Narrative:

Flight was loaded to 163600 pounds takeoff weight. Since aircraft had 'intermix' JT80-7 engines with less performance, captain reviewed takeoff data selecting flaps 5 degrees rather than flaps 15 degrees for departure since flap 15 degree climb limited weight was roughly the same as flap 5 'normal' weight meaning better second segment climb available at flap 5 degrees. Captain also requested runway 21R (longest available) and performed takeoff briefing to crew emphasizing abort and engine failure considerations. All normal procedures followed and upon clearance, takeoff roll was commenced. Acceleration was typically 'sluggish' given -7 engines but acceptable. Wind effect was slightly noticeable and seemed somewhat gusty, though ATIS report was 220 degrees/15 KTS steady state. Captain began rotation at vr call (144 KTS) and purposefully restr rotation rate to 2-2.5 degrees per second towards target 16 degree pitch. Maneuver seemed smooth and normal though performance still seemed sluggish through unstick and initial liftoff. At that point, airspeed seemed momentarily stagnant then bounced plus/minus 5 KTS from V2 (157 KIAS). All other indications normal and climb thereafter normal as well. Flight attendant in aft cabin, however, reported noise in aft body at lift-off. Captain contacted company dispatch/maintenance control reporting possible tail strike and made logbook entry. With all indications normal, company okayed continuing to destination and captain concurred, though requested load to be ramp checked at destination and reconciled with dtw back check as well. Flight proceeded and landed normally at destination. On ground inspection revealed no aircraft damage though tailskid did show evidence of slight ground contact, but tailskid pin was intact indicating no significant force encountered. Load check showed accurate count of bags and cargo. Since all cockpit crew members agreed that rotation procedure and rate were proper, captain can only conclude that a) company 'average bag weight' as optimistic, B) gusty conditions combined with older -7 engines decreased takeoff performance significantly from calculated data. While event does not constitute an 'incident' captain feels it illustrates a chronic and potential danger area since takeoff maneuvers are still very much a 'feel' operation and company enforces a dual qualification policy. Captain had just spent the previous month flying the A320, a fly-by-wire aircraft with completely different procedures, takeoff performance, and feel and received only 2 legs with a safety pilot in transition back to the B727. This would normally be minimally acceptable, but company's B727 fleet includes a multitude of variants with just a few -7 engine installations. Despite captain's planning, event occurred and while not serious, it was disturbing and non-confidence inspiring. Captain had requested a simulator period at beginning of month and company demurred, providing safety pilot instead for first 2 legs (even though policy for A320 always requires simulator ride into line operations, return to B727 does not). Captain strongly suggests that standardization of training policy, elimination or more restrictive dual qualification policy, and re-examination of aging -7 engine performance and average bag weights would be beneficial.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: TAIL SKID DRAG ON TKOF.

Narrative: FLT WAS LOADED TO 163600 LBS TKOF WT. SINCE ACFT HAD 'INTERMIX' JT80-7 ENGS WITH LESS PERFORMANCE, CAPT REVIEWED TKOF DATA SELECTING FLAPS 5 DEGS RATHER THAN FLAPS 15 DEGS FOR DEP SINCE FLAP 15 DEG CLB LIMITED WT WAS ROUGHLY THE SAME AS FLAP 5 'NORMAL' WT MEANING BETTER SECOND SEGMENT CLB AVAILABLE AT FLAP 5 DEGS. CAPT ALSO REQUESTED RWY 21R (LONGEST AVAILABLE) AND PERFORMED TKOF BRIEFING TO CREW EMPHASIZING ABORT AND ENG FAILURE CONSIDERATIONS. ALL NORMAL PROCS FOLLOWED AND UPON CLRNC, TKOF ROLL WAS COMMENCED. ACCELERATION WAS TYPICALLY 'SLUGGISH' GIVEN -7 ENGS BUT ACCEPTABLE. WIND EFFECT WAS SLIGHTLY NOTICEABLE AND SEEMED SOMEWHAT GUSTY, THOUGH ATIS RPT WAS 220 DEGS/15 KTS STEADY STATE. CAPT BEGAN ROTATION AT VR CALL (144 KTS) AND PURPOSEFULLY RESTR ROTATION RATE TO 2-2.5 DEGS PER SECOND TOWARDS TARGET 16 DEG PITCH. MANEUVER SEEMED SMOOTH AND NORMAL THOUGH PERFORMANCE STILL SEEMED SLUGGISH THROUGH UNSTICK AND INITIAL LIFTOFF. AT THAT POINT, AIRSPD SEEMED MOMENTARILY STAGNANT THEN BOUNCED PLUS/MINUS 5 KTS FROM V2 (157 KIAS). ALL OTHER INDICATIONS NORMAL AND CLB THEREAFTER NORMAL AS WELL. FLT ATTENDANT IN AFT CABIN, HOWEVER, RPTED NOISE IN AFT BODY AT LIFT-OFF. CAPT CONTACTED COMPANY DISPATCH/MAINT CTL RPTING POSSIBLE TAIL STRIKE AND MADE LOGBOOK ENTRY. WITH ALL INDICATIONS NORMAL, COMPANY OKAYED CONTINUING TO DEST AND CAPT CONCURRED, THOUGH REQUESTED LOAD TO BE RAMP CHKED AT DEST AND RECONCILED WITH DTW BACK CHK AS WELL. FLT PROCEEDED AND LANDED NORMALLY AT DEST. ON GND INSPECTION REVEALED NO ACFT DAMAGE THOUGH TAILSKID DID SHOW EVIDENCE OF SLIGHT GND CONTACT, BUT TAILSKID PIN WAS INTACT INDICATING NO SIGNIFICANT FORCE ENCOUNTERED. LOAD CHK SHOWED ACCURATE COUNT OF BAGS AND CARGO. SINCE ALL COCKPIT CREW MEMBERS AGREED THAT ROTATION PROC AND RATE WERE PROPER, CAPT CAN ONLY CONCLUDE THAT A) COMPANY 'AVERAGE BAG WT' AS OPTIMISTIC, B) GUSTY CONDITIONS COMBINED WITH OLDER -7 ENGS DECREASED TKOF PERFORMANCE SIGNIFICANTLY FROM CALCULATED DATA. WHILE EVENT DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AN 'INCIDENT' CAPT FEELS IT ILLUSTRATES A CHRONIC AND POTENTIAL DANGER AREA SINCE TKOF MANEUVERS ARE STILL VERY MUCH A 'FEEL' OP AND COMPANY ENFORCES A DUAL QUALIFICATION POLICY. CAPT HAD JUST SPENT THE PREVIOUS MONTH FLYING THE A320, A FLY-BY-WIRE ACFT WITH COMPLETELY DIFFERENT PROCS, TKOF PERFORMANCE, AND FEEL AND RECEIVED ONLY 2 LEGS WITH A SAFETY PLT IN TRANSITION BACK TO THE B727. THIS WOULD NORMALLY BE MINIMALLY ACCEPTABLE, BUT COMPANY'S B727 FLEET INCLUDES A MULTITUDE OF VARIANTS WITH JUST A FEW -7 ENG INSTALLATIONS. DESPITE CAPT'S PLANNING, EVENT OCCURRED AND WHILE NOT SERIOUS, IT WAS DISTURBING AND NON-CONFIDENCE INSPIRING. CAPT HAD REQUESTED A SIMULATOR PERIOD AT BEGINNING OF MONTH AND COMPANY DEMURRED, PROVIDING SAFETY PLT INSTEAD FOR FIRST 2 LEGS (EVEN THOUGH POLICY FOR A320 ALWAYS REQUIRES SIMULATOR RIDE INTO LINE OPS, RETURN TO B727 DOES NOT). CAPT STRONGLY SUGGESTS THAT STANDARDIZATION OF TRAINING POLICY, ELIMINATION OR MORE RESTRICTIVE DUAL QUALIFICATION POLICY, AND RE-EXAMINATION OF AGING -7 ENG PERFORMANCE AND AVERAGE BAG WTS WOULD BE BENEFICIAL.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.