we should try to head directly towards pottstown which would keep us out of ttn's airspace and also their WX. I agreed. The WX kept changing from 2000 ft and 2-3 mi visibility to less than 600 ft and 1 mi, and then there were times when we could comfortably maintain VFR on top with a thin scattered layer beneath us. It was extremely tricky and happening very fast. We were constantly in and out of 'sucker holes,' corridors of good WX that led nowhere. I was holding about 2300 ft VFR on top while my copilot tried to figure out our exact position. To our horror, we discovered that we were only 3 mi from ttn's tower. The wall of WX prevented us from seeing to the east. My copilot tuned in ttn's frequency only to hear the controller yelling our tail number. He had obviously tracked us when we originally went inadvertent and was now frantically trying to reach us since we were cutting off his IFR traffic. He asked us to reverse course twice and then told us to leave his airspace. As it ended up, we circumnavigated ttn's airspace sebound only to get caught just past nxx. The talking on the company's base frequency was endless and constantly distracting. I ended up switching off base's frequency and worked ATC, requesting a heading to N67 for an immediate landing from willow grove. My copilot finally 'joined' me with the flight about 3 mi short of wings. The chain of this incident obviously began with my copilot's anger. Our busting ttn's airspace was a failure to communicate. I should not have been so reticent to tell a 30-yr veteran that I needed him to pay attention to the flight more than a conversation with the chief pilot. This was a perfect example of why pilots are taught to leave their anger behind while on a trip. The two of them were obviously still angry from theirdisagreement prior to the flight. Going inadvertent IFR was no time for the 'PF' to also have to work the radios. It took all my attention to 'fly the ship' first. There was obviously no excuse for busting ttn's airspace and I certainly cannot blame the controller for his anger. Next time, I will insist on total cooperation from my crew members with the excess chit chat being left for another time. I have also learned my own lesson of leaving as much stress as possible on the ground and never again will I pay more attention to another aircraft rather than my position. My apologies to ttn.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: HELI FLC IN MARGINAL VISIBILITY FLEW INTO TRENTON CLASS D AIRSPACE WITHOUT CLRNC.

Narrative: I WAS PIC FOR THE PART 91 TRIP THAT DAY. MY COMPANY HAD 5 HELIS TRAVELING FROM NY, NJ AND PA AREAS ALL GOING TO A COMMON LNDG SITE IN SALEM, NJ. THE WX RPTS WERE FAR OFF FROM ACTUAL CONDITIONS, THEREFORE, NONE OF THE 5 CAPTS CANCELED THEIR TRIPS. MY COPLT FOR THE DAY WAS A 30-YR VETERAN WITH OVER 26000 FLT HRS. WE NORMALLY HAVE AN EXCELLENT WORKING RELATIONSHIP, HOWEVER, ON THIS PARTICULAR DAY, HE WAS ANGRY OVER A BROKEN WATER HOSE IN HIS CAR AND HE HAD ALSO HAD A FIGHT WITH OUR COMPANY DISPATCHER AND THE CHIEF PLT. WE STARTED OUR ACFT AND I REALIZED THAT HE WAS TAKING HIS ANGER OUT ON ME, IE, REFUSING TO PARTICIPATE IN THE FLT UNLESS I GAVE HIM A DIRECT COMMAND. I STOPPED TAXIING LONG ENOUGH TO TELL HIM HIS ANGER WAS MISDIRECTED AND UNLESS WE STRAIGHTENED THIS OUT, I WAS NOT GOING TO DEPART. HE APOLOGIZED, SAID HE WAS 'WITH ME' AND WE DEPARTED. THE WX WAS, AS I SAID, LESS THAN FORECAST, BUT WE MANAGED TO HOLD ABOUT 1200 FT COMING OFF MMU. THE VISIBILITY WAS ABOUT 3 MI. ALL THE OTHER HELIS FOR THIS TRIP WERE ALREADY IN THE AIR AND WE COULD HEAR THEM TALKING ON THE BASE FREQ. WE HEARD ONE SHIP SAY THAT TTN WAS IFR BUT THAT THEY HAD MANAGED TO CLB THROUGH THE CLOUD LAYER AND MAINTAIN VFR ON TOP. SINCE OUR FLT PATH WAS TAKING US THROUGH TTN'S AIRSPACE, WE THOUGHT WE WERE PREPARED. AS WE GOT CLOSER TO TTN, THE BEST I COULD MAINTAIN WAS ABOUT 800 FT WHILE THE VISIBILITY WENT DOWN TO LESS THAN 1 MI. TTN TOLD US TO STAND BY FOR OTHER TFC. IT WAS AT THIS TIME THAT I DECIDED TO TURN AROUND. THE WX WAS CERTAINLY GETTING WORSE. AS I MADE A STANDARD RATE TURN TO THE L AT ABOUT 800 FT, WE WENT INADVERTENT IFR. (THE SHIP WAS A VFR AGUSTA, I WAS THE ONLY CURRENT IFR PLT ON BOARD.) THIS CONDITION LASTED APPROX 25-30 SECONDS. I REALIZED DURING THAT TIME THAT MY COPLT WAS SPENDING A LOT OF TIME CONVERSING WITH MY CHIEF PLT ON THE BASE FREQ AND HADN'T CHKED US OUT OF TTN'S AIRSPACE. IT WAS ALSO AT THIS TIME THAT I HEARD TTN CALLING US. I CHKED OUT WITH TRENTON WHILE ATTEMPTING TO GETBACK TO VFR CONDITIONS. NEEDLESS TO SAY I WAS VERY BUSY. THE TALKING CONTINUED BTWN THE ACFT WITH SUGGESTIONS, CONDITIONS AND POS. WE BROKE OUT OVERHEAD 39N. I RADIOED OUR POS ON PRINCETON'S FREQ. MY COPLT, MEANTIME, HAD DIALED IN THE POTTSTOWN VOR AND TOLD ME THAT WE SHOULD TRY TO HEAD DIRECTLY TOWARDS POTTSTOWN WHICH WOULD KEEP US OUT OF TTN'S AIRSPACE AND ALSO THEIR WX. I AGREED. THE WX KEPT CHANGING FROM 2000 FT AND 2-3 MI VISIBILITY TO LESS THAN 600 FT AND 1 MI, AND THEN THERE WERE TIMES WHEN WE COULD COMFORTABLY MAINTAIN VFR ON TOP WITH A THIN SCATTERED LAYER BENEATH US. IT WAS EXTREMELY TRICKY AND HAPPENING VERY FAST. WE WERE CONSTANTLY IN AND OUT OF 'SUCKER HOLES,' CORRIDORS OF GOOD WX THAT LED NOWHERE. I WAS HOLDING ABOUT 2300 FT VFR ON TOP WHILE MY COPLT TRIED TO FIGURE OUT OUR EXACT POS. TO OUR HORROR, WE DISCOVERED THAT WE WERE ONLY 3 MI FROM TTN'S TWR. THE WALL OF WX PREVENTED US FROM SEEING TO THE E. MY COPLT TUNED IN TTN'S FREQ ONLY TO HEAR THE CTLR YELLING OUR TAIL NUMBER. HE HAD OBVIOUSLY TRACKED US WHEN WE ORIGINALLY WENT INADVERTENT AND WAS NOW FRANTICALLY TRYING TO REACH US SINCE WE WERE CUTTING OFF HIS IFR TFC. HE ASKED US TO REVERSE COURSE TWICE AND THEN TOLD US TO LEAVE HIS AIRSPACE. AS IT ENDED UP, WE CIRCUMNAVIGATED TTN'S AIRSPACE SEBOUND ONLY TO GET CAUGHT JUST PAST NXX. THE TALKING ON THE COMPANY'S BASE FREQ WAS ENDLESS AND CONSTANTLY DISTRACTING. I ENDED UP SWITCHING OFF BASE'S FREQ AND WORKED ATC, REQUESTING A HDG TO N67 FOR AN IMMEDIATE LNDG FROM WILLOW GROVE. MY COPLT FINALLY 'JOINED' ME WITH THE FLT ABOUT 3 MI SHORT OF WINGS. THE CHAIN OF THIS INCIDENT OBVIOUSLY BEGAN WITH MY COPLT'S ANGER. OUR BUSTING TTN'S AIRSPACE WAS A FAILURE TO COMMUNICATE. I SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SO RETICENT TO TELL A 30-YR VETERAN THAT I NEEDED HIM TO PAY ATTN TO THE FLT MORE THAN A CONVERSATION WITH THE CHIEF PLT. THIS WAS A PERFECT EXAMPLE OF WHY PLTS ARE TAUGHT TO LEAVE THEIR ANGER BEHIND WHILE ON A TRIP. THE TWO OF THEM WERE OBVIOUSLY STILL ANGRY FROM THEIRDISAGREEMENT PRIOR TO THE FLT. GOING INADVERTENT IFR WAS NO TIME FOR THE 'PF' TO ALSO HAVE TO WORK THE RADIOS. IT TOOK ALL MY ATTN TO 'FLY THE SHIP' FIRST. THERE WAS OBVIOUSLY NO EXCUSE FOR BUSTING TTN'S AIRSPACE AND I CERTAINLY CANNOT BLAME THE CTLR FOR HIS ANGER. NEXT TIME, I WILL INSIST ON TOTAL COOPERATION FROM MY CREW MEMBERS WITH THE EXCESS CHIT CHAT BEING LEFT FOR ANOTHER TIME. I HAVE ALSO LEARNED MY OWN LESSON OF LEAVING AS MUCH STRESS AS POSSIBLE ON THE GND AND NEVER AGAIN WILL I PAY MORE ATTN TO ANOTHER ACFT RATHER THAN MY POS. MY APOLOGIES TO TTN.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.