Narrative:

There was a thunderstorm at the north end of the airport. We could see it visually and had been looking at it on the radar. It looked like a level 3 storm with a steep gradient. At 4-5 mi from airport, both pilots saw the rain from the leading edge of the storm begin to obscure the runway lights at the north end of the airfield and we saw more and more of the lights being obscured. The storm was moving south. I was the copilot and told the captain, 'don't we want to go around now?' he said, 'no, the field is clear enough, we'll make it.' I was trying to tell the captain that it was unsafe to continue because of possible windshear. I continued to fly the approach (ILS backed up with a visual) at 300 ft AGL it began to rain. At decision ht (200 ft) we were stabilized on GS and the localizer with the approach lights, and end of runway in sight. We continued. At 100 ft buckets of rain pounded the aircraft and I lost all visual cues. I did not go around into the storm because I felt that would be more dangerous than continuing. The aircraft landed and drifted left and hydroplaned. The left main left the runway. Aircraft was recovered 2000 ft later. Passenger never knew there had been a problem. Causes: poor CRM. First officer should have been more forceful in informing the captain that the approach was risky. The captain did not recognize the danger of the storm. Uneventful taxi to gate. No injuries to all people on board. 1 engine changed and other minor damage.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737 FLC MAKES APCH AND LNDG INTO A MICROBURST RESULTING IN RWY EXCURSION AND LOSS OF ACFT CTL.

Narrative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

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.