37000 Feet | Browse and search NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System |
|
Attributes | |
ACN | 338470 |
Time | |
Date | 199606 |
Day | Sun |
Local Time Of Day | 1201 To 1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | atc facility : ckh airport : hnl |
State Reference | HI |
Altitude | msl bound lower : 2500 msl bound upper : 2500 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | tracon : hnl |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | Commercial Fixed Wing |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Navigation In Use | Other |
Flight Phase | climbout : initial cruise other |
Route In Use | departure other departure sid : sid |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : atp |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 160 flight time total : 19000 flight time type : 600 |
ASRS Report | 338470 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Qualification | pilot : instrument pilot : commercial |
Events | |
Anomaly | altitude deviation : excursion from assigned altitude non adherence : published procedure non adherence : clearance |
Independent Detector | other controllera other flight crewa |
Resolutory Action | flight crew : became reoriented |
Consequence | Other |
Supplementary | |
Primary Problem | Flight Crew Human Performance |
Air Traffic Incident | other |
Narrative:
On departure, molokai 4 clutz transition, from hnl, we inadvertently leveled at 2500 ft crossing the ckh 240 degree radial rather than climbing to coors at or above that altitude. While there is no excuse for having done so, there were several contributing factors worth discussing. The first officer was flying his first hnl round trip and was the PF. We briefed thoroughly about the crossing, both the probable need to use the ICAO departure profile if the restr was retained or the likely cancellation of same as happens frequently. The tower did not cancel and I therefore requested to do so with departure. For whatever reason his response ('negative') was misunderstood and I read back restr canceled. The controller replied 'negative, the restr is still in place,' I rogered that. Approximately simultaneously, my first officer asked 'does that mean maintain 2500 ft?' and the controller transmitted an advisory to 'in the future request cancellation from the tower or ground control.' apparently, I responded (incorrectly), affirmative to the first officer and then questioned the controller since, on just my previous flight, we had received contrary advice as to the proper source of a cancellation of the crossing. Subsequent vectors from the controller were initially confusing until we became aware that it was our maintaining of the 2500 ft altitude that was causing separation problems for departure control. We then reinitiated our climb profile somewhat chastened and embarrassed. While we technically met the at or above restr when crossing the ckh 240 degree radial we clearly were not operating in the expected fashion. The controller, in fact, reminded us of the or above stipulation. Subsequent vectors and traffic calls contributed to my head up and locked lack of awareness. Contributing to this primary mistake were the controller's questionable need to engage in the admonition in the first place. The first officer should have reexamined the departure page since my thoughtless response was a fairly direct contradiction of our departure briefing.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: AN ACR WDB CREW FAILED TO CONTINUE ITS CLB AFTER TKOF AT HNL. THEY CROSSED THE CKH 240 DEG RADIAL AT 2500 FT, BUT THEN FAILED TO CONTINUE THEIR CLB, DISRUPTING TFC.
Narrative: ON DEP, MOLOKAI 4 CLUTZ TRANSITION, FROM HNL, WE INADVERTENTLY LEVELED AT 2500 FT XING THE CKH 240 DEG RADIAL RATHER THAN CLBING TO COORS AT OR ABOVE THAT ALT. WHILE THERE IS NO EXCUSE FOR HAVING DONE SO, THERE WERE SEVERAL CONTRIBUTING FACTORS WORTH DISCUSSING. THE FO WAS FLYING HIS FIRST HNL ROUND TRIP AND WAS THE PF. WE BRIEFED THOROUGHLY ABOUT THE XING, BOTH THE PROBABLE NEED TO USE THE ICAO DEP PROFILE IF THE RESTR WAS RETAINED OR THE LIKELY CANCELLATION OF SAME AS HAPPENS FREQUENTLY. THE TWR DID NOT CANCEL AND I THEREFORE REQUESTED TO DO SO WITH DEP. FOR WHATEVER REASON HIS RESPONSE ('NEGATIVE') WAS MISUNDERSTOOD AND I READ BACK RESTR CANCELED. THE CTLR REPLIED 'NEGATIVE, THE RESTR IS STILL IN PLACE,' I ROGERED THAT. APPROX SIMULTANEOUSLY, MY FO ASKED 'DOES THAT MEAN MAINTAIN 2500 FT?' AND THE CTLR XMITTED AN ADVISORY TO 'IN THE FUTURE REQUEST CANCELLATION FROM THE TWR OR GND CTL.' APPARENTLY, I RESPONDED (INCORRECTLY), AFFIRMATIVE TO THE FO AND THEN QUESTIONED THE CTLR SINCE, ON JUST MY PREVIOUS FLT, WE HAD RECEIVED CONTRARY ADVICE AS TO THE PROPER SOURCE OF A CANCELLATION OF THE XING. SUBSEQUENT VECTORS FROM THE CTLR WERE INITIALLY CONFUSING UNTIL WE BECAME AWARE THAT IT WAS OUR MAINTAINING OF THE 2500 FT ALT THAT WAS CAUSING SEPARATION PROBS FOR DEP CTL. WE THEN REINITIATED OUR CLB PROFILE SOMEWHAT CHASTENED AND EMBARRASSED. WHILE WE TECHNICALLY MET THE AT OR ABOVE RESTR WHEN XING THE CKH 240 DEG RADIAL WE CLRLY WERE NOT OPERATING IN THE EXPECTED FASHION. THE CTLR, IN FACT, REMINDED US OF THE OR ABOVE STIPULATION. SUBSEQUENT VECTORS AND TFC CALLS CONTRIBUTED TO MY HEAD UP AND LOCKED LACK OF AWARENESS. CONTRIBUTING TO THIS PRIMARY MISTAKE WERE THE CTLR'S QUESTIONABLE NEED TO ENGAGE IN THE ADMONITION IN THE FIRST PLACE. THE FO SHOULD HAVE REEXAMINED THE DEP PAGE SINCE MY THOUGHTLESS RESPONSE WAS A FAIRLY DIRECT CONTRADICTION OF OUR DEP BRIEFING.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.