Narrative:

Aircraft had been brought from hangar. Several maintenance related items were addressed by technicians as we began preflight activities. FCU reset was one item noted by crew. Abeam geg, the following ECAM messages displayed: automatic flight FCU 1+2, automatic flight ap off, automatic flight a/thr off. No corrective procedure was applicable, aircraft hand flown to sea. Center and approach control provided vectors to relieve workload, as all heading, altitude, and speed information was lost. Visual approach was conducted at sea. Lead flight attendant was advised of situation, but no action was required by flight attendants. Dispatch and maintenance control were consulted with no recommendations. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter captain was giving IOE to a newly qualified captain on the A320. Prior to this flight reporter had brought in another aircraft with failed bleeds and a decompression. Because they had to get another aircraft on short notice, reporter's company brought an aircraft from the hangar. According to the reporter, the aircraft had items which had not been fixed, but maintenance worked fast to get them corrected. One of the items was an FCU problem, but maintenance was able to reset it and all appeared to be normal. In the reporter narrative he stated that he had lost heading, altitude and speed information, but on callback clarified that to loss of the primary flight instruments. All standby information was still good plus much of the pfd and navigation display. Reporter did not try to reset the FCU in flight because it was against company policy, plus he had enough flight instrument information to continue as in a conventional aircraft. He stressed the importance of human factors in an incident of this type. Flcs flying a sophisticated aircraft learn how to use the advanced system and depend on them, but then when those system are lost or partially lost it creates a great deal of stress and confusion. An example reporter mentioned was that the nd (navigation display) defaulted to the 80 mi scale. That was of no use to the flight crew at the time because they were still 240 mi from their next point on the navigation display. Also, not having an altitude set window or alert required writing down the altitude clrncs and watching carefully to insure the altitude level off.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACFT EQUIP PROB. FCU (FLT CTL UNIT), #1 AND #2 FAILED. RESULTED IN LOSS OF AUTOPLT, FLT DIRECTORS, ALT ALERT. FLC REQUESTED AND RECEIVED VECTORS FROM ATC AND, SINCE THE WX WAS GOOD, WERE ABLE TO MAKE A NORMAL APCH AND LNDG.

Narrative: ACFT HAD BEEN BROUGHT FROM HANGAR. SEVERAL MAINT RELATED ITEMS WERE ADDRESSED BY TECHNICIANS AS WE BEGAN PREFLT ACTIVITIES. FCU RESET WAS ONE ITEM NOTED BY CREW. ABEAM GEG, THE FOLLOWING ECAM MESSAGES DISPLAYED: AUTO FLT FCU 1+2, AUTO FLT AP OFF, AUTO FLT A/THR OFF. NO CORRECTIVE PROC WAS APPLICABLE, ACFT HAND FLOWN TO SEA. CTR AND APCH CTL PROVIDED VECTORS TO RELIEVE WORKLOAD, AS ALL HDG, ALT, AND SPD INFO WAS LOST. VISUAL APCH WAS CONDUCTED AT SEA. LEAD FLT ATTENDANT WAS ADVISED OF SIT, BUT NO ACTION WAS REQUIRED BY FLT ATTENDANTS. DISPATCH AND MAINT CTL WERE CONSULTED WITH NO RECOMMENDATIONS. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR CAPT WAS GIVING IOE TO A NEWLY QUALIFIED CAPT ON THE A320. PRIOR TO THIS FLT RPTR HAD BROUGHT IN ANOTHER ACFT WITH FAILED BLEEDS AND A DECOMPRESSION. BECAUSE THEY HAD TO GET ANOTHER ACFT ON SHORT NOTICE, RPTR'S COMPANY BROUGHT AN ACFT FROM THE HANGAR. ACCORDING TO THE RPTR, THE ACFT HAD ITEMS WHICH HAD NOT BEEN FIXED, BUT MAINT WORKED FAST TO GET THEM CORRECTED. ONE OF THE ITEMS WAS AN FCU PROB, BUT MAINT WAS ABLE TO RESET IT AND ALL APPEARED TO BE NORMAL. IN THE RPTR NARRATIVE HE STATED THAT HE HAD LOST HDG, ALT AND SPD INFO, BUT ON CALLBACK CLARIFIED THAT TO LOSS OF THE PRIMARY FLT INSTS. ALL STANDBY INFO WAS STILL GOOD PLUS MUCH OF THE PFD AND NAV DISPLAY. RPTR DID NOT TRY TO RESET THE FCU IN FLT BECAUSE IT WAS AGAINST COMPANY POLICY, PLUS HE HAD ENOUGH FLT INST INFO TO CONTINUE AS IN A CONVENTIONAL ACFT. HE STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF HUMAN FACTORS IN AN INCIDENT OF THIS TYPE. FLCS FLYING A SOPHISTICATED ACFT LEARN HOW TO USE THE ADVANCED SYS AND DEPEND ON THEM, BUT THEN WHEN THOSE SYS ARE LOST OR PARTIALLY LOST IT CREATES A GREAT DEAL OF STRESS AND CONFUSION. AN EXAMPLE RPTR MENTIONED WAS THAT THE ND (NAV DISPLAY) DEFAULTED TO THE 80 MI SCALE. THAT WAS OF NO USE TO THE FLC AT THE TIME BECAUSE THEY WERE STILL 240 MI FROM THEIR NEXT POINT ON THE NAV DISPLAY. ALSO, NOT HAVING AN ALT SET WINDOW OR ALERT REQUIRED WRITING DOWN THE ALT CLRNCS AND WATCHING CAREFULLY TO INSURE THE ALT LEVEL OFF.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.