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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 353454 |
Time | |
Date | 199611 |
Day | Wed |
Local Time Of Day | 1201 To 1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : hot |
State Reference | AR |
Altitude | agl bound lower : 100 agl bound upper : 100 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | IMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | tower : hot tower : chs |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | Commercial Fixed Wing |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | landing other |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : atp pilot : cfi |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 100 flight time total : 4600 flight time type : 3500 |
ASRS Report | 353454 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Qualification | pilot : atp |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 224 flight time total : 2688 flight time type : 812 |
ASRS Report | 353696 |
Events | |
Anomaly | non adherence : far non adherence : published procedure other anomaly other anomaly other |
Independent Detector | other flight crewa |
Resolutory Action | flight crew : regained aircraft control flight crew : returned to intended course or assigned course |
Consequence | Other |
Supplementary | |
Primary Problem | Flight Crew Human Performance |
Air Traffic Incident | Pilot Deviation |
Narrative:
From dfw to hot, the first officer was PF as we executed the ILS runway 5 approach at hot. At approximately 25 ft prior to decision ht, I announced 'I've got the runway.' per company training/procedures, the PF normally transitions from instruments to descend further in order to accomplish a normal visual landing. The first officer initiated the descent, however, he apparently did not hear my callout correctly and misinterpreted it as a request that he relinquish the controls to me. He replied back 'ok, you've got it.' at this time, I immediately responded 'no, no, you've got it.' during this exchange, the aircraft began a gradual drift to the right of the centerline. At this time, it became apparent to me that there was still confusion as to who would manipulate the controls for landing. As such, I took control of the aircraft and advanced the power levers to arrest our rate of descent. At this time the aircraft was positioned at the furthest right limits of the runway perimeter. The descent was stopped prior to ground contact and a small climb followed with simultaneous correction to the left toward the runway centerline. I then reduced power and accomplished a normal landing. I taxied the aircraft to the gate and completed a routine postflt with the first officer that did not reveal any abnormalities. A postflt discussion between myself and the first officer allowed us to evaluate the incident and to generate some solutions to prevent a similar event in the future. We agreed that phraseology was the primary factor which led to our miscom. Non descript terminology such as 'I've got it/you've got it' left open the possibility for misinterp as to whether or not the speaker was referring to the runway or the aircraft. We concluded that 'runway in sight' would clear up any confusion and that any xfer of controls should be confirmed by the initiating pilot calling out 'you've got the aircraft' and the receiving pilot responding, 'I've got the aircraft,' followed by a visual confirmation of the xfer.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: ACR SMT ON ILS RWY 5 HOT. WX 200 ONE HALF FOG. AT MINIMUMS CAPT, PNF, CALLED 'I'VE GOT THE RWY.' FO, PF, THOUGHT HE MEANT THE ACFT AND STOPPED FLYING. CAPT SAID NO, HE HAD THE RWY AND TOOK CTL OF THE ACFT DRIFTING TO THE L AND RECOVERED MAKING A NORMAL LNDG.
Narrative: FROM DFW TO HOT, THE FO WAS PF AS WE EXECUTED THE ILS RWY 5 APCH AT HOT. AT APPROX 25 FT PRIOR TO DECISION HT, I ANNOUNCED 'I'VE GOT THE RWY.' PER COMPANY TRAINING/PROCS, THE PF NORMALLY TRANSITIONS FROM INSTS TO DSND FURTHER IN ORDER TO ACCOMPLISH A NORMAL VISUAL LNDG. THE FO INITIATED THE DSCNT, HOWEVER, HE APPARENTLY DID NOT HEAR MY CALLOUT CORRECTLY AND MISINTERPRETED IT AS A REQUEST THAT HE RELINQUISH THE CTLS TO ME. HE REPLIED BACK 'OK, YOU'VE GOT IT.' AT THIS TIME, I IMMEDIATELY RESPONDED 'NO, NO, YOU'VE GOT IT.' DURING THIS EXCHANGE, THE ACFT BEGAN A GRADUAL DRIFT TO THE R OF THE CTRLINE. AT THIS TIME, IT BECAME APPARENT TO ME THAT THERE WAS STILL CONFUSION AS TO WHO WOULD MANIPULATE THE CTLS FOR LNDG. AS SUCH, I TOOK CTL OF THE ACFT AND ADVANCED THE PWR LEVERS TO ARREST OUR RATE OF DSCNT. AT THIS TIME THE ACFT WAS POSITIONED AT THE FURTHEST R LIMITS OF THE RWY PERIMETER. THE DSCNT WAS STOPPED PRIOR TO GND CONTACT AND A SMALL CLB FOLLOWED WITH SIMULTANEOUS CORRECTION TO THE L TOWARD THE RWY CTRLINE. I THEN REDUCED PWR AND ACCOMPLISHED A NORMAL LNDG. I TAXIED THE ACFT TO THE GATE AND COMPLETED A ROUTINE POSTFLT WITH THE FO THAT DID NOT REVEAL ANY ABNORMALITIES. A POSTFLT DISCUSSION BTWN MYSELF AND THE FO ALLOWED US TO EVALUATE THE INCIDENT AND TO GENERATE SOME SOLUTIONS TO PREVENT A SIMILAR EVENT IN THE FUTURE. WE AGREED THAT PHRASEOLOGY WAS THE PRIMARY FACTOR WHICH LED TO OUR MISCOM. NON DESCRIPT TERMINOLOGY SUCH AS 'I'VE GOT IT/YOU'VE GOT IT' LEFT OPEN THE POSSIBILITY FOR MISINTERP AS TO WHETHER OR NOT THE SPEAKER WAS REFERRING TO THE RWY OR THE ACFT. WE CONCLUDED THAT 'RWY IN SIGHT' WOULD CLR UP ANY CONFUSION AND THAT ANY XFER OF CTLS SHOULD BE CONFIRMED BY THE INITIATING PLT CALLING OUT 'YOU'VE GOT THE ACFT' AND THE RECEIVING PLT RESPONDING, 'I'VE GOT THE ACFT,' FOLLOWED BY A VISUAL CONFIRMATION OF THE XFER.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.