37000 Feet | Browse and search NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System |
|
Attributes | |
ACN | 340830 |
Time | |
Date | 199607 |
Day | Sun |
Local Time Of Day | 0601 To 1200 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | atc facility : sea |
State Reference | WA |
Altitude | msl bound lower : 37000 msl bound upper : 38400 |
Environment | |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | artcc : czvr |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | MD-11 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Navigation In Use | Other Other |
Flight Phase | cruise other |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain observation : company check pilot oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : atp |
ASRS Report | 340830 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain instruction : trainee |
Qualification | pilot : atp |
Events | |
Anomaly | altitude deviation : excursion from assigned altitude non adherence : clearance other anomaly other |
Independent Detector | aircraft equipment other aircraft equipment : unspecified other flight crewa |
Resolutory Action | flight crew : returned to intended course or assigned course flight crew : became reoriented |
Consequence | Other |
Supplementary | |
Primary Problem | Flight Crew Human Performance |
Air Traffic Incident | Pilot Deviation |
Narrative:
I had just returned to the cockpit to prepare for the descent into seattle. We were cruising at FL370. The FMS system was in the profile mode and we were just starting to load the STAR and approach. The captain that I was qualifying had his clipboard under the gcp and I pulled it out to remove the flight plan from it and I returned it to him. He put it back under the glareshield. I do not know whether it was his action or mine that accidentally rotated the altitude selector to a higher altitude. The fact that the FMS was in profile caused the aircraft to start a climb which neither of us noticed until we had climbed 1400 ft. I stopped the climb at that time and commenced a return to the assigned altitude. Profile was so smooth that detection of a climb went unnoticed. In the future, I will recommend to others that profile be used for climb and descent, but the 'bowtie' be used in cruise.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: AN ACR MD11 CREW ALLOWED THEIR ACFT TO CLB BECAUSE THEY LEFT THE FMC IN 'PROFILE' RATHER THAN IN ALT HOLD. ERROR ADMITTED. ALTDEV.
Narrative: I HAD JUST RETURNED TO THE COCKPIT TO PREPARE FOR THE DSCNT INTO SEATTLE. WE WERE CRUISING AT FL370. THE FMS SYS WAS IN THE PROFILE MODE AND WE WERE JUST STARTING TO LOAD THE STAR AND APCH. THE CAPT THAT I WAS QUALIFYING HAD HIS CLIPBOARD UNDER THE GCP AND I PULLED IT OUT TO REMOVE THE FLT PLAN FROM IT AND I RETURNED IT TO HIM. HE PUT IT BACK UNDER THE GLARESHIELD. I DO NOT KNOW WHETHER IT WAS HIS ACTION OR MINE THAT ACCIDENTALLY ROTATED THE ALT SELECTOR TO A HIGHER ALT. THE FACT THAT THE FMS WAS IN PROFILE CAUSED THE ACFT TO START A CLB WHICH NEITHER OF US NOTICED UNTIL WE HAD CLBED 1400 FT. I STOPPED THE CLB AT THAT TIME AND COMMENCED A RETURN TO THE ASSIGNED ALT. PROFILE WAS SO SMOOTH THAT DETECTION OF A CLB WENT UNNOTICED. IN THE FUTURE, I WILL RECOMMEND TO OTHERS THAT PROFILE BE USED FOR CLB AND DSCNT, BUT THE 'BOWTIE' BE USED IN CRUISE.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.