Narrative:

At approximately AB44 Z time on aug/xx/96, our flight called eglin ground and advised them we were 'ready to taxi' and that we had received the current ATIS. The controller responded 'air carrier taxi to runway 19.' we proceeded out of the ramp area and taxied down taxiway H. It is necessary to cross runway 01/19 at the departure end of runway 19 in order to get to the approach end for takeoff. The captain and I proceeded to look down the 10000 ft- long runway for traffic upon reaching the intersection since it is ultimately our responsibility to 'avoid collision with other aircraft.' (aim 4-67b). After failing to see the traffic, we crossed the runway since we were given a 'taxi to' clearance without any hold short instructions. We were aware this type of clearance auths us to 'cross all runways which the taxi route intersects' (aim 4-67a.5). However, we were unaware that it did not authority/authorized us to cross the assigned runway at any point. These were the chain of events that led to the controller asking if we were aware we had crossed an active runway without a clearance. By questioning many of our colleagues, the captain and I found that the overwhelming majority of them would have acted in the same manner we did. This is the main reason we decided to file this report. We feel this situation can be avoided in the future. Although we believed that we were cleared to cross all runways, it is certainly never a bad idea to verify that clearance (especially if an active runway is involved). Another simple procedure would have been for the controller to issue a 'hold short' instruction during his initial taxi clearance. Upon mandatory readback of this instruction, we would have never thought twice about crossing the runway. As with many aviation occurrences, it seems that the communication process between 2 parties had broken down. The captain and I (and possibly others) were in the mindset that 'taxi to' only meant do not cross the active runway at the actual takeoff point. Even though the aim clearly states otherwise (making us in the wrong), we feel that something as important as a hold short clearance should be stated in as many words and not through reference to a small paragraph in the ATC section of the aim (4-67a.5).

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A MDT CROSSES AN ACTIVE RWY DURING TAXI OUT AT VPS, FL.

Narrative: AT APPROX AB44 Z TIME ON AUG/XX/96, OUR FLT CALLED EGLIN GND AND ADVISED THEM WE WERE 'READY TO TAXI' AND THAT WE HAD RECEIVED THE CURRENT ATIS. THE CTLR RESPONDED 'ACR TAXI TO RWY 19.' WE PROCEEDED OUT OF THE RAMP AREA AND TAXIED DOWN TXWY H. IT IS NECESSARY TO CROSS RWY 01/19 AT THE DEP END OF RWY 19 IN ORDER TO GET TO THE APCH END FOR TKOF. THE CAPT AND I PROCEEDED TO LOOK DOWN THE 10000 FT- LONG RWY FOR TFC UPON REACHING THE INTXN SINCE IT IS ULTIMATELY OUR RESPONSIBILITY TO 'AVOID COLLISION WITH OTHER ACFT.' (AIM 4-67B). AFTER FAILING TO SEE THE TFC, WE CROSSED THE RWY SINCE WE WERE GIVEN A 'TAXI TO' CLRNC WITHOUT ANY HOLD SHORT INSTRUCTIONS. WE WERE AWARE THIS TYPE OF CLRNC AUTHS US TO 'CROSS ALL RWYS WHICH THE TAXI RTE INTERSECTS' (AIM 4-67A.5). HOWEVER, WE WERE UNAWARE THAT IT DID NOT AUTH US TO CROSS THE ASSIGNED RWY AT ANY POINT. THESE WERE THE CHAIN OF EVENTS THAT LED TO THE CTLR ASKING IF WE WERE AWARE WE HAD CROSSED AN ACTIVE RWY WITHOUT A CLRNC. BY QUESTIONING MANY OF OUR COLLEAGUES, THE CAPT AND I FOUND THAT THE OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF THEM WOULD HAVE ACTED IN THE SAME MANNER WE DID. THIS IS THE MAIN REASON WE DECIDED TO FILE THIS RPT. WE FEEL THIS SIT CAN BE AVOIDED IN THE FUTURE. ALTHOUGH WE BELIEVED THAT WE WERE CLRED TO CROSS ALL RWYS, IT IS CERTAINLY NEVER A BAD IDEA TO VERIFY THAT CLRNC (ESPECIALLY IF AN ACTIVE RWY IS INVOLVED). ANOTHER SIMPLE PROC WOULD HAVE BEEN FOR THE CTLR TO ISSUE A 'HOLD SHORT' INSTRUCTION DURING HIS INITIAL TAXI CLRNC. UPON MANDATORY READBACK OF THIS INSTRUCTION, WE WOULD HAVE NEVER THOUGHT TWICE ABOUT XING THE RWY. AS WITH MANY AVIATION OCCURRENCES, IT SEEMS THAT THE COM PROCESS BTWN 2 PARTIES HAD BROKEN DOWN. THE CAPT AND I (AND POSSIBLY OTHERS) WERE IN THE MINDSET THAT 'TAXI TO' ONLY MEANT DO NOT CROSS THE ACTIVE RWY AT THE ACTUAL TKOF POINT. EVEN THOUGH THE AIM CLRLY STATES OTHERWISE (MAKING US IN THE WRONG), WE FEEL THAT SOMETHING AS IMPORTANT AS A HOLD SHORT CLRNC SHOULD BE STATED IN AS MANY WORDS AND NOT THROUGH REF TO A SMALL PARAGRAPH IN THE ATC SECTION OF THE AIM (4-67A.5).

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.