Narrative:

During a departure taxi to runway 27L at ord, we observed numerous departures on runway 22L and runway 27L. We had a taxi route: taxiway B - taxiway M2 - taxiway M - runway 27L -- about 20 mins taxi time. We had been on tower frequency 120.75 since taxiway M2-taxiway M transition. Finally we got 'cleared into position and hold,' followed immediately with 'cleared for takeoff, fly runway heading.' as I turned the aircraft onto the centerline and turned on the landing lights, I commented to the first officer that the centerline lights (cl) were out. As power came up (unevenly), I was focused on rclms and engine gauges with 90 degrees left crosswind at 12 KTS. During acceleration I became aware of 'something's missing!' I asked the first officer if he saw the runway edge lights, negative was the response. At this point it was safer to continue the takeoff than abort, and I did so. After the short flight to ind, I checked our company fom to verify that runway edge lights were required for night operations. We had a 'reverse lighting' (a la computer screen) with the airport lighting in close proximity to ord's runway 27L. I had, after the continue decision, thought about rclm and adequate forward visibility statements elsewhere in the fom. Chain of events, human performance considerations: 1) no statement by ground control or tower about lighting problems. 2) no ATIS alerts about lighting. 3) observations of numerous operations on runway 27L (I don't believe we were the only flight so affected). 4) long duty day: 13:27 scheduled but the inbound was late, therefore late departure, and the taxi delay. At takeoff we had been on duty 13:32 (XA55 check in, XB07 block arrival). In summary, #1-4 above set us up for violation of company policy and FARS. I'm sure tower cabs have alert system for inoperative airport components. Perhaps ord's system was OTS. If not, I wonder why no one issued an alert to inoperative lights. The first officer suggested that the lights may have been barely illuminated (partial ground?) but not triggering an alert in the cabin attendant. Another learning experience of aviation!

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MLG MAKES TKOF FROM ORD WITH RWY CTRLINE LIGHTS AND RWY EDGE LIGHTS OFF AT NIGHT.

Narrative: DURING A DEP TAXI TO RWY 27L AT ORD, WE OBSERVED NUMEROUS DEPS ON RWY 22L AND RWY 27L. WE HAD A TAXI RTE: TXWY B - TXWY M2 - TXWY M - RWY 27L -- ABOUT 20 MINS TAXI TIME. WE HAD BEEN ON TWR FREQ 120.75 SINCE TXWY M2-TXWY M TRANSITION. FINALLY WE GOT 'CLRED INTO POS AND HOLD,' FOLLOWED IMMEDIATELY WITH 'CLRED FOR TKOF, FLY RWY HDG.' AS I TURNED THE ACFT ONTO THE CTRLINE AND TURNED ON THE LNDG LIGHTS, I COMMENTED TO THE FO THAT THE CTRLINE LIGHTS (CL) WERE OUT. AS PWR CAME UP (UNEVENLY), I WAS FOCUSED ON RCLMS AND ENG GAUGES WITH 90 DEGS L XWIND AT 12 KTS. DURING ACCELERATION I BECAME AWARE OF 'SOMETHING'S MISSING!' I ASKED THE FO IF HE SAW THE RWY EDGE LIGHTS, NEGATIVE WAS THE RESPONSE. AT THIS POINT IT WAS SAFER TO CONTINUE THE TKOF THAN ABORT, AND I DID SO. AFTER THE SHORT FLT TO IND, I CHKED OUR COMPANY FOM TO VERIFY THAT RWY EDGE LIGHTS WERE REQUIRED FOR NIGHT OPS. WE HAD A 'REVERSE LIGHTING' (A LA COMPUTER SCREEN) WITH THE ARPT LIGHTING IN CLOSE PROX TO ORD'S RWY 27L. I HAD, AFTER THE CONTINUE DECISION, THOUGHT ABOUT RCLM AND ADEQUATE FORWARD VISIBILITY STATEMENTS ELSEWHERE IN THE FOM. CHAIN OF EVENTS, HUMAN PERFORMANCE CONSIDERATIONS: 1) NO STATEMENT BY GND CTL OR TWR ABOUT LIGHTING PROBS. 2) NO ATIS ALERTS ABOUT LIGHTING. 3) OBSERVATIONS OF NUMEROUS OPS ON RWY 27L (I DON'T BELIEVE WE WERE THE ONLY FLT SO AFFECTED). 4) LONG DUTY DAY: 13:27 SCHEDULED BUT THE INBOUND WAS LATE, THEREFORE LATE DEP, AND THE TAXI DELAY. AT TKOF WE HAD BEEN ON DUTY 13:32 (XA55 CHK IN, XB07 BLOCK ARR). IN SUMMARY, #1-4 ABOVE SET US UP FOR VIOLATION OF COMPANY POLICY AND FARS. I'M SURE TWR CABS HAVE ALERT SYS FOR INOP ARPT COMPONENTS. PERHAPS ORD'S SYS WAS OTS. IF NOT, I WONDER WHY NO ONE ISSUED AN ALERT TO INOP LIGHTS. THE FO SUGGESTED THAT THE LIGHTS MAY HAVE BEEN BARELY ILLUMINATED (PARTIAL GND?) BUT NOT TRIGGERING AN ALERT IN THE CAB. ANOTHER LEARNING EXPERIENCE OF AVIATION!

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.