Narrative:

Flight dfw-fyv was over 30 mins past scheduled departure time when the passenger were boarded. Many of them were agitated due to being stranded at dfw many hours because of severe WX and below minimum landing WX at fyv. Aircraft was loaded to 29534 pounds, 234 pounds in excess of maximum ramp weight. The aircraft was also far aft of center of gravity limits. The load room was notified of the situation and the load agent insisted that her figures were correct and in limits and that I had made a mistake with my computations. During the ensuing discussion with the load agent there was mass confusion going on in the aircraft. Catering showed up late and a young new flight attendant was having a hard time dealing with an impending mutiny and irate passenger that were uncooperative in moving to new seats to balance the aircraft. After departing the gate and once all the confusion died down, I reinspected the load figures. I recalculated the manifest and came to the conclusion that we were most likely overweight. We stopped taxiing and contacted dispatch and explained the situation. Neither the dispatcher nor the lead dispatcher appeared to be familiar with the maximum taxi weight limitation of 29300 pounds and they indicated that I only had to burn off fuel to be below 29000 pounds for takeoff. I informed dispatch that there was the possibility that the aircraft might need to be inspected. Moc was finally contacted after much frequency congestion and equipment problems. After discussion, moc conceded that an inspection might be necessary. We returned to the gate where we were met by a mechanic and the ramp-load services manager. The ramp-load service manager reviewed the manifest figures at my invitation and confirmed the load weights and agreed that the act had been overloaded. He took appropriate action to correct the problem. The mechanic was consulted and he explained the only criteria that required a structural inspection was an overweight landing. I explained to him that great care was taken during taxi to not jostle the aircraft to prevent any possible damage. He signed off the aircraft for return to service. We recomputed our weights and verified that all requirements were met with dispatch and moc and we departed. My main concern throughout this ordeal was maintaining safety. Since no one was exactly sure about the possibility of unknown damage or other possible problems that might exist if the flight was allowed to takeoff and commence flight, I felt the best course of action was to return to the gate. Possible solutions to prevent future occurrence: flight deck crew: eliminate all distrs from outside the cockpit during load closeout. Dispatch-moc: all dispatchers and moc personnel should have a complete working knowledge of aircraft limitations, not just some obscure figure they once might have seen in a manual somewhere. Passenger service: provide support in the aircraft cabin to flight attendant with passenger loading and seating changes until the flight is completely closed out (especially when there have been delays and problems). There seems to be a recurring problem with agents 'dumping' angry passenger on airplanes and leaving as quickly as they can and not following through with their job responsibilities. Many passenger become angry because they are 'kept in the dark.' they have no knowledge of why they have been kept waiting for so many hours with a lot of excuses. Load agent: agent must have a firm knowledge of aircraft weight limitations before being assigned to work actual line operations. If a captain disagrees with the loading of his aircraft, there should be no argument. The issue should be promptly deferred to a supervisor for rectification.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: LTT TAXIED OVERWT FROM THE GATE. ACFT WAS RETURNED TO THE GATE TO RECTIFY THE PROB.

Narrative: FLT DFW-FYV WAS OVER 30 MINS PAST SCHEDULED DEP TIME WHEN THE PAX WERE BOARDED. MANY OF THEM WERE AGITATED DUE TO BEING STRANDED AT DFW MANY HRS BECAUSE OF SEVERE WX AND BELOW MINIMUM LNDG WX AT FYV. ACFT WAS LOADED TO 29534 LBS, 234 LBS IN EXCESS OF MAX RAMP WT. THE ACFT WAS ALSO FAR AFT OF CTR OF GRAVITY LIMITS. THE LOAD ROOM WAS NOTIFIED OF THE SIT AND THE LOAD AGENT INSISTED THAT HER FIGURES WERE CORRECT AND IN LIMITS AND THAT I HAD MADE A MISTAKE WITH MY COMPUTATIONS. DURING THE ENSUING DISCUSSION WITH THE LOAD AGENT THERE WAS MASS CONFUSION GOING ON IN THE ACFT. CATERING SHOWED UP LATE AND A YOUNG NEW FLT ATTENDANT WAS HAVING A HARD TIME DEALING WITH AN IMPENDING MUTINY AND IRATE PAX THAT WERE UNCOOPERATIVE IN MOVING TO NEW SEATS TO BAL THE ACFT. AFTER DEPARTING THE GATE AND ONCE ALL THE CONFUSION DIED DOWN, I REINSPECTED THE LOAD FIGURES. I RECALCULATED THE MANIFEST AND CAME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT WE WERE MOST LIKELY OVERWT. WE STOPPED TAXIING AND CONTACTED DISPATCH AND EXPLAINED THE SIT. NEITHER THE DISPATCHER NOR THE LEAD DISPATCHER APPEARED TO BE FAMILIAR WITH THE MAX TAXI WT LIMITATION OF 29300 LBS AND THEY INDICATED THAT I ONLY HAD TO BURN OFF FUEL TO BE BELOW 29000 LBS FOR TKOF. I INFORMED DISPATCH THAT THERE WAS THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE ACFT MIGHT NEED TO BE INSPECTED. MOC WAS FINALLY CONTACTED AFTER MUCH FREQ CONGESTION AND EQUIP PROBS. AFTER DISCUSSION, MOC CONCEDED THAT AN INSPECTION MIGHT BE NECESSARY. WE RETURNED TO THE GATE WHERE WE WERE MET BY A MECH AND THE RAMP-LOAD SVCS MGR. THE RAMP-LOAD SVC MGR REVIEWED THE MANIFEST FIGURES AT MY INVITATION AND CONFIRMED THE LOAD WTS AND AGREED THAT THE ACT HAD BEEN OVERLOADED. HE TOOK APPROPRIATE ACTION TO CORRECT THE PROB. THE MECH WAS CONSULTED AND HE EXPLAINED THE ONLY CRITERIA THAT REQUIRED A STRUCTURAL INSPECTION WAS AN OVERWT LNDG. I EXPLAINED TO HIM THAT GREAT CARE WAS TAKEN DURING TAXI TO NOT JOSTLE THE ACFT TO PREVENT ANY POSSIBLE DAMAGE. HE SIGNED OFF THE ACFT FOR RETURN TO SVC. WE RECOMPUTED OUR WTS AND VERIFIED THAT ALL REQUIREMENTS WERE MET WITH DISPATCH AND MOC AND WE DEPARTED. MY MAIN CONCERN THROUGHOUT THIS ORDEAL WAS MAINTAINING SAFETY. SINCE NO ONE WAS EXACTLY SURE ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF UNKNOWN DAMAGE OR OTHER POSSIBLE PROBS THAT MIGHT EXIST IF THE FLT WAS ALLOWED TO TKOF AND COMMENCE FLT, I FELT THE BEST COURSE OF ACTION WAS TO RETURN TO THE GATE. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO PREVENT FUTURE OCCURRENCE: FLT DECK CREW: ELIMINATE ALL DISTRS FROM OUTSIDE THE COCKPIT DURING LOAD CLOSEOUT. DISPATCH-MOC: ALL DISPATCHERS AND MOC PERSONNEL SHOULD HAVE A COMPLETE WORKING KNOWLEDGE OF ACFT LIMITATIONS, NOT JUST SOME OBSCURE FIGURE THEY ONCE MIGHT HAVE SEEN IN A MANUAL SOMEWHERE. PAX SVC: PROVIDE SUPPORT IN THE ACFT CABIN TO FLT ATTENDANT WITH PAX LOADING AND SEATING CHANGES UNTIL THE FLT IS COMPLETELY CLOSED OUT (ESPECIALLY WHEN THERE HAVE BEEN DELAYS AND PROBS). THERE SEEMS TO BE A RECURRING PROB WITH AGENTS 'DUMPING' ANGRY PAX ON AIRPLANES AND LEAVING AS QUICKLY AS THEY CAN AND NOT FOLLOWING THROUGH WITH THEIR JOB RESPONSIBILITIES. MANY PAX BECOME ANGRY BECAUSE THEY ARE 'KEPT IN THE DARK.' THEY HAVE NO KNOWLEDGE OF WHY THEY HAVE BEEN KEPT WAITING FOR SO MANY HRS WITH A LOT OF EXCUSES. LOAD AGENT: AGENT MUST HAVE A FIRM KNOWLEDGE OF ACFT WT LIMITATIONS BEFORE BEING ASSIGNED TO WORK ACTUAL LINE OPS. IF A CAPT DISAGREES WITH THE LOADING OF HIS ACFT, THERE SHOULD BE NO ARGUMENT. THE ISSUE SHOULD BE PROMPTLY DEFERRED TO A SUPVR FOR RECTIFICATION.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.