Narrative:

Aircraft #1 was on a vector at FL310. Aircraft #2 was also a DC9, northbound descending to FL310. Aircraft #1 needed to be descended as he was wbound landing day, oh. Aircraft #1 was not on the route that the flight progress strip indicated and no incoming coordination from ZOB had been effected authorizing the aircraft's route. Additionally, aircraft #1 could not be descended due to traffic at FL290 with whom we were striving to establish communications. Aircraft #2 had to be descended to FL310 because of traffic at FL330. The situation was complex enough with traffic landing pit, landing cle, landing dtw, landing day, departing pit, departing cle, departing day, and over-flts to the washington metropolitan area, ord and phl. The aircraft at FL290, landing cle and not in communication, compounded the complexity. Aircraft #1 compounded the complexity even more by not being on the arrival route to day, oh, that he was supposed to be on. Several aircraft were vectored, climbed, and descended for separation. There was too much to do and too little frequency time. I got help. All conflicts were resolved in time except aircraft #1 and #2. The aircraft saw each other and took no evasive action. I failed to establish either 5 mi lateral or 2000 ft vertical separation due to time constraints, coordination requirements, and distrs from controllers in the aisle. Suggestions: 1) emphasize initial separation by manual controllers. 2) coordinate when an aircraft is on a non standard route. 3) eliminate controller distrs. 4) ask pilots to minimize frequency usage. 5) teach radar controllers to be more active in the use of the 'quick look' function for spacing purposes. Note: conflict alert did not activate until 36 seconds before aedp, however, it would have made no difference.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ARTCC RADAR CTLR DOES NOT RECOGNIZE A POTENTIAL CONFLICT BTWN 2 ACR ACFT UNTIL AFTER SEPARATION IS LOST.

Narrative: ACFT #1 WAS ON A VECTOR AT FL310. ACFT #2 WAS ALSO A DC9, NBOUND DSNDING TO FL310. ACFT #1 NEEDED TO BE DSNDED AS HE WAS WBOUND LNDG DAY, OH. ACFT #1 WAS NOT ON THE RTE THAT THE FLT PROGRESS STRIP INDICATED AND NO INCOMING COORD FROM ZOB HAD BEEN EFFECTED AUTHORIZING THE ACFT'S RTE. ADDITIONALLY, ACFT #1 COULD NOT BE DSNDED DUE TO TFC AT FL290 WITH WHOM WE WERE STRIVING TO ESTABLISH COMS. ACFT #2 HAD TO BE DSNDED TO FL310 BECAUSE OF TFC AT FL330. THE SIT WAS COMPLEX ENOUGH WITH TFC LNDG PIT, LNDG CLE, LNDG DTW, LNDG DAY, DEPARTING PIT, DEPARTING CLE, DEPARTING DAY, AND OVER-FLTS TO THE WASHINGTON METRO AREA, ORD AND PHL. THE ACFT AT FL290, LNDG CLE AND NOT IN COM, COMPOUNDED THE COMPLEXITY. ACFT #1 COMPOUNDED THE COMPLEXITY EVEN MORE BY NOT BEING ON THE ARR RTE TO DAY, OH, THAT HE WAS SUPPOSED TO BE ON. SEVERAL ACFT WERE VECTORED, CLBED, AND DSNDED FOR SEPARATION. THERE WAS TOO MUCH TO DO AND TOO LITTLE FREQ TIME. I GOT HELP. ALL CONFLICTS WERE RESOLVED IN TIME EXCEPT ACFT #1 AND #2. THE ACFT SAW EACH OTHER AND TOOK NO EVASIVE ACTION. I FAILED TO ESTABLISH EITHER 5 MI LATERAL OR 2000 FT VERT SEPARATION DUE TO TIME CONSTRAINTS, COORD REQUIREMENTS, AND DISTRS FROM CTLRS IN THE AISLE. SUGGESTIONS: 1) EMPHASIZE INITIAL SEPARATION BY MANUAL CTLRS. 2) COORDINATE WHEN AN ACFT IS ON A NON STANDARD RTE. 3) ELIMINATE CTLR DISTRS. 4) ASK PLTS TO MINIMIZE FREQ USAGE. 5) TEACH RADAR CTLRS TO BE MORE ACTIVE IN THE USE OF THE 'QUICK LOOK' FUNCTION FOR SPACING PURPOSES. NOTE: CONFLICT ALERT DID NOT ACTIVATE UNTIL 36 SECONDS BEFORE AEDP, HOWEVER, IT WOULD HAVE MADE NO DIFFERENCE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.