Narrative:

Inbound to lax via civet arrival. Cleared for ILS runway 25L after arnes. WX clear, airport in sight from start of profile 50 mi away. Problems with following GS well known, briefed PF (copilot) about not following GS, recommended staying 1 DOT high until GS intercept altitude (published), briefed xchking charted minimum altitudes on approach plate once inside arnes. The first officer was new to the seat, fresh from training, chose to fly transition portion of runway 25L ILS as a non precision approach, meaning get to each altitude early and level off. I cautioned him several times about not getting too low, sure enough at hunda (lax 12.2) he flew below charted altitude -- I called his deviation at 100 ft low, he actually got to 300 ft low before I got him to climb back to proper altitude. Airport in sight at all times, safety of flight was never an issue. Note: there is a huge safety problem on this arrival where crew workload is required to be so high to avoid what appears to be an FAA harassment issue rather than genuine safety of flight. With the high frequency of civet/runway 25L arrs, either charting of the procedure needs to be changed or volume of the runway 25L GS needs to be changed to be useful from arnes into the airport. The situation as it exists is unsafe because of the extra workload and needs to be corrected by the airway and terps people. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter filed report mainly for immunity purposes, but, really has great apprehension overflying into lax. He is certain that they are watching all crossing altitudes very closely in order to catch the slightest deviation. The first officer was flying and the captain was coaching the first officer on how to fly the ILS runway 25L. First officer wanted to fly it as a non precision approach. As the aircraft stepped down for the crossing altitudes, it was tiring the PF. He eventually made the error of dropping low 300 ft on the hunda crossing. Aircraft was quickly and easily restored to proper altitude. Captain was apprehensive about the GS giving proper altitude protection. He was reassured that if he was flying 1 DOT high, it would be a good indication that no crossing altitudes were violated. Pilot also stated that, if the approach controller had made the statement, 'cleared for approach to ILS runway 25L, comply with all altitude restrs,' it would have alerted the whole flight crew to be conscious of being in compliance with any arrival restrs.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B727 DSNDS BELOW HUNDA INTXN DURING APCH TO ILS RWY 25L.

Narrative: INBOUND TO LAX VIA CIVET ARR. CLRED FOR ILS RWY 25L AFTER ARNES. WX CLR, ARPT IN SIGHT FROM START OF PROFILE 50 MI AWAY. PROBS WITH FOLLOWING GS WELL KNOWN, BRIEFED PF (COPLT) ABOUT NOT FOLLOWING GS, RECOMMENDED STAYING 1 DOT HIGH UNTIL GS INTERCEPT ALT (PUBLISHED), BRIEFED XCHKING CHARTED MINIMUM ALTS ON APCH PLATE ONCE INSIDE ARNES. THE FO WAS NEW TO THE SEAT, FRESH FROM TRAINING, CHOSE TO FLY TRANSITION PORTION OF RWY 25L ILS AS A NON PRECISION APCH, MEANING GET TO EACH ALT EARLY AND LEVEL OFF. I CAUTIONED HIM SEVERAL TIMES ABOUT NOT GETTING TOO LOW, SURE ENOUGH AT HUNDA (LAX 12.2) HE FLEW BELOW CHARTED ALT -- I CALLED HIS DEV AT 100 FT LOW, HE ACTUALLY GOT TO 300 FT LOW BEFORE I GOT HIM TO CLB BACK TO PROPER ALT. ARPT IN SIGHT AT ALL TIMES, SAFETY OF FLT WAS NEVER AN ISSUE. NOTE: THERE IS A HUGE SAFETY PROB ON THIS ARR WHERE CREW WORKLOAD IS REQUIRED TO BE SO HIGH TO AVOID WHAT APPEARS TO BE AN FAA HARASSMENT ISSUE RATHER THAN GENUINE SAFETY OF FLT. WITH THE HIGH FREQ OF CIVET/RWY 25L ARRS, EITHER CHARTING OF THE PROC NEEDS TO BE CHANGED OR VOLUME OF THE RWY 25L GS NEEDS TO BE CHANGED TO BE USEFUL FROM ARNES INTO THE ARPT. THE SIT AS IT EXISTS IS UNSAFE BECAUSE OF THE EXTRA WORKLOAD AND NEEDS TO BE CORRECTED BY THE AIRWAY AND TERPS PEOPLE. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR FILED RPT MAINLY FOR IMMUNITY PURPOSES, BUT, REALLY HAS GREAT APPREHENSION OVERFLYING INTO LAX. HE IS CERTAIN THAT THEY ARE WATCHING ALL XING ALTS VERY CLOSELY IN ORDER TO CATCH THE SLIGHTEST DEV. THE FO WAS FLYING AND THE CAPT WAS COACHING THE FO ON HOW TO FLY THE ILS RWY 25L. FO WANTED TO FLY IT AS A NON PRECISION APCH. AS THE ACFT STEPPED DOWN FOR THE XING ALTS, IT WAS TIRING THE PF. HE EVENTUALLY MADE THE ERROR OF DROPPING LOW 300 FT ON THE HUNDA XING. ACFT WAS QUICKLY AND EASILY RESTORED TO PROPER ALT. CAPT WAS APPREHENSIVE ABOUT THE GS GIVING PROPER ALT PROTECTION. HE WAS REASSURED THAT IF HE WAS FLYING 1 DOT HIGH, IT WOULD BE A GOOD INDICATION THAT NO XING ALTS WERE VIOLATED. PLT ALSO STATED THAT, IF THE APCH CTLR HAD MADE THE STATEMENT, 'CLRED FOR APCH TO ILS RWY 25L, COMPLY WITH ALL ALT RESTRS,' IT WOULD HAVE ALERTED THE WHOLE FLC TO BE CONSCIOUS OF BEING IN COMPLIANCE WITH ANY ARR RESTRS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.