Narrative:

The latest ewr ATIS was calling 45 broken, 60 overcast, visibility 4 mi in rain and fog. Obviously, it was dark. The captain was flying the ewr 4 departure from runway 4. This called for a turn at 400 ft to 060 degrees and a climb to 2500 ft with a turn to 290 degrees at 4 DME. In accordance with company climb procedures, at (actually slightly above) 1000 ft the captain called for 'quiet EPR and flaps 5 degrees,' which the engineer and I set. We were already in the WX by about 1000 ft -- it was ragged and broken (less than the ATIS was advertising). At about 1500 ft, still at flaps 5 degrees, ewr tower called us and directed an immediate turn to 270 degrees. I looked to the right (away from the turn), saw another aircraft and said something like, 'there's the traffic.' the captain glanced and saw the traffic's rotating beacon. I noticed and told the captain that the traffic was turning into us. The captain said something like, 'we're out of here!' he reduced power, increased bank and descended. I wasn't paying attention to our aircraft's attitude because I was trying to keep the traffic in sight. I did notice that we were down to at least 700 ft because I heard the 'don't sink!' (descending on takeoff) warning of the GPWS. I don't know if the traffic saw us or was directed, but he began an abrupt turn away from us. Ewr tower called us and advised us to climb to 2000 ft. I acknowledged the call. The captain began to roll out and climb. The tower commented that he didn't know where the traffic came from. We were then handed off to ny departure (120.15). We contacted ny and finished cleaning up the aircraft. Upon handoff from 120.15 (ny departure) to the next controller, I asked if departure needed any information from us about the maneuver. The controller said 'no' and that the outgoing controller had briefed him on the event. Obviously, during the flight to mem we continued to discuss what happened. The captain told me he had rolled to about 70 degrees of bank during the maneuver. That, combined with my observation of the other aircraft being about level with us, implies that the other aircraft was almost directly above us. I might assume that since the tower advised us to climb to 2000 ft, the traffic might have been at about 3000 ft. Apparently, we were between the traffic and the ground. Additionally, since we were already in ragged WX and still able to see the traffic, I suspect that he was rather close to us. It is difficult to estimate exactly how close we came to each other because of the darkness and WX, but it certainly looked too close for me. I believe that had we not maneuvered aggressively the outcome could have been quite different. Had I realized at the time how close the 2 of us really were to each other, I would have notified the departure controller that we were filing a near miss report -- which, indeed, the captain did upon arrival in mem. Perhaps the FAA should require operations like ours to install TCASII. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter states his captain did indeed file a report with ATC and with his company. He has not heard anything further. His feeling is that the other aircraft was a light twin of some kind. He has a feeling that perhaps someone in ATC did not coordination the traffic since they indicated there was no problem. He was very disturbed after the fact when captain informed him of the extreme maneuvering he had to do to get out of the situation.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B727 FREIGHTER ACFT HAS NMAC ON DEP FROM EWR IN MARGINAL WX CONDITIONS.

Narrative: THE LATEST EWR ATIS WAS CALLING 45 BROKEN, 60 OVCST, VISIBILITY 4 MI IN RAIN AND FOG. OBVIOUSLY, IT WAS DARK. THE CAPT WAS FLYING THE EWR 4 DEP FROM RWY 4. THIS CALLED FOR A TURN AT 400 FT TO 060 DEGS AND A CLB TO 2500 FT WITH A TURN TO 290 DEGS AT 4 DME. IN ACCORDANCE WITH COMPANY CLB PROCS, AT (ACTUALLY SLIGHTLY ABOVE) 1000 FT THE CAPT CALLED FOR 'QUIET EPR AND FLAPS 5 DEGS,' WHICH THE ENGINEER AND I SET. WE WERE ALREADY IN THE WX BY ABOUT 1000 FT -- IT WAS RAGGED AND BROKEN (LESS THAN THE ATIS WAS ADVERTISING). AT ABOUT 1500 FT, STILL AT FLAPS 5 DEGS, EWR TWR CALLED US AND DIRECTED AN IMMEDIATE TURN TO 270 DEGS. I LOOKED TO THE R (AWAY FROM THE TURN), SAW ANOTHER ACFT AND SAID SOMETHING LIKE, 'THERE'S THE TFC.' THE CAPT GLANCED AND SAW THE TFC'S ROTATING BEACON. I NOTICED AND TOLD THE CAPT THAT THE TFC WAS TURNING INTO US. THE CAPT SAID SOMETHING LIKE, 'WE'RE OUT OF HERE!' HE REDUCED PWR, INCREASED BANK AND DSNDED. I WASN'T PAYING ATTN TO OUR ACFT'S ATTITUDE BECAUSE I WAS TRYING TO KEEP THE TFC IN SIGHT. I DID NOTICE THAT WE WERE DOWN TO AT LEAST 700 FT BECAUSE I HEARD THE 'DON'T SINK!' (DSNDING ON TKOF) WARNING OF THE GPWS. I DON'T KNOW IF THE TFC SAW US OR WAS DIRECTED, BUT HE BEGAN AN ABRUPT TURN AWAY FROM US. EWR TWR CALLED US AND ADVISED US TO CLB TO 2000 FT. I ACKNOWLEDGED THE CALL. THE CAPT BEGAN TO ROLL OUT AND CLB. THE TWR COMMENTED THAT HE DIDN'T KNOW WHERE THE TFC CAME FROM. WE WERE THEN HANDED OFF TO NY DEP (120.15). WE CONTACTED NY AND FINISHED CLEANING UP THE ACFT. UPON HDOF FROM 120.15 (NY DEP) TO THE NEXT CTLR, I ASKED IF DEP NEEDED ANY INFO FROM US ABOUT THE MANEUVER. THE CTLR SAID 'NO' AND THAT THE OUTGOING CTLR HAD BRIEFED HIM ON THE EVENT. OBVIOUSLY, DURING THE FLT TO MEM WE CONTINUED TO DISCUSS WHAT HAPPENED. THE CAPT TOLD ME HE HAD ROLLED TO ABOUT 70 DEGS OF BANK DURING THE MANEUVER. THAT, COMBINED WITH MY OBSERVATION OF THE OTHER ACFT BEING ABOUT LEVEL WITH US, IMPLIES THAT THE OTHER ACFT WAS ALMOST DIRECTLY ABOVE US. I MIGHT ASSUME THAT SINCE THE TWR ADVISED US TO CLB TO 2000 FT, THE TFC MIGHT HAVE BEEN AT ABOUT 3000 FT. APPARENTLY, WE WERE BTWN THE TFC AND THE GND. ADDITIONALLY, SINCE WE WERE ALREADY IN RAGGED WX AND STILL ABLE TO SEE THE TFC, I SUSPECT THAT HE WAS RATHER CLOSE TO US. IT IS DIFFICULT TO ESTIMATE EXACTLY HOW CLOSE WE CAME TO EACH OTHER BECAUSE OF THE DARKNESS AND WX, BUT IT CERTAINLY LOOKED TOO CLOSE FOR ME. I BELIEVE THAT HAD WE NOT MANEUVERED AGGRESSIVELY THE OUTCOME COULD HAVE BEEN QUITE DIFFERENT. HAD I REALIZED AT THE TIME HOW CLOSE THE 2 OF US REALLY WERE TO EACH OTHER, I WOULD HAVE NOTIFIED THE DEP CTLR THAT WE WERE FILING A NEAR MISS RPT -- WHICH, INDEED, THE CAPT DID UPON ARR IN MEM. PERHAPS THE FAA SHOULD REQUIRE OPS LIKE OURS TO INSTALL TCASII. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATES HIS CAPT DID INDEED FILE A RPT WITH ATC AND WITH HIS COMPANY. HE HAS NOT HEARD ANYTHING FURTHER. HIS FEELING IS THAT THE OTHER ACFT WAS A LIGHT TWIN OF SOME KIND. HE HAS A FEELING THAT PERHAPS SOMEONE IN ATC DID NOT COORD THE TFC SINCE THEY INDICATED THERE WAS NO PROB. HE WAS VERY DISTURBED AFTER THE FACT WHEN CAPT INFORMED HIM OF THE EXTREME MANEUVERING HE HAD TO DO TO GET OUT OF THE SIT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.