Narrative:

The aircraft was a modified turboprop beechcraft bonanza. I was acting as a safety pilot in the right seat required by the aircraft owner's insurance company. The owner was flying in the left pilot seat. The flight originated from fsd en route to 9v9 in VFR conditions under an IFR flight plan at 8000 ft MSL. The only failure of any instrument was the fuel temperature indication of the standard equipped fuel totalizer which has its probe located in the left wing and the flight proceeded normally to 9v9. Upon engine start at 9v9 I noticed a buzz over the bose intercom system with a repetitive frequency of approximately 1 second, all other aspects of the start, taxi, before takeoff checks appeared normal. The buzz over the intercom became less pronounced during takeoff and during flight. We were returning to fsd on a direct course at 11000 ft MSL under an IFR flight plan. We began a descent at pilot's discretion to 8000 ft MSL in excess of 1000 FPM approximately 30 NM from fsd and were switched over to fsd approach. Fsd approach gave instructions to descend to 4000 ft MSL and subsequently cleared us for a visual approach to runway 33. At 6000 ft MSL I noticed all annunciators including landing gear annunciators illuminate for 2 seconds and then extinguish except for the landing gear annunciators which indicated the landing gear was down and locked through it was not. I made a check of all circuit breakers and found none to be tripped. A second illumination of the annunciators occurred 15 seconds later with the same result. I then depressed the annunciators press-to-test button but none of the annunciators illuminated but I still had a gear down and locked indication. I then noticed I had no side tone in my headset and questioned the owner who responded by saying that he did not have a side tone and did not hear me over the intercom through his headsets. I then told the owner to call sioux falls approach as a test to determine whether the communications were working since the digital display of all communications, navigation, radar and fuel totalizer were functioning. But the owner then told me that the radios were not working after I questioned him again as to the status of his call to sioux falls approach. Immediately thereafter, black smoke erupted from between the bottom of the pilot and copilot seats at 4000 ft MSL. Instantaneously we were unable to breathe or see and I instructed the owner to turn the generator and battery switches off while I kept a loose grip on the controls due to his having a difficult time maintaining control of the aircraft. The owner was unable to shut the switches off so I then leaned over to do so myself. Due to the intense smoke in the cockpit, I opened the passenger door and the left seat storm window to ventilate the cabin which was contrary to what was called for in the emergency checklist. The owner then yelled to me that he had a fire but I saw none. Regardless, I attempted to reach the fire extinguisher located behind my seat but it was covered by books in addition to being out of my arm's length. I turned to our passenger and yelled to her to get the fire extinguisher. From my peripheral vision I noticed she had stopped removing objects between the seats and then I reached with my left arm while maintaining outside vigilance and unclipped the extinguisher from its mounting bracket. Pulled the extinguisher up and then released the door so as to use both hands to remove the locking pin on the extinguisher and handed it to the owner since I did not see any of the flames which were apparent to him. During this time I took the controls and maneuvered the aircraft direct towards runway 3. The flame and smoke subsided after the owner shot the extinguisher under his seat. The owner then took the controls of the plane and landed on runway 3 and intentionally veered the aircraft off the runway so as not to block it. This was contrary to my objections since it took additional time to evacuate/evacuation the aircraft. We then evacuate/evacuationed the aircraft and waited for emergency equipment to arrive. The cause was due to an electrical arc which caused a 7 MM hole in a fuel line under the pilot and copilot seats. Jet a fuel was then ignited due to the short circuit and subsequently began to burn under the seats, under the main spar and into the left wing fuel cell. I was a required crew member as dictated by the pilot's insurance company and had higher ratings and greater flight time, but the FAA had deemed that I was not the PIC which is contrary to how other FAA offices define a PIC. Usually the pilot with the highest rating and flight time is classified as PIC. This ambiguity should be remedied for future far violation and accident investigations of pilots so as to determine proper cause. During previous flts with this particular pilot I found my suggestions and instructions to following aircraft limitations and safety of flight issues ignored. I adamantly feel that if insurance companies dictate another pilot to be on board then both pilots should train together in limitations, normal and emergency procedures coupled with crew resource management. Secondly, the owner's inability to work as a team delayed many of the procedures that were used to meet this emergency since I had to continuously determine what he needed which made my job extremely difficult. Additionally, fuel system should not be allowed into the cabin and should be protected against internal electrical sources. The modification of this aircraft also allowed fuel lines to be in very close proximity to structural members of the aircraft and should be separated. I hold a bs in aerospace engineering with graduate work in addition to flight test experience and am a graduate of a test pilot school. Stricter regulations need to be created to prevent modified aircraft such as this one to be designed and built by people unable to accomplish true engineering design in areas such as structure analysis, fluid flow and safety which routinely require teams of engineers, proper engineering research and flight test. Additionally, fuel system should not be allowed into the cabin and should be protected against internal electrical sources.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: SAFETY PLT ON BEECH BONANZA MODIFIED TURBO ACFT HAS ELECTRICAL FAILURES AND FIRE ON BOARD. EMER APCH AND LNDG.

Narrative: THE ACFT WAS A MODIFIED TURBOPROP BEECHCRAFT BONANZA. I WAS ACTING AS A SAFETY PLT IN THE R SEAT REQUIRED BY THE ACFT OWNER'S INSURANCE COMPANY. THE OWNER WAS FLYING IN THE L PLT SEAT. THE FLT ORIGINATED FROM FSD ENRTE TO 9V9 IN VFR CONDITIONS UNDER AN IFR FLT PLAN AT 8000 FT MSL. THE ONLY FAILURE OF ANY INST WAS THE FUEL TEMP INDICATION OF THE STANDARD EQUIPPED FUEL TOTALIZER WHICH HAS ITS PROBE LOCATED IN THE L WING AND THE FLT PROCEEDED NORMALLY TO 9V9. UPON ENG START AT 9V9 I NOTICED A BUZZ OVER THE BOSE INTERCOM SYS WITH A REPETITIVE FREQ OF APPROX 1 SECOND, ALL OTHER ASPECTS OF THE START, TAXI, BEFORE TKOF CHKS APPEARED NORMAL. THE BUZZ OVER THE INTERCOM BECAME LESS PRONOUNCED DURING TKOF AND DURING FLT. WE WERE RETURNING TO FSD ON A DIRECT COURSE AT 11000 FT MSL UNDER AN IFR FLT PLAN. WE BEGAN A DSCNT AT PLT'S DISCRETION TO 8000 FT MSL IN EXCESS OF 1000 FPM APPROX 30 NM FROM FSD AND WERE SWITCHED OVER TO FSD APCH. FSD APCH GAVE INSTRUCTIONS TO DSND TO 4000 FT MSL AND SUBSEQUENTLY CLRED US FOR A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 33. AT 6000 FT MSL I NOTICED ALL ANNUNCIATORS INCLUDING LNDG GEAR ANNUNCIATORS ILLUMINATE FOR 2 SECONDS AND THEN EXTINGUISH EXCEPT FOR THE LNDG GEAR ANNUNCIATORS WHICH INDICATED THE LNDG GEAR WAS DOWN AND LOCKED THROUGH IT WAS NOT. I MADE A CHK OF ALL CIRCUIT BREAKERS AND FOUND NONE TO BE TRIPPED. A SECOND ILLUMINATION OF THE ANNUNCIATORS OCCURRED 15 SECONDS LATER WITH THE SAME RESULT. I THEN DEPRESSED THE ANNUNCIATORS PRESS-TO-TEST BUTTON BUT NONE OF THE ANNUNCIATORS ILLUMINATED BUT I STILL HAD A GEAR DOWN AND LOCKED INDICATION. I THEN NOTICED I HAD NO SIDE TONE IN MY HEADSET AND QUESTIONED THE OWNER WHO RESPONDED BY SAYING THAT HE DID NOT HAVE A SIDE TONE AND DID NOT HEAR ME OVER THE INTERCOM THROUGH HIS HEADSETS. I THEN TOLD THE OWNER TO CALL SIOUX FALLS APCH AS A TEST TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE COMS WERE WORKING SINCE THE DIGITAL DISPLAY OF ALL COMS, NAV, RADAR AND FUEL TOTALIZER WERE FUNCTIONING. BUT THE OWNER THEN TOLD ME THAT THE RADIOS WERE NOT WORKING AFTER I QUESTIONED HIM AGAIN AS TO THE STATUS OF HIS CALL TO SIOUX FALLS APCH. IMMEDIATELY THEREAFTER, BLACK SMOKE ERUPTED FROM BTWN THE BOTTOM OF THE PLT AND COPLT SEATS AT 4000 FT MSL. INSTANTANEOUSLY WE WERE UNABLE TO BREATHE OR SEE AND I INSTRUCTED THE OWNER TO TURN THE GENERATOR AND BATTERY SWITCHES OFF WHILE I KEPT A LOOSE GRIP ON THE CTLS DUE TO HIS HAVING A DIFFICULT TIME MAINTAINING CTL OF THE ACFT. THE OWNER WAS UNABLE TO SHUT THE SWITCHES OFF SO I THEN LEANED OVER TO DO SO MYSELF. DUE TO THE INTENSE SMOKE IN THE COCKPIT, I OPENED THE PAX DOOR AND THE L SEAT STORM WINDOW TO VENTILATE THE CABIN WHICH WAS CONTRARY TO WHAT WAS CALLED FOR IN THE EMER CHKLIST. THE OWNER THEN YELLED TO ME THAT HE HAD A FIRE BUT I SAW NONE. REGARDLESS, I ATTEMPTED TO REACH THE FIRE EXTINGUISHER LOCATED BEHIND MY SEAT BUT IT WAS COVERED BY BOOKS IN ADDITION TO BEING OUT OF MY ARM'S LENGTH. I TURNED TO OUR PAX AND YELLED TO HER TO GET THE FIRE EXTINGUISHER. FROM MY PERIPHERAL VISION I NOTICED SHE HAD STOPPED REMOVING OBJECTS BTWN THE SEATS AND THEN I REACHED WITH MY L ARM WHILE MAINTAINING OUTSIDE VIGILANCE AND UNCLIPPED THE EXTINGUISHER FROM ITS MOUNTING BRACKET. PULLED THE EXTINGUISHER UP AND THEN RELEASED THE DOOR SO AS TO USE BOTH HANDS TO REMOVE THE LOCKING PIN ON THE EXTINGUISHER AND HANDED IT TO THE OWNER SINCE I DID NOT SEE ANY OF THE FLAMES WHICH WERE APPARENT TO HIM. DURING THIS TIME I TOOK THE CTLS AND MANEUVERED THE ACFT DIRECT TOWARDS RWY 3. THE FLAME AND SMOKE SUBSIDED AFTER THE OWNER SHOT THE EXTINGUISHER UNDER HIS SEAT. THE OWNER THEN TOOK THE CTLS OF THE PLANE AND LANDED ON RWY 3 AND INTENTIONALLY VEERED THE ACFT OFF THE RWY SO AS NOT TO BLOCK IT. THIS WAS CONTRARY TO MY OBJECTIONS SINCE IT TOOK ADDITIONAL TIME TO EVAC THE ACFT. WE THEN EVACED THE ACFT AND WAITED FOR EMER EQUIP TO ARRIVE. THE CAUSE WAS DUE TO AN ELECTRICAL ARC WHICH CAUSED A 7 MM HOLE IN A FUEL LINE UNDER THE PLT AND COPLT SEATS. JET A FUEL WAS THEN IGNITED DUE TO THE SHORT CIRCUIT AND SUBSEQUENTLY BEGAN TO BURN UNDER THE SEATS, UNDER THE MAIN SPAR AND INTO THE L WING FUEL CELL. I WAS A REQUIRED CREW MEMBER AS DICTATED BY THE PLT'S INSURANCE COMPANY AND HAD HIGHER RATINGS AND GREATER FLT TIME, BUT THE FAA HAD DEEMED THAT I WAS NOT THE PIC WHICH IS CONTRARY TO HOW OTHER FAA OFFICES DEFINE A PIC. USUALLY THE PLT WITH THE HIGHEST RATING AND FLT TIME IS CLASSIFIED AS PIC. THIS AMBIGUITY SHOULD BE REMEDIED FOR FUTURE FAR VIOLATION AND ACCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS OF PLTS SO AS TO DETERMINE PROPER CAUSE. DURING PREVIOUS FLTS WITH THIS PARTICULAR PLT I FOUND MY SUGGESTIONS AND INSTRUCTIONS TO FOLLOWING ACFT LIMITATIONS AND SAFETY OF FLT ISSUES IGNORED. I ADAMANTLY FEEL THAT IF INSURANCE COMPANIES DICTATE ANOTHER PLT TO BE ON BOARD THEN BOTH PLTS SHOULD TRAIN TOGETHER IN LIMITATIONS, NORMAL AND EMER PROCS COUPLED WITH CREW RESOURCE MGMNT. SECONDLY, THE OWNER'S INABILITY TO WORK AS A TEAM DELAYED MANY OF THE PROCS THAT WERE USED TO MEET THIS EMER SINCE I HAD TO CONTINUOUSLY DETERMINE WHAT HE NEEDED WHICH MADE MY JOB EXTREMELY DIFFICULT. ADDITIONALLY, FUEL SYS SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED INTO THE CABIN AND SHOULD BE PROTECTED AGAINST INTERNAL ELECTRICAL SOURCES. THE MODIFICATION OF THIS ACFT ALSO ALLOWED FUEL LINES TO BE IN VERY CLOSE PROX TO STRUCTURAL MEMBERS OF THE ACFT AND SHOULD BE SEPARATED. I HOLD A BS IN AEROSPACE ENGINEERING WITH GRADUATE WORK IN ADDITION TO FLT TEST EXPERIENCE AND AM A GRADUATE OF A TEST PLT SCHOOL. STRICTER REGS NEED TO BE CREATED TO PREVENT MODIFIED ACFT SUCH AS THIS ONE TO BE DESIGNED AND BUILT BY PEOPLE UNABLE TO ACCOMPLISH TRUE ENGINEERING DESIGN IN AREAS SUCH AS STRUCTURE ANALYSIS, FLUID FLOW AND SAFETY WHICH ROUTINELY REQUIRE TEAMS OF ENGINEERS, PROPER ENGINEERING RESEARCH AND FLT TEST. ADDITIONALLY, FUEL SYS SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED INTO THE CABIN AND SHOULD BE PROTECTED AGAINST INTERNAL ELECTRICAL SOURCES.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.