Narrative:

I was the PF (captain) phl-mht. The flight was approaching mht at approximately XA30. We requested an ILS approach to runway 35. Runway 17 was in use at mht. We rechked our landing data and determined that we were too heavy to land on runway 35 because of a tailwind and wet runway. We requested runway 17 and were given radar vectors to runway 17. The first officer briefed the VOR 17 approach (chart 13-2). We thought at this time that the VOR 17 approach was in use. Manchester has 2 VOR approachs to runway 17 (VOR 17, chart 13-2) which utilizes the mht VOR and the VOR DME 17 which uses the concord VOR (approach chart 13-3). The controller vectored us to final approach course and cleared us for the VOR 17 approach to mht. As we intercepted the final approach he advised us that we were 1/4 mi right of course and that the approach used the concord VOR. We tuned the concord VOR (112.9) and reset the course selector for the VOR/DME approach. The controller verified that we were on course and we rebriefed the approach and continued. The runway was sighted at approximately 1500 ft MSL and 4 mi from the threshold. We made a normal landing. I do not think safety was a problem in this incident because we were on an approved instrument approach during the entire time. We were also under radar surveillance. I do think that ATC controllers should clarify which NAVAID should be used for different approachs to the same runway. Example: 'air carrier X is cleared for VOR/DME approach to runway 17 at manchester. Verify using concord VOR for approach.' human factors play a major role in operating on the 'backside of the clock' (XA30 local). We (all pilots and controllers) have to be aware that our body clocks don't work well at XA30 and we have to guard against the pitfalls encountered during these hours. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter stated he was flying a modified B727-100 with EFIS. He said the controller may have said 'VOR DME approach runway 17.' but, that did not register. The order of sequence in the approach chart number 13-2 for the approach he was using as compared with 13-3 which was the approach to runway 17 he was supposed to use, and the fact his radios were already tuned to the manchester VOR, and manchester was the airport he was headed for helped to mislead him to use the manchester VOR approach procedure. He said he sent the report in hoping at all those airports that have multiple approachs to the same runway every care is taken to assure the pilot is using what the controller intends replete with the same missed approach in mind.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACCORDING TO THE RPTR THE TRACON CLRED THE RPTR FOR A VOR APCH TO RWY 17. THERE ARE 2 VOR APCHS. THE RPTR BELIEVES THE CTLR SHOULD STATE 'CLRED FOR THE MANCHESTER (OR CONCORD) VOR APCH TO RWY 17.' THEN THERE WOULD BE NO AMBIGUITY. HE BELIEVES AT ALL PLACES WHERE MORE THAN 1 NDB OR VOR TO A RWY IS AVAILABLE, THE CTLR SHOULD ASSURE THE PLT IS ORIENTED TO THE ONE INTENDED.

Narrative: I WAS THE PF (CAPT) PHL-MHT. THE FLT WAS APCHING MHT AT APPROX XA30. WE REQUESTED AN ILS APCH TO RWY 35. RWY 17 WAS IN USE AT MHT. WE RECHKED OUR LNDG DATA AND DETERMINED THAT WE WERE TOO HVY TO LAND ON RWY 35 BECAUSE OF A TAILWIND AND WET RWY. WE REQUESTED RWY 17 AND WERE GIVEN RADAR VECTORS TO RWY 17. THE FO BRIEFED THE VOR 17 APCH (CHART 13-2). WE THOUGHT AT THIS TIME THAT THE VOR 17 APCH WAS IN USE. MANCHESTER HAS 2 VOR APCHS TO RWY 17 (VOR 17, CHART 13-2) WHICH UTILIZES THE MHT VOR AND THE VOR DME 17 WHICH USES THE CONCORD VOR (APCH CHART 13-3). THE CTLR VECTORED US TO FINAL APCH COURSE AND CLRED US FOR THE VOR 17 APCH TO MHT. AS WE INTERCEPTED THE FINAL APCH HE ADVISED US THAT WE WERE 1/4 MI R OF COURSE AND THAT THE APCH USED THE CONCORD VOR. WE TUNED THE CONCORD VOR (112.9) AND RESET THE COURSE SELECTOR FOR THE VOR/DME APCH. THE CTLR VERIFIED THAT WE WERE ON COURSE AND WE REBRIEFED THE APCH AND CONTINUED. THE RWY WAS SIGHTED AT APPROX 1500 FT MSL AND 4 MI FROM THE THRESHOLD. WE MADE A NORMAL LNDG. I DO NOT THINK SAFETY WAS A PROB IN THIS INCIDENT BECAUSE WE WERE ON AN APPROVED INST APCH DURING THE ENTIRE TIME. WE WERE ALSO UNDER RADAR SURVEILLANCE. I DO THINK THAT ATC CTLRS SHOULD CLARIFY WHICH NAVAID SHOULD BE USED FOR DIFFERENT APCHS TO THE SAME RWY. EXAMPLE: 'ACR X IS CLRED FOR VOR/DME APCH TO RWY 17 AT MANCHESTER. VERIFY USING CONCORD VOR FOR APCH.' HUMAN FACTORS PLAY A MAJOR ROLE IN OPERATING ON THE 'BACKSIDE OF THE CLOCK' (XA30 LCL). WE (ALL PLTS AND CTLRS) HAVE TO BE AWARE THAT OUR BODY CLOCKS DON'T WORK WELL AT XA30 AND WE HAVE TO GUARD AGAINST THE PITFALLS ENCOUNTERED DURING THESE HRS. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR STATED HE WAS FLYING A MODIFIED B727-100 WITH EFIS. HE SAID THE CTLR MAY HAVE SAID 'VOR DME APCH RWY 17.' BUT, THAT DID NOT REGISTER. THE ORDER OF SEQUENCE IN THE APCH CHART NUMBER 13-2 FOR THE APCH HE WAS USING AS COMPARED WITH 13-3 WHICH WAS THE APCH TO RWY 17 HE WAS SUPPOSED TO USE, AND THE FACT HIS RADIOS WERE ALREADY TUNED TO THE MANCHESTER VOR, AND MANCHESTER WAS THE ARPT HE WAS HEADED FOR HELPED TO MISLEAD HIM TO USE THE MANCHESTER VOR APCH PROC. HE SAID HE SENT THE RPT IN HOPING AT ALL THOSE ARPTS THAT HAVE MULTIPLE APCHS TO THE SAME RWY EVERY CARE IS TAKEN TO ASSURE THE PLT IS USING WHAT THE CTLR INTENDS REPLETE WITH THE SAME MISSED APCH IN MIND.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.