Narrative:

On a marginal day I was scheduled for some dual traffic pattern time with a flight instructor. The conditions were pre-cold front passage and were reported to be 500 ft scattered and 1500 ft overcast with numerous layers above. The wind was calm. After calling the tower to confirm the report and waiting for some of the scud to blow over, we departed. Immediately upon departing and turning crosswind, both the instructor and myself noticed that the lower layer to the east of the field was much thicker than 'scattered.' I immediately cut the power back on the climb out when we inadvertently entered IMC. We called the tower and notified that this would be a full-stop landing. We were quickly able to get ourselves back into VMC conditions. The tower called and asked if we were VMC because he did not have us in sight. At that time, however we were downwind and had both the tower and field in sight. We soon landed without event. After landing we made a report to the tower about the conditions being 700 ft scattered to broken on the east side of the field. I feel that both the instructor and myself should have taken the observed WX conditions with a grain of salt. WX conditions can be extremely localized as was the case on the east side of the runway. Thankfully, both the instructor and myself were instrument current at the time and were able to quickly remove ourselves from the IMC conditions. My desire to get the flying time in, as well as the instructor's relative inexperience were contributing factors. In a sense, I felt that he was relying on my judgement as PIC and my reliance on him as professional were potentially dangerous combinations.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: C182-RG DEPARTED ON VFR TRAINING FLT FOR TFC PATTERN WORK. WX RPT HAD INDICATED CEILING AT 1500 FT. ON DEP NOTED HVY CLOUD LAYER TO THE E OF THE FIELD AND ADVISED TWR THEY WERE RETURNING FOR A FULL STOP LNDG. ON LNDG ADVISED TWR WX WAS 700 FT SCATTERED TO BROKEN ON THE E SIDE OF THE FIELD.

Narrative: ON A MARGINAL DAY I WAS SCHEDULED FOR SOME DUAL TFC PATTERN TIME WITH A FLT INSTRUCTOR. THE CONDITIONS WERE PRE-COLD FRONT PASSAGE AND WERE RPTED TO BE 500 FT SCATTERED AND 1500 FT OVCST WITH NUMEROUS LAYERS ABOVE. THE WIND WAS CALM. AFTER CALLING THE TWR TO CONFIRM THE RPT AND WAITING FOR SOME OF THE SCUD TO BLOW OVER, WE DEPARTED. IMMEDIATELY UPON DEPARTING AND TURNING XWIND, BOTH THE INSTRUCTOR AND MYSELF NOTICED THAT THE LOWER LAYER TO THE E OF THE FIELD WAS MUCH THICKER THAN 'SCATTERED.' I IMMEDIATELY CUT THE PWR BACK ON THE CLB OUT WHEN WE INADVERTENTLY ENTERED IMC. WE CALLED THE TWR AND NOTIFIED THAT THIS WOULD BE A FULL-STOP LNDG. WE WERE QUICKLY ABLE TO GET OURSELVES BACK INTO VMC CONDITIONS. THE TWR CALLED AND ASKED IF WE WERE VMC BECAUSE HE DID NOT HAVE US IN SIGHT. AT THAT TIME, HOWEVER WE WERE DOWNWIND AND HAD BOTH THE TWR AND FIELD IN SIGHT. WE SOON LANDED WITHOUT EVENT. AFTER LNDG WE MADE A RPT TO THE TWR ABOUT THE CONDITIONS BEING 700 FT SCATTERED TO BROKEN ON THE E SIDE OF THE FIELD. I FEEL THAT BOTH THE INSTRUCTOR AND MYSELF SHOULD HAVE TAKEN THE OBSERVED WX CONDITIONS WITH A GRAIN OF SALT. WX CONDITIONS CAN BE EXTREMELY LOCALIZED AS WAS THE CASE ON THE E SIDE OF THE RWY. THANKFULLY, BOTH THE INSTRUCTOR AND MYSELF WERE INST CURRENT AT THE TIME AND WERE ABLE TO QUICKLY REMOVE OURSELVES FROM THE IMC CONDITIONS. MY DESIRE TO GET THE FLYING TIME IN, AS WELL AS THE INSTRUCTOR'S RELATIVE INEXPERIENCE WERE CONTRIBUTING FACTORS. IN A SENSE, I FELT THAT HE WAS RELYING ON MY JUDGEMENT AS PIC AND MY RELIANCE ON HIM AS PROFESSIONAL WERE POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS COMBINATIONS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.